

THE
DISTINCTION
BETWEEN
WORDS ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS.
IN THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
POINTED OUT,
AND THE PROPER CHOICE OF THEM
DETERMINED.

Useful to all who would either write or speak with
Propriety and Elegance.

By the Rev. Dr. JOHN TRUSLER.

THE SECOND EDITION,
WITH ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS.

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DICTIONARY

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

AND ITS DERIVATIVES

AND ITS SYNONYMS

OF THE



By JOHN R. SEAR

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T H E
P R E F A C E.

THE design of this volume is to point out the delicate difference between words reputed synonymous; that is to say, the distinguishing characteristics of such words, as resembling each other in their general idea, may nevertheless be distinguishable one from another by some additional one, peculiar to each of them.

In order to use words with propriety and elegance, there is a choice to be attended to. We must be a little nice upon words, not imagining that such as are called synonymous, are really so, that is, exactly uniform in their sense, and resemble each other as perfectly as two drops of water from the same spring: for, on a closer examination we shall see that this resemblance does not take in the whole extent and force of signification, but consists only in one principal idea which they all express; each word differing from the other by some relative

relative one, which constitutes its proper and particular character. That resemblance which conveys one general idea makes then the words synonymous; and the difference that arises from the particular idea that accompanies the general, makes them far from being perfectly alike, distinguishing them as various shades of the same colour.

I will not absolutely say that there are not occasions on which so nice a choice may be dispensed with; but I maintain that there are still more, where they ought not, or cannot pass one for another, especially in studied and elaborate compositions. I will allow it to be a matter of indifference, in choosing a yellow habit, whether we take the hue of the marigold or jonquil; but would we make an agreeable variety, it is necessary to consult the different shades or tints: how seldom then does it happen that the mind does not find itself in similar circumstances? Very rare indeed! as in that consists the whole art of writing.

Lest any one, under a false notion that the richness of a language consists in the plurality and abundance of words, should explode this system, relative to the distinction of those reputed synonymous, I must say, that though language is enriched by an abundance of words, yet that abundance is not merely numeral, but such as springs from diversity, like that which is observed in the various productions of nature. It is the satisfaction of the mind, and not the tickling of the ear, which is the object of all conversation and writing; for which reason the quantity of words is not so much to be esteemed as their quality. If they vary only from each other in their sounds, and not in their greater or less degrees of energy, comprehension, precision, &c. they, in my opinion, serve more

to burthen the memory, than enrich or facilitate the art of speech. To stand up for a number of words, without any regard to their sense, is confounding abundance with superfluity. Where is the great utility in having many terms to express one single idea? Is there not more advantage in having proper expressions for every idea we can form?

It will be in vain for Pleonasm to allege in its defence, that by this abundance we avoid the bad effects of repetition; for we are deceived with respect to the cause of that effect; it is not the repeating of the same sound that offends so much, as the repetition of the same idea. If the same word displeases when used a second time, it is not because it hath already struck the ear; but because it hath before affected the mind, which grows weary, and is disgusted without the graces of novelty. Hence came the establishment of certain words we call Pronouns, the repetition of which custom hath made familiar, having given them no other office than simply to recal the matter in question, without any redundancy of words. For the same reason, what we call Articles and Prepositions are equally repeated without disgust, nothing being expected from them but a bare nomination or indication; for having nothing to determine of themselves, they always appear new, when the subject they indicate is new. This is an undeniable proof that the beauty of words is more owing to their variety of meanings than to their different articulations, and that 'tis a multiplicity of ideas that produces in effect a multiplicity of terms. If any one yet doubts this, he has nothing to do but to examine them a little closer, and be a little nicer in his choice; or, without giving himself the trouble of such examination, let
him

him peruse only with attention the reflections here laid before him; for be the remarks either just or not, they will plainly shew that there are no words so perfectly synonymous as to signify exactly the same upon all occasions; consequently they admit of a particular nicety in choice. It is this choice the following sheets endeavour to determine, by definitions and examples which distinguish and disclose the proper character of these words, in which it is hoped they will in some measure succeed.

Some part of this work is a translation from the French of the Abbé Gerard, at least so much as would agree with our mode of expression; the rest the Reader will find to be new. Should any one imagine, because some words which are here classed as passing for synonymous, do not immediately strike the mind as such; that labouring at a distinction was unnecessary and useless; if he cannot recollect a passage where he has seen, or call to mind that he has at any time heard them indiscriminately used, let him cast his eye over the folio edition of Johnson's dictionary, and he will instantly discover that these endeavours, though perhaps inadequate to the task, have not been wholly fruitless; and, should the same error be remarked in the following pages which the tenor of the work condemns, it is hoped it will be attributed to the necessity of varying the expressions, in a treatise of this particular cast, in order to make them agreeable to the mind. There are, it must be confessed, many more words that might have been taken under consideration; but, on reflection, that a thorough reform, even in these at present taken notice of, will go a considerable way towards the improvement of our tongue, the work cannot but be thought of service; at least it may be.

P R E F A C E.

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be considered as the wanton fallies of a mind greatly zealous for the beauty of its native language.

Note.—This edition is improved, by expunging such distinctions between words, as on a more attentive examination appeared to the Author to be trifling, and by many respectable additions and amendments.


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THE
DISTINCTION

BETWEEN

WORDS esteemed SYNONYMOUS.



Sweat, Perspiration.

BY *sweat*, we mean sensible evaporation; by *perspiration*, insensible.

Sweat is not only offensive to the eye, but to the nose; whereas, *perspiration* is offensive to neither.

It requires a certain degree of exercise, or warmth, to make us *sweat*; whereas, we *perspire* naturally, as in our sleep. Indeed, *perspiration*, though not to be seen in general, will, at times, become visible; for the insensible vapour may be seen in condensed air. A person, for example, going down into an ice-house, smokes.

To Lie, Lay.

These words have certainly a very different meaning, and are seldom used one for another, but when connected with other words, so as to form phrases. To shew the impropriety of an indiscriminate use of them, it will be sufficient to point out the distinction in a few instances.

B

To

To *lie* by, implies, to remain still; to *lay* by, means, to reserve for some future time.

To *lie* down, implies, to rest or repose oneself; to *lay* down, means, to deposit, or to advance as a proposition.

To *lie* in, implies, to be in childbed; to *lay* in, means, to store.

To *lie* with, implies, to sleep with; to *lay* with, means, to bet with.

To *lie* under, implies, to be subject to; to *lay* under, means, to subject to.

Copper-plate, Cut, Print.

Each of these words denotes an impression taken off in ink, representing a picture; but *copper-plate*, implies, an impression from an engraving on copper; whereas, *cut*, implies, one from a cutting on wood.

Print is rather a general term, by which we understand an impression from either wood, copper, pewter, or any other metal.

Cuts are always worked off with the letter-press; but *copper-plates* require to be worked alone, and that in a rolling-press.

Prints are now become so fashionable in books, as to give great encouragement to many ingenious cutters in wood, so that, in a variety of figures, *cuts* are substituted in the room of *copper-plates*.

Picture, Painting.

A representation, to the eye, of any thing in nature, by light and shade; whether it be done by the brush, the needle, or any other instrument, is what we understand by a *picture*; whereas, the word *painting*, implies, such a representation drawn in colours, by a brush.

Many a pleasing *picture* has been produced, where *painting* has been nowhere concerned. We have *pictures* in needle-work; *pictures* in marble; *pictures* in

in tapestry, &c. and performed in so masterly a manner, as to resemble, and be little inferior to the finest *paintings*.

Bush, Tree.

There is certainly a manifest difference between the sense of these words, as they stand alone, and imply each a genus; but, when compounded with other words, which express a particular species, they are often used as synonymous.

Every one immediately sees, and makes a distinction between a *bush* and a *tree*; but, is the same distinction preserved, between a *gooseberry-bush* and a *gooseberry-tree*; a *currant-bush* and a *currant-tree*?

A *gooseberry-bush*, in my idea, implies, many stems from the same root; whereas, a *gooseberry-tree* rises from the ground in a single stem, and continues thus, a foot or more in height, before it branches out.

Battle, Engagement.

In the use of these words, *battle* seems to me to be best applied to a fight between two armies; *engagement*, to one between two fleets.

More men fall generally in a *battle*, than in an *engagement*; because a greater number are opposed to each other in the former, than in the latter, and the conflict usually continues longer.

Good-manners, Good-breeding.

Good-manners is the effect of civilization; *good-breeding*, of a polite education.

Good-breeding is of much larger extent than *good-manners*; it includes all the fashionable accomplishments; whereas, *good-manners* is confined to our conduct and address.

Good-breeding cannot be attained by the best understandings, but by study and labour; whereas, a

tolerable degree of reason will instruct us in every part of *good-manners*, without any other assistance.

Bower, Arbour.

These both imply shady places, under covert of trees, or branches interwoven; but a *bower* differs from an *arbour*, in that the latter is long and arched; whereas, a *bower* is either round or square at the bottom, and made with a sort of dome or cieling at the top.

Cathedral, Collegiate Church.

Both these terms imply, a place where choir-service is performed; but, by the word, *cathedral*, is understood the principal church of the diocese; whereas, by *collegiate church*, is meant, no more than a church where there is collected a number of clerks or clergymen, &c. living together in a body, and performing there choir-service.

All *cathedrals* have chapters belonging to them, and are found in most cities, and in all bishopricks. *Collegiate churches* are inferior to *cathedrals*, and are established elsewhere; as at Rippon, Yorkshire; St. George's Chapel, at Windsor, &c. All *collegiate churches* have not chapters.

Every *cathedral* has a *collegiate* body; but every *collegiate church* is not a *cathedral*.

The *cathedral* is the parish church of the whole diocese, which a *collegiate church* is not.

To Die, Expire.

To die, implies a quitting of this world; whereas, *to expire*, implies the last action of life.

"She died," says Rowe, "every day she lived."

The instant we *expire*, that very instant our doom is fixed; there is no repentance beyond the grave.

To

To die well, we should be so prepared, as to be able to *expire* without a groan.

Difference, Distinction.

Difference respects the senses; *distinction*, the understanding.

We see, we hear, we feel, we smell, we taste, a *difference*; but we perceive a *distinction*.

We say, a *difference* in sounds, in tastes, &c. but a *distinction* in ideas.

Courage, Bravery, Intrepidity, Valour, Prowess.

Each of these words implies, a readiness to meet danger; but *courage* a natural one, *bravery* being rather an acquired *courage*. *Intrepidity* seems to rise upon *bravery*, but carries with it an idea of rashness; whereas, *valour* denotes a combination of *courage* and *bravery*, a fearlessness, but with a degree of studied coolness. *Prowess* is best applied to military gallantry.

A man, though not naturally *courageous*, may, by a military education, and a nice sense of honour, acquire such a degree of *bravery*, as to perform feats of *valour*, which shall exceed all the *prowess* of the most daring *intrepidity*.

Courage, as a natural quality, is frequently applied to animals. We say, a horse of *courage*. *Bravery* may be the effect of example as well as education. Many a timid man has made a *brave* soldier; he has advanced mechanically, glowing with the martial spirit of his comrades, and has shewn a *prowess* equal to men of consummate *valour*.

We say, a *valiant* warrior, but an *intrepid* hero.

Courage leads us cheerfully on, and is impatient to attack. *Bravery* either banishes fear, or surmounts it. *Intrepidity* encounters the greatest perils, and dares even present death. True *valour* never despises the enemy, but executes its designs with coolness and

deliberation. *Proveſts* glories rather more in the achievements of its own arm, than in the combination of the force of numbers.

Custom, Habit.

Custom is a frequent repetition of the ſame act; *Habit*, the effect of ſuch repetition.

It is a good *cuſtom* to riſe at an early hour, being conducive to health, and, as in a little time, it will produce a *habit* of ſo doing; for if a man has been accuſtomed to wake at fix, he will always wake at that hour, whether he has ſlept long or not.

Custom, ſuppoſes an act of the will; *habit*, implies an involuntary act.

A good *cuſtom* ought never to be laid aſide; but as *habit* is a kind of ſecond nature, brought on by *cuſtom*, no bad *cuſtom* ſhould be indulged.

Custom is more applicable to many; *habit*, to an individual.

So prone are men to imitation, that they will frequently follow *cuſtom*, even in ridiculous things; faſhions are a proof of this.

If the mind pays particular attention to any impreſſion, its force and diſtinctneſs is increaſed. Hence ariſes the improvement of the ear, touch, &c. This from *habit*. A blind man, for example, will hear and feel better than another.

Entertaining, Diverting.

A thing may be *entertaining*, and yet not *diverting*.

That which *entertains* will amuſe; but that which *diverts*, will make us laugh.

Entertaining is moſt applicable to ſilent amuſement; *diverting*, to the reverſe.

An *entertaining* man is an exceeding good companion; but we ſhould take care not to be *diverting*, at the expence of our character or good ſenſe.

Sin,

Sin, Crime.

Sin may be in the thought or secret purpose of a man, of which neither a judge nor a witness can take notice; but a *crime* is such a *sin*, as consists in action against a law; of which action he can be tried by a judge, and convicted or cleared by witnesses.

Thus all *crimes* are *sins*, but not all *sins* *crimes*.

Giving alms to a strong sturdy beggar may be no *sin*, because, given with a principle of charity; but it may be a *crime*, if contrary to a statute law. Thus men may commit *crimes* through ignorance or error, and yet not *sin*.

Indeed, taken in the sense of Divine cognizance, every *sin* is a *crime* before God.

Wit, Humour.

Wit relates to the matter; *humour*, to the manner.

Our old comedies abound with *wit*, and the players of those times added considerably to the representation, by the great fund of *humour* they threw into the parts.

Humour, always excites laughter; *wit*, does not.

A fellow of *humour*, will set a whole company in a roar. There is a certain smartness in *wit*, that it cuts while it pleases.

Wit, always implies sense and abilities; *humour*, does not.

Humour is chiefly relished by the vulgar, whilst intellectual excellence is requisite to comprehend *wit*.

Occasion, Necessity.

Occasion, rather implies seasonableness, or something proper; whereas, by *necessity*, is understood indispensableness, or something obligatory.

There may be an *occasion* for certain things, when there is no *necessity*.

Occasion requires that we should put on mourning at the death of a father, though there is no *necessity* for our so doing.

Thus the word, *necessity*, infolds in its idea that of *occasion*; though the word, *occasion*, does not that of *necessity*.

Extravagance, Profuseness.

Both these words imply waste, but *profuseness*, a greater degree of it than *extravagance*.

Accustomed *extravagance* will, at last, lead a man on to *profuseness*.

Accent, Emphasis.

Accent is distinguished from *emphasis*, as the former regards the tone of the voice; the latter the strength of it.

There are three grammatical *accents* in common use, the acute, the grave, and the circumflex, on which the whole system of pronunciation turns; but as minutely as the *accents* of words have been studied, the *accents* of sentences seem to have been utterly overlooked.

The necessity of preserving propriety of *emphasis*, is so great, that the true meaning of words cannot be conveyed without it.

Maid, Virgin, Damsel.

The word, *virgin*, seems to rise upon that of *maid*; *maid* implying pure in deed; *virgin*, pure in thought, word, and deed.

The purity of the Holy *Virgin*, is an example worthy of being imitated by every *maid*.

Many a *virgin*, through an unhappiness of temper, and deformity of person, has died a *maid*.

Virgin,

Virgin, as an adjective, is used frequently in an allegorical sense, and implies, that which is in its first state, and perfectly unfulfilled; whereas, *maiden* is not. Thus we say, *virgin* thoughts, *virgin* snow, *virgin* honey.

Damsel means a young gentlewoman, and is applied to all *maids* of a superior class of people, it not being applicable to the lowest.

Residence, Dwelling

Residence implies more the situation; *dwelling*, the habitation.

We say, a pretty place of *residence*; but a homely *dwelling*.

Presumptuous, Presumptive.

These words have been used as synonymous; but with great inelegancy.

Presumptuous implies an arrogant confidence; *presumptive*, taken by previous supposition.

I would recommend, however, the word *presumptive*, to be used only in the sense supposed; as, the *presumptive* heir, in opposition to the heir apparent.

Memory, Remembrance, Recollection.

The soul is affected with sensations and ideas, the retention of which is *memory*.

We can frequently experience the same sensations and ideas which we have experienced before; the reproduction of these sensations and ideas, with a sense of their identity, is *remembrance*.

We can assemble, at will, a series of past ideas, and of past sensations; this faculty is termed, *recollection*.

Memory is a faculty purely passive, as sensibility; but the *remembrance* of particular sensations, or particular ideas, is not simply the perceiving our sensa-

tions present and past, but the knowing, that the sensation or idea which we actually experience, to be the same we had experienced before.

The *memory* has the faculty of retaining things which we have been once affected with; sensibility, those that do affect us: one is the index of things past, the other of things present: but it is the understanding only that has the power to perceive them, in those indexes of things past and present; and to consider, compare, and acknowledge them, if simply re-produced, or really new; in a word, it is the understanding only which has the sense of their identity.—Hence, we perceive, that *remembrance* is not a simple faculty, but the compound of *memory*, sensibility, and understanding.

In *recollection*, likewise, it is not the *memory* that traces past sensations, and past ideas in our minds: from the little we can attend to what is passing within us, during the succession of our thoughts, we may be convinced; that the understanding only (incessantly actuated with some sensation, with some idea,) passes from those with which it is actually affected, to the analogous sensations and ideas which have already affected it, and *recollects* in the mind, things past by analogy. Thus, when we chuse to *recollect* any sensations or ideas, we perceive them about to offer, when the mind runs over the nearest analogies.

Though this power, to render present in the mind the sensations and ideas treasured up in the *memory*, acts, sometimes, without an interposition; it is sometimes subject to the will. *Recollection* is not, therefore, a simple faculty, but the aggregate of many united. In *remembrance*, *memory* is combined with the understanding and the will, but without these sensations. It is thus that these different faculties produce *remembrance* and *recollection*.

Enthusiasm, Superstition.

Enthusiasm is a kind of excess in devotion; *superstition* is the excess, not only of devotion, but of religion in general.

An

An *enthusiast* in religion, is like an obstinate clown; a *superstitious* man, like an insipid courtier. *Enthusiasm* has something in it of madness; *superstition*, of folly.

Most of the sects that fall short of the Church of England, have in them strong tinctures of *enthusiasm*; as the Roman Catholic religion is one huge overgrown body of childish and idle *superstition*.

Nothing is so glorious in the eyes of mankind, and ornamental to human nature, setting aside the infinite advantages which arise from it, as a strong, steady, masculine piety; but *enthusiasm* and *superstition* are the weaknesses of human reason, that expose us to the scorn and derision of infidels, and sink us even below the beasts that perish.

To Improve, Amend.

To *improve*, supposes, or not denies, that the thing is well already; but to *amend*, implies something wrong.

We *improve* our virtues, but *amend* our faults.

Æra, Epoch.

In strictness of speech, *epoch* is that fixed point, where an *æra*, made use of, commences.

Thus, the 26th of February, 747, (abating 57 days) before the christian *æra*, may be said to be the *epoch* of the *æra* of Nabonassar. Within this *æra*, other *epochs* may be noted; as that of the death of Augustus; that of the death of Alexander, &c. but these cannot be properly called *epochs* of the *æra* of Nabonassar.

An *epoch*, is also a point fixed by chronologers; whereas, an *æra*, is a like point fixed by the popular usage of a country or nation. We say, the first *epoch* began with the creation; the second, with the deluge; &c. but we say, the Philippic *æra*; the *æra* of Martyrs or Dioclesian; the Persian *æra*, &c.

Fear, Terror, Consternation.

These words seem to rise upon each other. *Fear*, acts upon the mind; *terror*, upon the senses; *consternation*, upon the heart.

We *fear* things in imagination. Dreadful sights create *terror*. A combination of horrid circumstances will throw us often into the greatest *consternation*.

Landscape, Prospect.

The former is expressive of home scenes; the latter of more distant ones.

We say, a pretty *landscape*, but an extensive *prospect*.

A *landscape* should contain variety enough to form a picture upon canvas.

Prospects should take in the blue distant hills, but never those so remote as not to be distinguished from clouds, at a view. See *View, Prospect*.

Affection, Love.

Affection, is that attachment arising from natural ties, or from a continued course of friendship. *Love*, is that attachment between the sexes, implanted in us by our Creator, for mutual happiness in a conjugal state.

It is *affection* that unites a man to his child or his friend; but *love* that ties him to his wife.

Love attaches us solely to one person; but we may have an *affection* for many.

It is rare to find a first *love* followed by a second; and, I doubt, whether ever it can be said by a third; but *affection* is as frequent as attractions occur.

Discredit, Disgrace.

Disgrace rises upon *discredit*.

Discredit

Discredit lessens a man in the opinion of the world; *disgrace* ruins him.

That which turns out a *discredit* to a man, if continued in, will in the end *disgrace* him.

Essay, Dissertation, Treatise.

These words, like many others, seem to rise upon each other; an *essay*, being an attempt to amuse or instruct; *dissertation*, a more full and regular discourse on any subject; whereas, *treatise* implies both method, order, and system.

An imperfect indigested *essay*, is often better received than a prolix *dissertation*, and leaves a greater impression on the mind, than a philosophical or systematical *treatise*.

Haste, Hurry.

Both these denote speed; *haste*, however, carries with it an idea of care and method, whereas, *hurry* implies the reverse.

A man of sense may be in *haste*, but he is never in a *hurry*; convinced that *hurry* is the surest way to make him do what he undertakes ill.

To be in a *hurry*, is a proof that the business we embark in confuses us, and is too great for us; whereas, to be in *haste*, on particular occasions, bears no such implication; but is a mark of diligence.

School, Academy.

School, implies a place of discipline and instruction; *academy*, a place not intended to teach or profess any art or science, but to improve it; it is not for novices to be instructed in, but for those that are more knowing; for persons of distinguished abilities to confer in, and to communicate their lights and discoveries to each other, for their mutual benefit and improve-

improvement, as the royal *academy* in England, and those of many other nations.

Schools begin the education, *academies* finish it.

Boys, who learn to read with a tone, at *school*, seldom get the better of it, even when they are grown up. *Academies* are the nurseries of learned men.

Tempest, Storm, Hurricane.

By *tempest*, is understood a very violent wind; by *storm*, a commotion of the elements. *Hurricane* implies the utmost violence of the wind, is a *tempest* of but short continuance, and is rather partial, running through a district in certain directions.

Tempests are more dreadful at sea than *storms*. *Hurricanes* are generally more destructive than either *storms* or *tempests*.

We use the word *storm*, to denote any violence of weather; but then, in order to determine what weather we mean, we are under a necessity of adding such other words to it, as shall express the idea we want to convey. Thus, we say, a *storm* of wind; a *storm* of hail, &c. but the word *tempest*, is understood to be neither more nor less than, as was said before, a very violent wind: should this excess of wind be attended with rain, thunder, and lightning, it then becomes a *storm*. A *hurricane*, while it lasts, tears every thing before it.

The word, *tempest*, is used with most elegance, when we are talking of the sea; *storm*, and *hurricane*, when we are speaking of the land.

Words cannot describe the distresses of seamen, when out in *tempestuous* weather. *Stormy* weather, is generally succeeded by serene; but *hurricanes* are of such a nature, as to sweep every thing from the face of the earth, in their way.

Mirth, Cheerfulness.

Mirth I consider as an act of the mind, *cheerfulness*, as a habit.

Mirth,

Mirth is short and transient; *cheerfulness*, fixed and permanent.

Those are often raised into the greatest transports of *mirth*, who are subject to the greatest depressions of melancholy; whereas *cheerfulness*, though it does not give the mind such an exquisite gladness, prevents us from falling into any depths of sorrow.

Mirth is like a flash of lightning that breaks through a gloom of clouds, and glitters for a moment; *cheerfulness*, keeps up a kind of day-light in the mind, and fills it with a steady and perpetual serenity.

Assurance, Impudence.

Assurance is the faculty of possessing a man's self, or of saying and doing indifferent things, without any uneasiness or emotion of mind; whereas *impudence* is shamelessness or want of modesty.

Assurance will make a man respectful; *impudence* makes him insolent.

It is a moderate knowledge of the world, and a mind determined to do nothing against the rules of honour and decency, that gives *assurance*; but an *impudent* follow is not only ignorant of life, but lost to all sense of honour and virtue.

What we endeavour to express, when we say a modest *assurance*, is the just mean between bashfulness and *impudence*.

Forest, Chace, Park,

Are all habitations for animals of venary; but none are accounted *parks*, but such as are from royal grant.

Forests and *chases* lay open, *parks* are enclosed.

The *forest* is the most noble of all, being a franchise, and is the property of the king; if he transfer one to a subject, it becomes a *free-chace*.

If any offend in a *park* or *chace*, which are private property, he is punishable by the common law; but a *forest* hath laws of its own, and certain officers belonging to it, as foresters, verderers, regards, agisters,

ters, &c. whereas, a *chace* or *park* hath only keepers and woodwards.

They differ something also in the species of beasts that inhabit them. The hart, the hind, the boar, the wolf, are *forest* beasts; whereas, the buck, the doe, the fox, and the hare, are animals belonging to a *chace* or *park*.

One of our kings thought proper to destroy a number of parishes, in Hampshire, in order to make a *forest*.

Tax, Rate, Assessment.

Taxes are government imposts, as, the *land-tax*, *window-tax*, *wheel-tax*, &c. *Rates*, are parish charges, as, the *church-rate*, *poor's-rate*, &c. *Assessments*, imply chiefly, the sums appointed by assessors to be paid, whether they be *rates* or *taxes*.

Assessments may be considered as the genus; *rates* and *taxes* as certain species of that genus: thus, every *rate* and every *tax* is an *assessment*; but *assessment* may partake of both, or either.

Assessors, in making out their *assessments*, should be just and equitable, and not bear harder upon one inhabitant than another.

The *assessors* of the *land-tax*, are generally men of property in the county: those of the church and *poor-rates*, are the churchwardens and overseers of parishes.

Understanding, Intelligence, Knowledge.

These three words seem to point out the extent of intellectual abilities. *Understanding*, implies the lowest degree, *intelligence*, a degree above, and *knowledge*, the superlative.

Every man is endowed with *understanding*, but it requires reading and an acquaintance with the world, to become a man of *intelligence*.

Knowledge is not to be acquired but with the study of years.

We say, a man of tolerable *understanding*; of great *intelligence*; of extensive and consummate *knowledge*.

In a higher sense, *understanding* may be applied to man, *intelligence* to angels, but *knowledge* is the attribute of God.

The Creator, in his universal *knowledge*, made the world, and filled it with various orders of beings; he formed a number of *intelligent* spirits that surround his throne and inhabit the vast expanse; but man he seated on this pensile globe, with a variety of animals destined for his use, and gave him an *understanding* capable of enjoying them.

Testament, Will.

Both of these words relate to the disposal of a man's property at his death; but *testament* is limited to goods and chattels, requiring executors; whereas, *will* is confined to land, and requires no executor.

Every *testament*, indeed, is a *will*; but every *will* is not a *testament*.

An infant, at the age of fourteen, may make a *testament* of personal property, but cannot make a *will* of real property. See to *Devise*, &c. below.

To Devise, Bequeath.

These verbs equally denote giving at the end of life; but *devise*, seems properly applicable to land; *bequeath*, to goods.

Indeed, whether a man dispose of his property after his death, by the words *devise* or *bequeath*, is of little consequence, so long as the testator's intention evidently appears; but he that would use them with propriety, while living, will make the above distinction.

Where a man has nothing but personal property to *bequeath*, his testament requires to be signed only by two witnesses; but if he *devises* an estate, it is necessary that his *will* should be signed by three.

Men *bequeath* legacies as tokens of friendship, but they seldom *devise* property but to relations.

Bishoprick,

Bishoprick, Diocese.

The sense in which I would consider these words, is that extent of country over which a bishop hath episcopal jurisdiction; but *bishoprick*, implies greater extent than that of *diocese*; for *bishoprick* may extend into the *diocese* of another bishop, on account of a peculiar jurisdiction which the bishop of one *diocese* may have in that of another.

The archbishop of Canterbury hath more than one hundred peculiars or churches in the several *dioceses* of London, Winchester, Rochester, Norwich, Lincoln, Oxford, and Chichester, where he exercises episcopal jurisdiction; of course, his *bishoprick* extends into those *dioceses*.

To Depose, Deprive.

Deposition, takes away an office from a man; *deprivation*, only takes from him the exercise of that office.

As in the case of a bishop. To *depose* him, would be to degrade him from his order; but to *deprive* him, is merely to take from him the exercise of that order in such a particular diocese, leaving him still a bishop as he was before: in short, it only vacates his promotion.

The consecration of a bishop gives so indelible a character, that should it so happen, that for some just cause he should be *deprived* from his see, or suspended both from the execution of his spiritual jurisdiction, and the profits of his bishoprick, yet he would still retain the title of a bishop, as he cannot be *deposed*, that is, the order cannot be absolutely taken from him.

So, with respect to a crowned head. To *depose* a monarch, is to un-king him; but to *deprive* him of his crown, is merely to vacate the throne, and take from him the exercise of his regal authority.

During the commonwealth, king Charles was *deprived* of his crown, though he was not *deposed*, he being

being virtually king of England, from the instant of his father's death. James II. also, was not *deposed*, but *deprived*; and under this idea, kept his title, and was acknowledged by foreign powers as king of England while he lived.

Appropriation, Impropriation.

These words equally denote a division of the great tithes of a parish from the small, in favour of some other person or persons, distinct from him who performs the clerical duty of the church; but it is properly called an *appropriation*, when such tithes are in the hands of a bishop, a college, or religious house; *impropriation*, when (as Blackstone says) they are *improperly* in the hands of a layman.

The art of *appropriation* was certainly invented by monastic men, as a curb and weight upon the secular clergy, and took place before the conquest; but the precise time when it began, is uncertain. It is, however, well known, that *impropriation* originated on the suppression of the monasteries, when Henry VIII. disposed of the great tithes among his favourites. Hence they came into lay hands.

Animal, Brute, Beast.

Animal, implies every living creature, and is the genus; *brute* and *beast*, are species of that genus.

Brutes and *beasts* are *animals* distinguished from birds, insects, fishes, and man; but *brutes*, imply rather domestic *animals*; *beasts*, such as are wild.

We say, the *brutes* of the field, the *beasts* of the forest.

Man is an *animal* endowed with reason, given him for the purposes of society; if he uses it not, he puts himself on a level with *brutes*, and may in time become as savage as a *beast* of prey.

Existence,

Existence, Duration.

Existence implies being; *duration*, the continuance of that being, or, in other words, *existence* is the time or term of production; *duration*, the time of preservation. Whatever gives birth gives *existence*; whatever preserves that *existence* gives it *duration*: thus, *duration* follows the *existence* of a thing, as necessarily as *existence* follows essence.

A studious man will give *existence* to a variety of ideas, which shall have little or no *duration*, but shall be dropped almost as soon as taken up.

We owe our *existence* to God, and our *duration* on earth to his favour only.

If these words are ever used to express the same sense, it will be best to apply the word *existence* to animate beings, *duration* to inanimate.

It requires care to preserve our *existence*, without it, we should expire almost as soon as we begin to breathe.—Stone buildings are of longer *duration* than such as are built of brick.

Clearly, Distinctly.

It is with respect to vision that I would make my observations on these words, which are very generally confounded by writers on optics.

We see an object *clearly*, whenever it is sufficiently illuminated to enable us to form a general idea of its figure; but we see it not *distinctly*, till it be so near that we can recognize all its parts. When we view a distant tower, we see it *clearly*, as soon as we perceive it to be a tower; but we see it not *distinctly*, till we approach it so near as to be able to determine, not only its general dimensions, but to distinguish the parts of which it is composed, as the order of architecture, the materials, the windows, &c. we may, therefore, see an object *clearly*, without seeing it *distinctly*; and we may see it *distinctly*, without seeing it *clearly*; because, a *distinct* vision implies a successive examination of the different parts of objects.

Old men see *clearly*, but not *distinctly*: they perceive large or luminous objects at a distance, but they are unable to distinguish small objects, as the characters of a book, without their being magnified by convex glasses. Short-sighted persons, on the contrary, see small objects *distinctly*; but they have no *clear* vision of large objects, unless they are diminished by concave glasses.

A great quantity of light is necessary for *clear* vision, and a small quantity for *distinct* vision. Hence, short-sighted people see better in the night than other men.

To *Abandon*, *Forsake*, *Leave*, *Relinquish*, *Desert*,
Quit.

The words *abandon* and *leave*, imply involuntary acts; the words *forsake*, *relinquish*, and *desert*, those that are voluntary.

To *abandon*, is more applicable to things; *leave*, to persons. He was under a necessity of *abandoning* his possessions, and compelled to *leave* his friends.

To *forsake*, implies leaving in resentment or dislike; to *relinquish*, quitting any claim to; to *desert*, leaving meanly or treacherously.

Being treated with disrespect, we are apt to *forsake* even the person whose cause we were studious to espouse. Every honest man, finding his plea not backed by justice, would readily *relinquish* his claim, and even make his competitor a recompence, adequate to the expence and trouble he had put him to. It is an act of the greatest baseness, to *desert* one's friend in time of distress.

To *quit*, implies the breaking off from; and may be either voluntary or involuntary.

When he had acquired, by trade, sufficient to support himself for the remainder of his life, he prudently *quitted* his business. Being overpowered by superior strength, he was obliged to *quit* his hold.

We should by no means *abandon*, while we can keep possession; nor *leave*, while we are able to stay; we should not *forsake*, without sufficient reason; nor
are

are we bound to *relinquish*, but when our title is bad; no colour of excuse can be alledged for *desertion*; nor should we ever *quit*, with a view of laying hold again.

To *Abdicate, Renounce, Resign.*

To *abdicate*, is an involuntary act; *renounce* and *resign*, are voluntary.

Abdicate, more particularly relates to a throne; *renounce*, to matters of religion; *resign*, to employments.

King James the second *abdicated* the throne of England, when he could keep possession of it no longer. Many persons, through conviction of mind, have formerly *renounced* the errors of the church of Rome. We frequently *resign* our employments, through a desire of retirement.

To *abdicate* a crown, is ever looked upon as disgraceful; to *renounce* a religion, as honourable, when done through the prevalence of truth; and to *resign* an office, as noble, when generously given up in favour of another, and with the approbation of the person we serve.

To *Abate, Diminish, Decrease, Lessen.*

These words are nearly synonymous, when they are verbs neuter; they then mean to grow less: as verbs active, they are very different. Even as neuters, they will carry some difference in their meaning.

To *abate*, implies a decrease in action; *diminish*, a waste in substance; *decrease*, a decay in moral virtue; *lessen*, a contraction of parts.

Want of spirits, when a man is running, will *abate* his ardour, and consequently his pace. Febrifuges, if properly applied, will *abate* a fever. Put sugar into water, and it will *diminish* visibly. An object, seemingly

seemingly *diminishes* in proportion to the distance from which we view it.

Through a contempt of religion, men daily *decrease* in virtue. A *decrease* in piety, is usually accompanied with false notions of God. Draw the air from a blown-up bladder, and it *lessens* proportionably.

As verbs active; to *abate*, more particularly implies to lower in the price of; *diminish*, to make less by abscision or destruction, either with respect to bulk, value, quality, or quantity; *lessen*, to a voluntary act of degradation.

Shop-keepers generally ask their customers an advanced price for goods, that they may be enabled to *abate*, if desired.

By dividing of substance, we *diminish* its bulk; by breaking a diamond, we *diminish* its value; by mixing water with spirits, we *diminish* the quality; and by taking one yard from ten, we *diminish* the quantity.

A mean action always *lessens* us in the sight of good men; and whatever false notions vanity may inculcate, we ever seem *less*, when we strive to appear greater.

To *Abhor*, *Hate*, *Loath*, *Detest*.

All these words imply aversion, but require to be differently used upon different occasions.

To *abhor*, implies an aversion to that to which we have a natural antipathy; *bate*, an aversion, actuated by revenge: *loath*, is more applicable to food: *detest*, implies aversion, actuated by disapprobation.

We *abhor* what we cannot endure. We are apt to *bate* the person who injures us. We *loath* the food by which we have been surfeited. We *detest* the man who is guilty of a mean action.

The spendthrift naturally *abhors* niggardliness, and the niggard, profligacy. The *hatred* of the revengeful man is roused, whenever the object of his revenge

revenge approaches. The stomach *loaths* the very sight of that meat by which we have been satiated. Every thinking man *detests* the least degree of meanness, more particularly that which is sordid or base.

Abject, Low, Mean, Beggarly.

As the words *abject* and *low* are indiscriminately used, when meant to signify a person's state or condition, so are the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when we would express the disposition; but the impropriety of so doing is very evident.

By *abject*, is understood that forlorn situation in life, that a man brings himself into by ill conduct; by *low*, that in which Providence has placed him: the first is voluntary, the latter involuntary.

Divine Wisdom hath thought proper, for many reasons, to make distinctions between men, placing some in a higher sphere, others in a *lower*; but never was he the cause of any one's *abjectness*. Want of merit or fortune, often renders a man *low*; but it must be a villanous character to make him *abject*.

With respect to the words *mean* and *beggarly*, when meant to express the disposition, the absurdity of using them, one for the other, is equally visible.

Mean, signifies a man's readiness to perform a dirty or illicit action; whereas *beggarly*, is more particularly expressive of a narrow groveling spirit.

He who can stoop to be guilty of a *meanness*, merits the contempt of all who know him. It has ever been accounted *beggarly*, to live below the rank of life we are in.

When a man is brought into a state of penury and contempt, by a long course of infamy, we justly call him *abject*; if his narrow circumstances are only owing to the poverty of his parents, we then repute him *low*; when guilty of any thing beneath the character of an honest man, or a gentleman, we account him *mean*; and, when the treasures of the rich are sullied by the narrow notions of the poor, we call it *beggarly*.

To *Abolish*, *Abrogate*, *Disannul*, *Repeal*, *Revoke*.

Abolish, is a term rather to be used with respect to customs; *abrogate* and *repeal*, with regard to laws; *disannul* and *revoke*, to private contracts.

When old customs have been, by long experience, found to be detrimental, they have very prudently been *abolished*. New fashions *abolish* old ones.

The word, *abrogate*, is generally used with respect to ancient laws; *repeal*, to modern: that is, when we talk of rendering old laws null, we call it *abrogating*; when those lately made, *repealing*.

Despotic power has frequently *abrogated* what was instituted by equity. Upon the enactment of a new law, many inconveniences have sometimes appeared, before unthought of; this has occasioned a *repeal*.

The *abrogation* of a fundamental law, frequently causes the ruin of the sovereign, or of the people; and sometimes of both. The legislative power has often found itself obliged to *repeal* an act of parliament, one session, which passed the last, merely to appease the clamours of the people.

The difference in meaning, between the words, *disannul* and *revoke*, is not very great; yet such as to admit of a distinction.

Disannul is applied to a written contract; *revoke*, to a verbal.

He who gives a conditional bond to another, has a right to *disannul* it, if the specified conditions are not punctually observed. To *revoke* a promise, now a-days, is no other than fashionable; whereas, formerly, it was considered as a breach of friendship.

To *Finish*, *Complete*, *End*, *Conclude*.

With respect to the first three words, the proper idea of *finishing* is the bringing a thing to its last period: the *completion* of any thing, is the actual arrival of that last period; and the characteristic of *ending*, is cessation or discontinuation.

Lazy people begin many things without *finishing* any. We ever feel a secret satisfaction in the *completion* of a work we have been long about. May we not question the wisdom of those laws, which, instead of *ending* suits, do but serve to prolong them?

By the word *conclude* we understand, performing the last act of ratiocination; widely differing from *complete*. We *complete* a piece of mechanism, but *conclude* an oration.

A piece of clockwork is of little value till *completed*. It is allowed by all rhetoricians, that the greatest ornament of an harangue, is a well finished *conclusion*.

We *finish* what we have begun, by continuing to work at it. We *complete* a work, by putting the last hand to it. We *end* it, by discontinuation. Thus we may *finish* without *ending*, and *end* without *completing*.

On, Upon.

These two words are indiscriminately used one for another on all occasions, but with great impropriety.

On, rather signifies by; as, *on* my word; *on* my honour, &c. whereas, *upon* means up, on the top of, and is applied to matter; as, *upon* the table; *upon* the chair; *upon* the house, &c.

The absurdity of a contrary diction is evident, from the following change of words: it was his honour *upon* which he swore.

Indeed, the word, *upon*, is used with elegance, even detached from substance, when the sense is figurative; as for instance, he relied *upon* the promise of his friend; intimating, that such promise was the staff *upon* which he leaned: but on other occasions, the impropriety is gross.

Action, Act, Deed.

As custom has applied the word, *deed*, chiefly to signify the written evidence of any legal act, it will be

be necessary only to shew the difference between the words *action* and *act*.

The word *action* then, is applicable indifferently to every thing we do, whether common or extraordinary; but the word, *act*, should signify something done, which is remarkable.

An elegant speaker will not say, a *virtuous act*, a *good* or a *vicious act*; but an *act of virtue*, or of *goodness*, or of *iniquity*: whereas, to say, a *virtuous action*, or a *good* or *vicious action*, is proper and elegant.

'Tis, generally speaking, a good *action* to conceal the faults of our neighbours; and it is the rarest *act* of charity among mankind.

The sentiments of the heart are not so much to be judged of from words as from *actions*. It is an *act* of great heroism to pardon our enemies, when we have power to be revenged on them.

These two words are further distinguishable by our considering them somewhat physically. The word *action*, in this light, relates more to the power that acts; and the word *act* is more applicable to the effect itself, produced by that power; this makes the one, probably, the attribute of the other: so that it may be justly said, we should always have a presence of mind attendant upon our *actions*, to render all of them, either *acts* of bounty, or *acts* of justice.

To Enlarge, Increase.

The word *enlarge* is properly used to signify an addition of extent. *Increase* is critically applicable, only to number, height and quantity.

We *enlarge* a town, a field, a garden. We *increase* the inhabitants of a town, our expences, our revenues.

The former word is more suitable to one entire and vast quantity of space; the latter, to any gross and multiplied quantity in general: thus it is commonly said, that we have *enlarged* our house, when we have

made it more extensive, by adding buildings to the sides of it: but we usually say, a house is *increased* with an additional story, or with several new rooms.

By *enlarging* our territory, we generally *increase* our riches. Princes certainly *enlarge* their renown, by widening the bounds of their dominions; and they are apt to think, they at the same time *increase* their power: but in this they are sometimes mistaken; for such an *enlargement* may chance to produce only an *increase* of cares and troubles, which may end in their utter ruin.

A king who labours more after acquiring new subjects than in governing those he already has, may *enlarge* his fame; but will never *increase* his happiness.

Address, Air, Mien, Behaviour, Manners, Deportment, Carriage.

What is called our *air*, *mien* and *carriage* seem to be born with us, and strike at first sight: our *address*, *manners*, *behaviour* and *deportment* are owing to education; and gradually disclose themselves in our intercourse with the world.

Mien rather relates to our look; *carriage* to our frame; but the word *air*, to both. We usually judge of the *mien*, by the face; the *carriage*, by the person; and the *air*, by both.

How sweet is the *mien* that has good humour in the countenance! A gentleman, though in rags, is easily discovered by his graceful *carriage*. An open countenance and majesty of person, give a man the most engaging *air* imaginable.

Address is confined to our words; *deportment*, to our actions; *behaviour* arises from both; and the fruit of *behaviour* is *manners*.

Our *address* shall often please, when our *deportment* shall disgust; and VICE VERSA.

When our *address* is engaging, and our *deportment* comformable, 'tis impossible our *behaviour* should be otherwise.

In

In order to be well with the world, we should suit our *behaviour* to our company; which, though in the eye of some persons, has been considered as deceitful, must in the end be looked upon as the height of good *manners*.

An engaging *air*, which is the union of a charming *mien* and graceful *carriage*, is necessary to make any thing please; but unless accompanied with good *manners*, arising from a genteel *address* and *deportment*, it becomes perfectly disgusting.

To *Accost*, *Approach*.

We *accost* those with whom we would speak; but often *approach*, without any intention to *address*.

The bold can *accost* without the least hesitation. We cannot *approach* the great without some kind of ceremony.

When we have any thing to say to a person, we naturally *accost* him; when we would insinuate ourselves into his good graces, we endeavour to *approach* him.

Education teaches us to *accost* the ladies with civility; but to *approach* them, requires some kind of assurance, seasoned with respect.

Ingenuity, *Cleverness*, *Abilities*, *Parts*.

Ingenuity relates more to the invention of things; *cleverness*, to the manner of executing them; *ability*, to the actual execution of them; and *parts*, to the discernment. The third, then, puts in use what the second dictates, pursuant to the digested plan of the fourth, invented by the first.

A man may be *ingenious*, and not *clever*; he may be *clever*, without *abilities* to execute; and he may have great *abilities*, and yet not be a man of *parts*.

Admitting we are not very *ingenious*, still, if we are accustomed to the management of things, we

may be *clever*; but it requires *abilities* to do with them as we would; and *parts*, to conduct them.

He who discovered the powers of refraction and reflection, had he known nothing more, would have been *ingenious*: he who constructed the telescope, was *clever*; the finisher, was a man of *abilities*; and without doubt, the philosopher, he who applies the instrument to the various purposes of astronomy, must be a man of *parts*.

To Add, Augment.

By *adding* one thing to another, we *augment* the same. By the word *adding*, we understand, the joining of different things together; or, if they are things of the same kind, joining them in such a manner as not to confound them, but that after such junction, each may be distinguished from the other: whereas the word *augment*, indicates our making a thing larger or more abundant, by such an addition as shall cause it afterwards to appear one and the same thing; or at least, that when the addition is made, the whole together shall be conceived under one idea; thus, for example, we *add* one basket of rubbish to another; one room to another; but we *augment* the heap, and the house.

There are many who would not scruple to *augment* their own stock, by fraudulently *adding* to it that of another.

To *add* is a verb active only; *augment*, both active and neuter.

Our ambition *augments* with our fortune; and we are no sooner in possession of one hundred pounds, than we are eager to *add* to it another.

To Study, Learn.

To *study*, implies a uniform application, in search of knowledge; to *learn*, implies that application with success.

We

We *study* to learn; and *learn* by dint of *study*.

People of vivacity *learn* easily; but are heavy at *study*.

We can *study* but one thing at a time; but we may *learn* many.

The more we *learn* the more we know; but oftentimes, the more we *study* the less we know.

We have *studied* well, when we have *learned* to doubt.

There are many things we *learn* without *study*; and other thing we *study* without *learning*.

Those are not the wisest who have *studied* most; but those who have *learnt* most.

We see some persons *studying* continually, without *learning* any thing; and others, *learning* almost every thing without the least *study*.

The time of our youth is the time of *study*; but it is in a more advanced age, when we truly can be said to *learn*; it is then only, we have capacity to digest, what we have before laid up in the memory.

Buttress, Support, Prop.

The *Buttress* fortifies; it is fixed close to resist the impulsion of other bodies: the *support* bears, by being placed beneath a thing to prevent its falling under a weight: the *prop* assists, and its general use is to strengthen.

A wall is frequently made stronger by *buttresses*: an arch is *supported* by columns: a house, when in danger of falling, is kept up by *props*.

That which has received a violent thrust, or is much bulged, stands in need of a *buttress*; that which is too heavy to carry itself, is in want of *supporters*; and that which ought to stand upright, and cannot be made to do so of itself, must be *propped*.

In a figurative sense, *buttress* relates more to defence; *support*, to credit; and *prop*, to friendship.

The true Christian seeks no *buttress* against the malignity of men, but that of innocence and integrity; he makes work the most solid *support* of his life;

and looks upon implicit obedience to the decree of heaven, as the most steady *prop* of his felicity.

Enough, Sufficient.

The object of both these words is quantity; but with this difference, that *enough* relates more to the quantity one desires to have, and *sufficient* to that quantity one really wants to employ.

Thus the avaricious man never has *enough*; let him accumulate ever so much, he still desires more; and the prodigal never *sufficient*, he still wanting to expend more than he has.

We say we have *enough*, when we wish not for more; and we say we have *sufficient*, when we have just what is necessary.

When applied to such things as are consumable, the word *enough*, seems to denote a much greater quantity than the word *sufficient*; for in relation to such things, when we say we have *enough*, it seems, as though we should have too much, had we more: but what we call *sufficient*, may be added to, without coming near, that extreme: for we may say of a very small income or revenue, that it is *sufficient*; though at the same time we can hardly think it *enough*.

The word *enough*, has a more general and comprehensive meaning; the word *sufficient*, a more limited and particular one.

An hour at table is certainly *sufficient* for our nourishment; but not *enough* for some persons' pleasure or satisfaction.

An œconomist can find *enough* where there is very little; but the prodigal never has *sufficient*, let him have ever so much.

To Declare, Affirm, Protest, Aver, Assert, Maintain, Swear, Avouch, Attest.

In the first seven words, we find different degrees of declaration. To *declare* signifies to tell any thing

thing simply, but seriously; to *affirm* means to say confidently; to *protest* implies a solemn affirmation; to *aver*, signifies a positive declaration; to *assert*, that declaration defended; to *maintain* implies a support of such assertion; to *swear* is to ratify it by an oath.

When we give our opinion, on being seriously asked, we are said to *declare* it: when we would give that declaration more force, we *affirm* it: and to strengthen that affirmation, we *protest* it solemnly; that is, we *affirm* it by invoking the Deity.

Note. The other words are sufficiently explained above.

If ever we wish to gain credit in the world, whatever we *declare* should be backed by truth. True politeness forbids our *affirming* any thing, unless required by the obligations of justice. To make frequent use of *protestations*, betrays a suspicion, that our bare word is not to be believed. Always to *aver*, hath an appearance of dogmatizing, and shews us ignorant of that proper degree of diffidence, which ever accompanies wisdom. Some persons are so ready to *assert*, that let the matter be right or wrong, 'tis equally the same. When our opinions are just and well-grounded, we have an undoubted right to *maintain* them. *Swearing*, was first instituted in courts of judicature, as a conscientious testimony of truth.

The words, *avouch* and *attest*, though often used as synonymous with the foregoing, have a very different signification. The word, *avouch*, implies an assertion in defence of another; *attest*, a bearing witness to what another has just before said.

When the reputation of an honest man has been undeservedly hurt, 'tis the part of a friend to *avouch* his good character.

Too much care to *attest* all that is advanced, renders our conversation tiresome.

There is another verb, *warrant*, which has some affinity to the word *maintain*; but as custom has made the use of it vulgar, it is unnecessary to take any further notice of it.

Arms, Weapons.

By *arms*, we understand those instruments of offence generally made use of in war; such as, fire-arms, swords, &c. By *weapons*, we more particularly mean instruments of other kinds (exclusive of fire-arms), made use of as offensive on especial occasions.

In the state of Switzerland, all men are obliged to learn the use of *arms* in their youth, that, in cases of extremity, they may be capable of defending themselves against the attacks of their enemies.

In times of insurrection, people make use of such *weapons* as they can get.

Attractions, Allurements, Charms.

Besides the general idea which makes these three words appear synonymous, it is likewise their common fate, scarce ever to be used in the singular number; at least in those senses in which they are here considered; that is, whenever they are used to signify the power of beauty, of agreeableness, or of any thing which pleases.

With respect to their different meaning, it appears to me, that *attractions* mean something natural; *allurements*, somewhat rather artificial; and *charms*, somewhat stronger and more uncommon than either.

Attractions may be said to engage us; *allurements* to entice us; *charms* to seduce us.

The heart of man can scarce stand against the *attractions* of a pretty woman: It is with difficulty he can defend himself against the allurements of a *coquette*; but to resist the *charms* of a sweet-tempered beauty is impossible.

Ladies always owe their *attractions* and their *charms*, to the happy formation of their features and persons; but they sometimes procure their *allurements* at their toilettes.

I know not whether I may fall in with the taste of mankind; but, in my opinion, *attractions* rise from

from those ordinary graces which nature has bestowed upon the women with more or less liberality, and which are the common appendages of the sex; *allurements*, from those cultivated graces which form a faithful mirror of the natural, and are studied merely with a desire to please; *charms*, from those singular graces which nature sometimes bestows as a most valuable gift, and which are most particular and personal.

Defects not seen at first, but afterwards observed, lessen *attractions* greatly. *Allurements* vanish as soon as the artifice appears. *Charms* lose their force when time and custom hath rendered them familiar.

These words are not in use only with regard to beauty and the graces of the sex, but with respect to every thing that pleases. In this case, *attractions* and *charms* are applied only to such things as are amiable in themselves; whereas the word, *allurements*, is sometimes applied to such things as are even in themselves odious; but which we love nevertheless.

Virtue has *attractions* which the most vicious of men cannot avoid being sensible of. The riches of the world are *allurements*, which never fail to captivate in spite of their ill tendency. Pleasure has such *charms*, that it is hunted after by every one, as well by the philosopher as the libertine.

We say, great *attractions*; powerful *allurements*; and invincible *charms*.

Honour *attracts*; fortune *allures*; but the *charms* of glory are invincible.

Miserly, Niggardly, Covetous, Avaricious.

The word, *miserly*, signifies, rather a parsimonious disposition, or a depriving ourselves of the necessities of life, merely to hoard the riches we possess. By *niggardly*, we understand, that sordid temper that does things by halves. *Covetous*, implies an eager craving for the possessions of another. By *avaricious*, we mean that inordinate thirst of gain,

that makes a man grasp at every thing he sees. Taking the words in these senses, which are undoubtedly the proper ones, we may be *covetous*, and not *avaricious*; *niggardly*, and not *miserly*.

He who never gives any thing away, is justly called *miserly*; he who fails to bestow when necessary, or when he bestows gives too little, draws on himself the epithet of *niggardly*; he who longs for the goods of another, is *covetous*; and he who grasps at wealth by all means whatever, is *avaricious*.

Of all extraordinary beings, there is no greater one than the *miser* who punishes himself, and starves in the midst of plenty.

The *miser* is laughed at, but the *niggard* is despised.

The contented man is at quiet within himself; but the *covetous* is ever on the rack: he eagerly wishes for what another possesses, and his inability of obtaining it, is his continual torment.

It is necessary to be ever watchful of an *avaricious* man, for his disposition leads him to take every opportunity of defrauding you.

Acknowledgment, Confession.

Acknowledgment supposes a question asked; whereas *confession* favours a little of self-accusation.

We *acknowledge* what we had an inclination to conceal: We *confess* that which we were blameable in doing.

It is interrogation which causes *acknowledgment*; repentance, *confession*.

It is better to make a sincere *acknowledgment*, than a bad excuse.

We should not *confess* to all sorts of people.

An *acknowledgment* unasked, is either noble or foolish, according to the circumstances and effect it produces.

Confession, unaccompanied with repentance, is an insult to the Deity.

It would be want of spirit to *acknowledge* a fault, without a certainty that such *acknowledgment* would be satisfactory; and it would be foolish to make *confession*, without hopes of pardon; for why should we declare ourselves culpable to those who breathe nothing but vengeance?

Admonition, Advice, Counsel.

The end of *admonition* is gentle reproof. *Advice* and *counsel*, are to convey instructions; but with this difference, that *advice* implies no superiority with respect either to rank or parts in the person who gives it; whereas, *counsel* generally carries with it one, if not both.

Admonition in a master, frequently has a greater effect than correction.

People are readier to give *advice* than to take it. Parents should take care to *counsel* their children before they turn them out into the world.

Admonition should be given with temper; *advice*, with sincerity; and *counsel*, with art and modesty.

Admonish a friend in private, but reward him openly.

Nothing is more salutary than good *advice*, and yet nothing is more nauseous to take.

When *counsel* is given with an air of impertinence, it is sure to make the *counsel* despised, and the counsellor odious.

To Have, Possess.

In order to *have* a thing, it is not necessary to have the power of disposal of it, or to have it actually in our hands; it is sufficient that it belongs to us: but to *possess* it, it must be in our hands, and we have the liberty of disposing of it whenever we think proper.

Thus we *have* an estate, notwithstanding it is mortgaged for the benefit of our creditors; but as to riches, we *possess* them.

We are not always masters of what we *have*; we are of what we *possess*.

A married man *has* continual torment, when the Demon of Jealousy *possesses* him.

We *have* often but the half of things, partaking them with others; we *possess* them when they are entirely our own.

Those who *have* only the knowledge of arts, follow their rules; but those who *possess* them, lay down their rules to follow.

Battle, Combat, Fight.

Battle is an action more general, and commonly preceded by some preparation. *Combat* seems to be an action more particular, and often unexpected. *Fight* may be either one or the other, and is seldom used in the plural.

Thus the *fight* between the Carthaginians and the Romans; and that at Pharsalia, between Cæsar and Pompey, were *battles*: but those in which the Horatii and the Curatii decided the fate of Rome, were *combats*.

Handsome, Pretty, Beautiful.

It is the fate of these words, when applied to the female sex, to be used indiscriminately one for the other; and yet at the same time, no three words can be more different.

By a *handsome* woman, we understand one that is tall, graceful, and well-shaped, with a regular disposition of features; by a *pretty*, we mean one that is delicately made, and whose features are so formed as to please: by a *beautiful*, a union of both.

A lady may be *handsome* and not *pretty*; *pretty* and not *handsome*: but to be *beautiful*, she must be both *pretty* and *handsome*.

Many a *handsome* woman has a forbidding countenance.

It

It has been the misfortune of many a *pretty* woman to be crooked.

A *beautiful* woman is now-a-days very rare to be met with.

Prettiness carries an idea of simplicity; *handsomeness*, of nobility; *beauty*, of majesty.

The ladies in romances, are described, as either *beautiful* or *handsome*; the shepherdesses, by the poets, are represented as *pretty*; so in other things, we say, a *beautiful* palace; a *handsome* house; a *pretty* cottage.

A *beautiful* woman is an object of curiosity; a *handsome* woman, of admiration; and a *pretty* one, of love.

When applied to other things, *beautiful* relates to something more serious and engaging; *pretty*, to somewhat more gay and diverting: this is the reason why we say, a *beautiful* tragedy; but a *pretty* comedy.

Benignity, Benevolence, Kindness, Tendernefs, Humanity.

Benignity is a sort of kind condescension, and an attribute of princes only. *Benevolence*, a wishing well to mankind, and seems relative to those who have more particularly the power of doing good. *Kindness* is the same disposition among equals. *Tendernefs* is a susceptibility of impression, and more applicable to persons nearly connected. *Humanity* denotes a fellow-feeling for the distressed, even of a stranger.

Benignity, *benevolence*, and *kindness*, spring from the will; *tendernefs* and *humanity*, from the heart.

The *benignity* of a prince, makes him universally beloved by his subjects.

Benevolence is a shining character, and is more conspicuous for the charitable actions it produces.

Kindness is what one man naturally expects from another, and what we are reciprocally bound to impart.

The *tendernefs* of a parent, has often been the ruin of a child.

The distresses of individuals will often draw tears from a person truly *humane*.

From the very instant of our birth, we experience the *benignity* of heaven, and malignity of corrupt nature.

The realized *benevolence* of some good men, have almost made them worshiped by their fellow creatures.

Kindnesses are in the power of every one to shew; therefore, he that withholds them, favours more of the brute than of the man.

The great *tenderness* of animals to their young, is a standing proof to the many unfeeling mothers.

True *humanity* consists, in not treating with rigour, but excusing the weaknesses, supplying the defects, assuaging the pains, and comforting the afflictions of our neighbour.

Poverty, Indigence, Want, Need, Necessity.

Poverty is that situation of fortune, opposed to riches, in which we are deprived of the conveniences of life.

Indigence is a degree lower; we there want the necessaries; and is opposed to superfluity.

Want seems rather to arrive by accident, implies a scarcity of provisions, rather than a lack of money, and is opposed to abundance.

Need and *necessity* relate less to the situation of life than the other three words, but more to the relief we expect, or the remedy we seek; with this difference between the two, that *need* seems less pressing than *necessity*.

Merit, or a fortunate circumstance in life, frequently extricates us from a state of *poverty* in which we were born; and in which prodigality often plunges the rich.

Diligence is the best remedy against *indigence*, which is generally the just punishment of idleness.

Wise precautions prevent *want*, which is often brought on by extravagance.

When

When we are in *need*, we should seek assistance from our friends, but be careful not to importune too much.

The means of obtaining relief in extreme *necessity*, is to implore the succour of the truly charitable.

A state of *poverty* is most conducive to the health of the soul ; we being there out of the way of temptations.

The man who opens his hand to the cravings of the *indigent*, feels within his breast a secret satisfaction, which the uncharitable man is an entire stranger to.

He that will waste, will *want*.

A friend in *need*, is a friend indeed.

Necessity is the mother of invention.

Good-fortune, Prosperity.

What we call *good-fortune* is the effect of chance ; it comes unexpected. *Prosperity* is the success of conduct, and comes by degrees.

Fools have sometimes *good-fortune* : wise men do not always *prosper*.

The capitol that was saved by the cackling of geese, and not by the vigilance of the centinels, is a piece of history more proper to shew the *good-fortune* of the Romans, than their military government on that occasion ; though on all others, their wise conduct has contributed as much to their *prosperity* as the valour of their soldiers.

Good-nature, Good-humour.

These terms, though very expressive of their respective meanings, are too often, for want of proper discernment, confounded.

We may be *good-humoured*, and not *good-natured* ; *good-natured*, and yet not always *good-humoured*.

To make this properly appear, it is necessary to give a full definition of each.

By

By *good-nature* is meant that disposition which partakes the felicity of all mankind; that promotes the satisfaction of every individual, within the reach of its ability; that relieves the distressed, comforts the afflicted, diffuses blessings, and communicates happiness, as far as its sphere of action can extend; whereas, *good-humour* is nothing more than a cheerful, pleasing deportment, arising either from a natural gaiety of mind, or an affectation of popularity, joined to an affability of behaviour, which is the result of good-breeding, and a compliance with the taste of every company.—This kind of *good-humour* is by far the most striking quality; 'tis frequently mistaken for, and complimented with, the superior name of real *good-nature*. A man, by this specious appearance, has often acquired that appellation, who, in all the actions of his private life, has been a morose, cruel, revengeful, sullen, haughty tyrant. On the contrary, a man of a true benevolent disposition, and formed to promote the happiness of all around him, may sometimes, perhaps, from an ill habit of body, an accidental vexation, or a commendable openness of heart, above the meanness of disguise, be guilty of little sallies of peevishness or *ill-humour*, that may carry the appearance of, and be unjustly thought to proceed from *ill-nature*, by persons who are not acquainted with his true character; and who take them for synonymous terms, though, in reality, they have not the least analogy to each other.

Happiness, Felicity, Bliss.

These three words denote equally an advantageous state and agreeable situation; but that of *happiness* marks properly the state of fortune, capable of dispensing pleasures, and placing them within our reach; that of *felicity* expresses particularly the state of the heart disposed to taste pleasure, which it finds in whatsoever it possesses; that of *bliss*, which conveys a mystic idea, paints a state of imagination, which

which we anticipate, as it were, from a thorough conviction that we shall inherit it hereafter.

Our *happiness* glares in the eyes of the world, and exposes us often to envy. Our *felicity* is known only to ourselves, and gives us continual satisfaction. The idea of *bliss* extends itself beyond a life temporal.

We are sometimes in a state of *happiness*, without being in a state of *felicity*. *Happiness* consists in the possession of wealth, honours, friends and health; but 'tis the satisfaction of the mind, and the enjoyment of those things, that constitutes *felicity*. As to *bliss*, it is the portion of the godly, and depends, in each religion, on the persuasion of the mind.

Satisfaction without, forms the *happiness* of man; satisfaction within, his *felicity*: *bliss* must be asked of God. The first is within the reach of riches, the second of wisdom, but the third is reserved for those whom the scripture calls, the poor in spirit.

Confines, Limits, Bounds.

Confines are, where we are at liberty to go. *Limits* are, what we ought not to pass. *Bounds* are, what we cannot pass.

We approach or get farther from the *confines*; we contract or extend the *limits*; we advance or remove the *bounds*.

By *confines*, we rather understand, the edge or border: the *confines* of a country not surrounded by the sea, are generally distinguished by rivers or hills.

He who continually exceeds the *limits* which temperance hath set, will soon find himself on the *confines* of the grave.

They say, with more eloquence than truth, that the *limits* of the Roman empire, were those of the world.

The Sea, the Alps, and the Pyrenean mountains, are the natural *bounds* of France.

Ambition knows no *bounds*; and we are never happy.

happy, but when the *bounds* of our fortune are those of our desire.

Extremity, End.

Each of these words signifies the last of those parts which constitutes a thing, but with this difference, that *extremity* supposes a situation and an arrangement, intimating the greatest distance; whereas, *end* supposes a length only, and denotes that place where the length ceases.

Extremity answers to the centre; *end* to the beginning; thus we say, the *extremity* of a kingdom, the *end* of life.

Aim, View, Design.

The *aim* is more fixed, we take every method to pursue it; the *view*, more vague, we make use of means to accomplish it; the *design*, more close, we leave nothing undone to complete it.

A good prince has no other *design* in his government, than to render his state flourishing, because he has the happiness of his people in *view*, and true glory is his *aim*.

The true christian has no other *aim* than heaven; no other *view*, than to please God; nor any other *design* to complete, than his own salvation.

We are said to lay an *aim*; to have *views*; to form a *design*.

Reason forbids our laying any *aim* that is impossible to attain; to have any chimerical *views*, or to form any *design* we are unable to execute.

If my *views* are just, I have a *design* in my head that will bring me to my *aim*.

Burden, Load.

By the word *burden* we understand, a weight possible to be borne; by *load*, a weight more than we are able to bear.

A light

A light *burden* is no inelegant expression ; but a light *load*, certainly is.

In the heat of summer our very clothes are a *burden*.

Many a poor animal is so inhumanly laden, as to sink under the *load*.

Taken now in a figurative sense, they are equally different.

How unhappy is the man who feels the *burden* of an evil conscience !

We have sometimes, through a bad habit of body, such a *load* upon our spirits, as not to be able to support ourselves.

Charm, Enchantment, Spell.

The word, *charm*, carries an idea of force, which puts a stop to ordinary effects and natural causes. The word *enchantment* is used, properly, for that which regards the illusion of the senses. The word, *spell* bears particularly an idea of something which disturbs the reason. All the three, in the literal sense, mark the effect of a magical operation, condemned by religion, and laughed at by philosophy.

Antiquated tales say, there is a *charm* to destroy the effect of arms, and make them invulnerable. We read in old romances, of the surprising power of *enchantments*, that have suddenly changed the manners, and reversed the fortune. Weak people have thought, and do still believe, that by means of a *spell*, the health has been destroyed, and the person so bewitched made raving mad ; but persons of good sense, see no *charm* in the world but the caprice of passions, with respect to reason, which often suspends reflection, and stops the effects which that would naturally and necessarily produce : they are acquainted with no other *enchantment*, than that seduction arising from a depraved taste, and disordered imagination : they know also, that which is foolishly attributed to the power of a *spell*, maliciously laid, is no other than the effect of a bad constitution, which is frequently

quently remedied by an application of proper medicines.

To Chastise, Punish, Correct, Discipline.

We *chastise* him who has committed a fault, to prevent his doing the same again : we *punish* the person guilty of a crime, by way of expiation, and as an example to others. To *correct* signifies, to amend by means of *chastisement* ; to *discipline* means, to regulate and instruct.

We *chastise* a child in order to *correct* his manners : officers are frequently obliged to *punish* a soldier with death, to keep up good *discipline* in the regiment.

It is necessary for good *correction*, that the *chastisement* be not the effect of anger : justice demands, that the *punishment* be rigorous when the crime is enormous ; otherwise, there can be no good *discipline* in the state.

God, like a tender Father, *chastises* us in this life, that we may not be *punished* in the life to come.

As the words, *chastise* and *punish*, are thought to have the nearest affinity to each other, it may not be unnecessary to shew a yet further difference between them.

Chastise then carries always with it an idea of subordination ; denoting, an authority or superiority in him who *chastises* over the person *chastised* ; but the word, *punishment*, carries no such idea in its signification ; for we are sometimes *punished* by our equals, by ourselves, by our inferiors, by the mere event of things, or by the effects of the fault we have committed.

Parents who, through tenderness to their children, forbear to *chastise* them, are often *punished* for their folly by their future ingratitude and ill-conduct.

Prudence, Discretion, Care, Caution.

Prudence is here the mother virtue, and signifies, wisdom applied to practice : *discretion* is the effect of prudence,

prudence, and means, a knowledge to govern or direct one's self. By *care* we understand, heed, in order to preservation. *Caution* implies a greater degree of wariness.

A proper attention to *prudence* would make us so *discreet*, as to be *careful* in every thing we do, and cause us to act with the greatest *caution*.

A hasty conduct can never be called *prudent*: want of attention in affairs of moment, is the greatest height of *indiscretion*; for without that necessary qualification, 'tis impossible any thing we do can be attended with success: he who expects to do any thing well, must act with *care*; and he, who is desirous of avoiding difficulties, with *caution*.

To weigh matters well, before we put them into execution, is a mark of *prudence*.

A *discreet* man, in the company of dangerous persons, such as would take advantage of his words, would be *careful* how he opened his mouth, and would utter nothing but with the greatest *caution*.

Circumspection, Consideration, Regard.

A proper attention to the manner of acting and conducting ourselves; in our commerce with the world, with respect to others; contributing rather to their satisfaction than our own, is the common and general idea, which these three words present at first sight; notwithstanding which, it appears to me, that their application should be different.

Circumspection principally takes place in discourse; it prevents our letting any thing escape us, that may do hurt or give offence; and is the effect of prudence which risks nothing. *Consideration* is more personal, and relates particularly to our manner of treating other people, making a proper distinction, as different opportunities may offer; and is the consequence of esteem and duty. *Regard* relates more to the state or situation of persons; being particularly careful to omit nothing which good sense and politeness

politeness require ; and is the fruit of a good education.

To be well with the world, requires *circumspection*, when we are speaking before those with whom we are not acquainted ; *consideration*, for people of rank and quality ; and *regard*, towards those with whom we are interested.

We ought to have a great deal of *circumspection* in conversations of religion and government, because they are public matters, and subjects on which particulars are not at liberty to say what they think, especially, if their thoughts are in opposition to those established in the country where they are. It is not adviseable, for our interests, to omit shewing marks of *consideration* to such persons whose assistance we may stand in need of, and from whom we hope to receive any service. We cannot have too great a *regard* for the ladies ; it is what they expect, and are displeased if we neglect.

Cunning, Finesse, Device, Artifice, Trick, Stratagem.

Cunning is the art of conducting designs in a manner proper to succeed. *Finesse* is a French word, lately adopted by the English, and means, an acting secretly and under cover. *Device* is rather a pretty thought or contrivance. *Artifice* is unnatural, and a far-fetched mean of executing designs. *Trick*, which eludes the senses, implies a juggle ; and *stratagem* denotes a disguised way of obtaining our ends.

The first three of these words, are oftner understood in a good sense than the other.

Cunning, is employed in using means ; *finesse*, insinuates insensibly, and must be accompanied by penetration ; *device*, surprises and gives satisfaction ; *artifice*, generally makes use of studied dissimulation ; a *trick* is commonly looked on as a fraud, and a *stratagem* is oftner illicit than otherwise.

Without

Without some degree of *cunning*, it will be impossible to deal with, or guard against the generality of mankind.

Finesse is so essential to the courtier, that without it, he is seen through presently.

Pretty *devices* declare the authors of them persons of ingenuity.

We ought particularly to guard against a man who makes use of a great deal of *artifice*.

Jugglers perform *tricks* to divert, and consequently if clever, deserve applause; but he who *tricks* his neighbour in order to serve himself, is a rogue.

All *stratagems* in war are lawful; but in other cases, they are ever considered as derogatory to the character of an honest man.

Moment, Instant.

A *moment* is not long; but an *instant* is still shorter. The word *moment* has a signification more extended; it is taken sometimes for time in general; and is used in a figurative sense: that of *instant* is more contracted; it marks the shortest duration of time, and is never used but in the literal sense.

All depends upon knowing the favourable *moment*; sometimes an *instant* too soon or too late, is all that makes the difference between success and misfortune.

Let us banish thought as much as in our power, still now and then a reflective moment will intrude. The face of things, which we have thought established, have been frequently changed in an *instant*.

Every *moment* is dear to one who knows the value of time. Every *instant* of our life is a step nearer the grave.

Customs, Manners, Fashions.

Customs relate to the general practice of the people; *manners*, to their way of life; and *fashions*, to their dress.

D

There

There cannot be a more ridiculous *custom*, than that of persons complimenting each other in time of divine service; it being supposed, they have there, more material things to engross their attention.

An increase, or decrease of luxury, has been found to have more or less influence on the *manners* of the people.

It has been observed, that there is a continual round of *fashions*; when the new are worn out, they then have recourse to the old, and those old ones become new.

To *Be*, *Exist*, *Subsist*.

Be agrees with all sorts of subjects, substances or modes; with all manner of beings, real or ideal: *Exist* is used only with respect to substances, and those real: *Subsist* is applied equally to substances or modes, but with reference to the duration of their being, which is not expressed by the other two words.

We say of qualities, forms, actions, motions, and of all their different relations, that they *are*: we say, of matter, spirit, bodies, and all real beings, that they *exist*: we say of states, works, affairs, laws, and all establishments, which are neither destroyed or changed, that they *subsist*.

The verb *be* is commonly used to mark the event of any modification or quality in the subject: that of *exist*, is in use only, to express the end of simple existence: and we employ *subsist*, to point out the duration of that existence or modification. Thus we say, that man *is* inconstant; that the phoenix *exists* not; that all human establishments *subsist* but for a time.

Famous, *Illustrious*, *Celebrated*, *Renowned*.

Each of these qualities distinguishes the reputation; but that which the word *famous* expresses, means

means no more than a simple distinction of one country or age above another, let that distinction be taken either in good part or bad. That which the word *illustrious* expresses, is founded upon a merit, supported by dignity and glory; which makes the object not only known but admired, and ranked among the great. That which we understand by the word *celebrated* expresses a superior degree of talents with respect either to abilities or knowledge; though it raises not the object to an equal degree of grandeur, with the *illustrious* it is nevertheless honourable. That which the word *renowned* denotes, is founded only upon fashion or public taste; which, without casting much honour on the subject, draws it simply from oblivion, and makes its name known to the world.

The maid of Orleans cried down by the English, but esteemed by the French, was equally *famous* in both nations. Princes shine during their life, but they are only *illustrious* in future ages, by the monuments of grandeur, wisdom and greatness, which they leave behind them. There are *celebrated* authors, whose works we cannot find fault with; and those which we cannot even commend, without risking our own reputation. A man's fortune is half made when once he becomes *renowned* in his profession.

Famous, *celebrated*, and *renowned* are equally applicable to persons or things; but *illustrious* to persons only; at least when we would be nice in our choice of words.

Erostratus, among the Greeks, set fire to the temple of Diana to make himself *famous*: he was rendered more so by an order of the state, that his name should never after be mentioned on pain of punishment. The greatest part of our libels are of the same kind; they raise a dust, and become *famous* by being burnt by the hangman. The Duke of Marlborough became *illustrious* by the many victories he obtained; his glorious actions are *celebrated* in history. The Gobelins were so *renowned*, that their names live in the place where they worked, and in

those works in which others imitate them. It is a question, whether the Phalernian wine was more *renowned* than those are of Champagne and Burgundy.

Excuse, Pardon, Forgiveness.

We make *excuse* for an apparent fault or slight offence: we ask *pardon* for a real fault, or when the offence is greater. We implore *forgiveness* of our sins. The first is an apology in order to justify ourselves, and is founded on politeness; the second is the mark of a good disposition, and is done in hopes of extenuation; the last, to avert the vengeance of God, and declares repentance.

The good mind *excuses* easily. The good heart *pardons* readily. God delights more in *forgiveness* than in *revenge*.

Excuse is more used, when we address ourselves to equals; *pardon* to superiors; and *forgiveness* to heaven.

Good manners demand an *excuse* for that which turns out wrong, let the intention be never so good. It can never be a degradation to ask pardon of that person whom we have offended; besides, the superior rank of some persons makes it an absolute duty in the offender. How great is the presumption of that wretch who fancies himself not in need of the *forgiveness* of the Almighty!

Duty, Obligation.

Duty means something conscientious, and springs from a law; *obligation* something absolute in practice, and springs from custom.

We are said to fail in our *duty*; and to dispense with an *obligation*.

It is the *duty* of a clergyman to carry himself modestly; and he is *obliged* to wear dark coloured cloaths;

Policy

Policy finds less disadvantage in neglecting her duty, than in forgetting the least of her *obligations*.

To Live, Dwell.

These two words are esteemed synonymous in that sense, in which they signify residence; but *live* relates to the particular place where we inhabit; *dwell*, to the building in which we reside.

We *live* in London; in Middlesex; in the country; we *dwell* in a large house; a cottage; or a furnished lodging.

When persons of distinction *live* in London, they *dwell* in hovels, comparatively speaking, with their houses in the country.

We say, with great propriety, I *live*, all the summer, in the country, and have one of the prettiest *dwellings* imaginable.

To Stay, Remain.

The common idea of these two words is a cessation of progression; and their difference consists in this; that to *stay* seems to have less duration than to *remain*.

A good servant, when sent on a message, *stays* as short a time as possible.

When we have given offence, we should endeavour to make such an atonement, that the offended party may not *remain* dissatisfied.

The duration of time, expressed by the word *stay*, seems less determinate than that by the word *remain*.

Thus we say, he *remained* at his country house a month; he *stayed* longer than we expected.

Event, Incident.

Event is a word most agreeable to states and governments; *incident* to casualties in private life.

The revolutions of the state, are *events* that determine the happiness of the people.

Our life is full of *incidents* which the eye of prudence cannot foresee.

To Awake, Awaken.

The first of these words is more frequently used in a literal sense; the last in a figurative.

The least noise *awakes* those who sleep indifferently. It requires but little to *awaken* a passion which is not entirely rooted out from the heart.

Heavy, Weighty.

The word *heavy* is more applicable to that which loads the body; *weighty*, to that which burdens the mind. It requires strength to carry the one; parts to support the other.

Weak men find that *heavy* which the strong find light. The administration of state affairs, is too *weighty* a concern for one person to undertake.

To Conquer, Subdue, Overcome.

Each of these words implies resistance; but that of *conquer* refers to victory over enemies; and is generally used in the literal sense: that of *subdue* is more applicable to our passions, being oftener used in a figurative, and means a bringing under subjection: that of *overcome* supposes efforts against any obstacle that opposes; meaning, rather to surmount.

We have conquered our enemies, when we have beaten them in such a manner as to put it out of their power to do us any further hurt. We may be said to have *subdued* our lusts, when we are able to withstand every temptation. We *overcome* our adversaries when we obtain our end, in spite of every opposition.

It

It requires courage and valour to *conquer*; endeavour and resolution to *subdue*; patience and perseverance to *overcome*.

Alexander gloried more in his *conquests* than in any other thing upon earth. Of all passions, avarice is the most difficult to *subdue*; as neither age or weakness of constitution is able to rebate its edge. We should strive to *overcome* evil with good.

To no purpose, Ineffectually, In vain.

We work *to no purpose* when we meet not with the reward we expected to receive; *Ineffectually*, when that which we have done, answers not the end proposed; *In vain*, when our work is of no kind of use whatever.

I shall have worked *to no purpose* if these sheets meet not with the approbation of the public; *Ineffectually*, if after all my trouble, I have not been able to shew the true difference between words reputed synonymous; and *in vain*, if the book is found to be neither amusing nor instructive.

Wave, Surge, Billow.

Waves are the natural effect of the fluidity of a running water; they are as applicable to rivers as the sea, and leave the idea of a calm. *Surges* are applied properly to the sea only; imply swollen waves and mark a small degree of agitation. *Billows* proceed from a more violent motion, consequently denote a greater agitation; they break into white foam; and are attended with no little roar.

We cut through the *waves*; are lifted by the *surges*; tossed and dashed by the *billows*.

The life of some men may be aptly compared to the sharp-keeled vessel cutting through the *waves*, leaving no noise or track behind it; while that of others may be represented, as tossed up and down on

the wind-swoln *surges* of a boisterous fortune; or dashed in pieces by the foaming *billows* of adversity.

Uproar, Tumult, Riot.

Uproar conveys an idea of some great noise; *tumult* and *riot* of some great disorder.

The difference between the words *tumult* and *riot* is, that *tumult* implies the rising of many people; *riot* the disturbance of a few; whereas, an *uproar* may be occasioned by one single person.

Tumults and *riots* are always attended with such *uproars* as give umbrage to a peaceable neighbourhood.

Houses of debauchery are subject to *riots*: a *tumult* often happens in ill-policed cities.

Inclination, Propension, Bias.

These three words rise gradually; *inclination* implying something less strong than *propension*; *propension* than *bias*: the first leads us to an object; the second draws us; the third drags us.

Inclination is greatly owing to education; *propension* to custom; *bias* to constitution.

Choice of company is essential to the education of youth, because, at that age, they imbibe easily the *inclinations* of those whose company they keep. It is a dangerous thing to give a loose to any one vice, as frequent commission is apt to create strong *propension*. Persons of warm constitutions have a natural *bias* to venery.

Inclination is generally applied to good objects; *propension* to bad. Thus we say, the charitable man is ever *inclined* to assist his neighbour. So depraved is human nature, that we have always a *propension* to vice.

Of two persons to be served, a foreigner and a countryman; we are generally *biased* in favour of the last.

Should,

Should, Ought, Is necessary.

The first of these expressions implies more precisely, an obligation of complaisance, custom, or personal interest: thus we *should* not offend the company we are in; we *should* follow the fashion; we *should* know a man before we trust him. The second denotes more particularly, an obligation of reason and good sense; thus, we *ought* in every thing, to give up to those who know better than ourselves; we *ought* to serve them who have served us. The third is more used to express an essential and indispensable obligation; thus, it is *necessary* to love God, in order to be saved: It is *necessary* to be complaisant, to please.

Furthermore, Moreover, Besides.

Furthermore is properly used, when there is need only to add one more reason to those before-mentioned; its intent is to multiply, and it has no relation but to number. *Moreover* is in its right place, when used; to add a reason of a different kind to those that went before; its chief office is to add, with a particular respect to diversity. *Besides* is used with propriety, when we would strengthen by a new reason the force of those that were sufficient of themselves, its principal office is to enhance by abundance.

For a state to support itself, those who govern should be moderate; those who ought to obey, governable; *furthermore*, the laws should be judicious. There will always be war among men, because they are naturally ambitious, and are governed by interest; *moreover*, zeal for religion makes them rigid. Holy Scripture teaches us the anity of the Godhead, and reason points it out to us; *besides*, all nature makes us perceive it.

To Manifest, Publish, Proclaim.

These three words imply open declaration; but that of *manifest* seems to convey a proof of what is made known; meaning, to shew incontestably: *publish* denotes only a simple declaration but general: to *proclaim* is to make known by a formal and legal publication.

When once a man has lost his name, let him *manifest* his good character as much as possible, he will find it difficult to recover the good opinion of mankind, for prejudice is blind even to the most visible truths. He who *publishes* to the world the failings of another, betrays in himself a want of humanity, and is sure to meet with the contempt of every thinking man. A famous Sultan of Egypt left to posterity a most remarkable testimony of the vanity of earthly grandeur; for on his death-bed, he commanded that his winding-sheet should be carried at the end of a lance by a herald; who was to *proclaim*, here is all that this great prince will carry out of the world with him, of his wealth, dignity, and dominion, that he enjoyed upon earth.

Manifestos of a state, are usually *published* by formal *proclamation*.

To Tell, Disclose, Reveal, Divulge, Discover.

To make known that which is unknown, is the common signification of these words: but to *tell* is to declare things purposely, with a design to inform those, we would not have remain ignorant. To *disclose*, is to shew either by design or inadvertency, that which was before concealed. To *reveal*, is to lay open a secret: to *divulge*, is to do the same abroad. To *discover*, is the declaring a person to have done a thing which he would not have been thought the author of.

So great an itch have some persons for prattling, that they *tell* every individual thing they hear. Confidants too often *disclose* the intrigues they are entrusted

trusted with. Confessors *reveal* sometimes by their imprudence the confession of penitents. The *divulging* of a secret has often done more harm than any one thing whatever; as it is impossible to smother what once has been blazed abroad. If we would not be *discovered*, we should be careful to have no witnesses of our actions.

Equivocation, Ambiguity, Double-entendre.

Equivocation has two senses; the one natural, in which we would have what we say understood, and in which the hearer does absolutely understand us; the other perverted, understood only by the person speaking. *Ambiguity* has one general sense, susceptible of different interpretations; it always creates a difficulty in getting at the true sense of the author, and sometimes an impossibility. The *double entendre*, a French word lately naturalized, has two natural and apt significations, one of which presents itself to the common understanding of all the world; and by the other is made a fine allusion, understood but by certain persons.

These three ways of speaking, are upon occasion, ingenious methods of concealing one's true meaning: but we make use of an *equivocation*, to deceive; of an *ambiguity*, to keep in the dark from all; and of a *double-entendre*, to conceal from some.

It is beneath the character of an honest man to make frequent use of *equivocations*; he that does, being sure to meet with the contempt of mankind. *Ambiguities*, are perhaps, oftener the effect of a confusion of ideas than a studied design of keeping people in the dark: we ought never to use them but when an elucidation would be dangerous. Malice and politeness have introduced the *double-entendre*, but it should never be used at the expence of our neighbours reputation.

Great, Big, Large.

The word *great* is a general term, signifying any thing considerable either in bulk, extent, quality, number, &c. thus we say, a *great* house; a *great* road; a *great* weight; a *great* many; a *great* famine; a *great* happiness. The words *big* and *large* are more circumscribed; *big* implies greatness of bulk; *large* greatness of extent. Thus we say, a *big* man; a *big* stone; but a *large* room; a *large* field.

A *large* man is as great an impropriety as a *big* field; and we need only mention a *big* or *large* pleasure to shew the absurdity.

Staid, Grave, Serious.

We are *staid*, through discretion and custom; *grave*, through humour and constitution; *serious*, through taste and affectation.

Levity is the reverse of being *staid*; vivacity, of *gravity*; wantonness, of *seriousness*.

A constant round of business and continual transaction of affairs make us *staid*; reflections on our latter end give *gravity*; the desire of being thought *grave*, *seriousness*.

Genius, Talent.

These are both born with us, and are a happy disposition of nature by which we are qualified for some peculiar employment: but *genius* seems to be more internal, and possessed of the powers of invention; *talent*, more external, and capable of execution.

Thus we have a *genius* for poetry and painting; but a *talent* for speaking and writing.

Such as have a *genius* for mechanics, may have no *talent* for watch-making.

People,

People, Persons.

The word *people* is so very general, that it cannot be connected with a determinate number; as for instance, four, five, or six *people*; but that of *persons* may.

To be pleasant at table, none should be admitted but *people* of good humour; neither should there be more than seven or eight *persons*.

In order to describe a company, we should know the quality of the *people*, and the number of *persons* present.

In all governments, we find ill-affected *people*; and there are always among a number, some discontented *persons*.

To Regard, Concern, Touch.

We say very indifferently, without much choice, that a thing *regards* us, *concerns* us, or *touches* us, to mark the part we bear in it. There nevertheless appears to me, to be a delicate distinction between these three expressions, each rising gradually above the other, according to the rank in which I have placed them. Though we have the least part imaginable in a thing, it may be said, to *regard* us; to *concern* us, we must have a greater; but when we are sensibly affected by it, it may be said to *touch* us. It seems also, that the word *regard* is more applicable, when our interest is in question; that of *concern*, when speaking of things, committed to our care and conduct; that of *touch*, when it respects our honour or fortune.

The ill-behaviour of a servant to a customer, *regards* the master; as it affects his interest. The least disturbance in Europe, in some measure, *regards* every state; it being difficult for any of them to keep a perfect neutrality for any length of time, while the others are at war. All the operations of government *concern* the first minister. It *concerns* a man

to be punctual in the discharge of his duty: The conduct of a wife *touches* the husband so close, that he ought to have an eye over all she does. The behaviour of an ambassador, *touches* always more or less the honour of the prince he represents.

Many people make themselves uneasy at that which does not in the least *regard* them; meddle with what noways *concerns* them; and at the same time are indifferent to those things which *touch* them nearly.

Tranquillity, Peace, Quiet.

These words, let them be applied either to the soul, to a republic, or any particular society; express equally a situation exempt from trouble and molestation; but *tranquillity* relates to that within one's self, and in the time present, independent of any other relation: *peace* to the situation, with regard to enemies in whose power it is to make an alteration: *quiet* with respect to time past or future, as succeeding or preceding a situation troubled.

Uneasy people have no *tranquillity* in their families. Litigious persons are hardly ever at *peace* with their neighbours. After a troublesome time, we enjoy a *quiet* state with greater satisfaction.

What a state of *tranquillity* does the religious man enjoy; no outward things having the power to ruffle or discompose him! To preserve *peace*, we should keep ourselves always in a state of defence. It is indulgence only that will establish *quiet* in a mutinous people.

Huge, Vast, Enormous, Immense.

The common idea of these words is something greatly beyond the usual measure; but those of *huge* and *vast*, relate more to such things as are material; those of *enormous* and *immense*, to such as are ideal; with

with this difference between them ; that *huge* implies greatness in bulk ; *vast*, greatness in extent ; *enormous*, greatness in size even to deformity and dreadfulnes ; *immense*, unlimited extent, even beyond expression. Thus we say, a *huge* giant ; a *vast* tract of land ; an *enormous* crime ; the *immense* expanse.

There are some promontories so *huge* as to shock the eye that views them. The desarts of Arabia are so *vast*, that unless travellers carried their lodging and provision with them, they would perish before they reached their journey's end. The sins of the presumptuous wretch are so *enormous*, that he can have little hopes of salvation, but in the infinite mercies of an all-gracious God. So great is the *immensity* of the Godhead, as to exceed the utmost stretch of human thought.

Way, Road.

Way is much more extensive and general than *road* ; and implies the passage from place to place, whether through the high *road* or not : *road* is much more limited and particular, and means the beaten way of travellers, from one town or city to another. Which, says the traveller, is our best *way* to Hampton ; the Hounslow *road* or Kingston ? either *road* ; says his guide, is good ; but when we come to Twickenham, the shortest *way* is across the fields ; though the pleasantest *way* would be to go by water.

As the word *way* is often used to signify means ; which when considered as the intermediate step to attainment, is not widely different from that of *road* ; when we would adopt the figure of travelling, not to confuse our ideas, we generally make use of the word *road* : thus diligence with perseverance is the high *road* to preferment ; yet, notwithstanding, *way* is a much more elegant expression : a strict adherence to the principles of christianity is the direct *way* to heaven.

Ways,

Ways, Means.

We go the *ways*; we use the *means*.

Ways are the methods we take, *means*, what we put in execution to succeed. The first word enfolds in its idea, honour and probity; the last pays little or no regard but to the end aimed at. Thus, good *ways* are those which are just; good *means*, those which are sure.

Simoniacal practices are very bad *ways*; but very good *means* of obtaining benefices.

I cannot avoid here taking notice of the ingrammatical impropriety of annexing the singular number to the word *means*; the fault almost of every speaker and writer; liberality, say they, is *a* sure *means* of becoming popular: there *is* no better *means* of keeping in with the world, than that of passing by affronts with composure.—Glaring absurdity! since the word *means* is evidently plural, and it would be much more elegant was the false concord avoided.

Often, Frequently.

One relates to the repetition of the same acts; the other, to a plurality of objects. We *often* disguise our thoughts: by doing the same thing *often* it becomes habitual. We *frequently* meet with traitors: we *frequently* do those things which we repent of afterwards.

There are two other words bearing an equal signification with *often*, viz. *oft* and *oftentimes*, but they being no more than the same word abbreviated and lengthened, it is needless to take any further notice of them.

Cannot, Impossible.

One of these words more properly relates to inability; the other to impossibility.

†

We

We cannot serve two masters. It is *impossible* to execute two opposite orders at the same time.

We cannot love one by whom we have been injured. It is *impossible* to love one to whom we have a natural aversion.

Glory, Honour.

Glory expresses something more singular than *honour*. The one makes us undertake voluntarily, the most difficult things; the other leads us willingly to the execution of the most rigorous exactions.

Quest of *glory* sometimes stimulates the soldier's courage, even to rashness; and notions of *honour*, in spite of fear, keep him often to his duty.

An indifference to *glory* may pass unnoticed; but not so, with respect to *honour*.

It is customary in conversation, to place interest in opposition to *glory*; and inclination to *honour*: thus we say, an author who labours after *glory*, takes more pains in the completion of his piece, than he who works merely for interest: and when an avaricious man lays out his money, it is more through *honour* than inclination.

World, Universe.

World conveys only an idea of one single being, though general; that which exists: *Universe*, an idea of many beings, or rather that of all parts of the world; all that exists: the first of these words, is sometimes used in the literal sense, as when we say, the old and new *world*; and sometimes in a figurative, as when we say, in this *world* and in the other; the wicked *world*; the polite *world*: the second is always used according to the letter; and in a sense that excepts no one thing: it is for this reason, when we would express the *universe*, by the term, *world*, that we are obliged to put the word *all* before

before it, which we have no occasion to do by *universe*; for example, we should say, the sun warms *all the world*, and is the heat of the *universe*.

Answer, Reply.

The *answer* is made to a demand or a question asked; the *reply*, to an answer or a remonstrance.

Academics are taught first to start difficulties, and then to *answer* them. It is nobler to hear a wise remonstrance and profit by it, than make any *reply*.

The word *answer* is more extensive in its signification than *reply*; we *answer* the questions of those who ask us; the demands of such as expect our services; the examination of counsel; the arguments of disputants; the letters we receive; and for all our conduct. The word *reply* is far more limited; it supposes a dispute, commenced from difference of sentiment; we *reply* to the answer of an author whose works we have criticised; to the reprimands of those whose correction we are unwilling to submit to; to pleaders; to an answer in chancery.

An *answer* should be clear, true, and dictated by reason and good sense; a *reply* strong and convincing, armed by truth, and strengthened by experience.

We should teach children as much as possible to give nice and judicious *answers*; and convince them, that there is more honour in listening, than in making *replies* to those who have the goodness to instruct them.

Danger, Hazard, Risk, Venture.

All these words imply chance of harm; but that of *danger* relates to the evil that may happen; those of *hazard*, *risk*, and *venture* to the good, we may lose; with this difference, that *hazard* expresses something near; *risk*, something at a distance; *venture*,

ture, something farther off, relating only to the possibility of events. Hence those expressions, in *danger* of death; in *hazard* of our life; by giving a loose to debauchery, we *risk* our health; nothing *venture*; nothing have.

Danger creates fear; *hazard*, alarm; *risk*, caution; but we often *venture* with the greatest satisfaction.

The avaricious man, spurred on by interest, fears no *danger*; *hazards* his health and happiness; runs every *risk* that attends his profession; and gladly ventures his all, in search of that, which if obtained, he would not have the spirit to enjoy.

Against, In spite of.

Both these denote opposition; but the expression, *in spite of*, implies more resolution and greater force than the word *against*; *against*, supposing little or no resistance in the object opposed; but *in spite of*, a considerable struggle.

We act *against* the will, or *against* rule, and *in spite of* oppositions.

The good man does nothing *against* the dictates of his conscience. The wicked man commits sin *in spite of* the punishment annexed to it.

Rashness will attempt things, *against* all appearance of success; and resolution will pursue the attempt, *in spite of* all the obstacles it meets with.

Boldness, Audaciousness, Impudence, Effrontery.

There is a commendable *boldness* that proceeds from a self-consciousness of worth; but the *boldness*, which is here meant, springs from ignorance; is brazen and presuming. *Audaciousness* is a greater degree of *boldness*, such as is steeled against reproof; is rude and noisy. *Impudence* consists, in being an utter stranger to all kind of modesty; is scurrilous
and

and abusive. *Effrontery*, proceeds from pride and self-sufficiency; is overbearing and insolent.

The *bold* are unawed by diffidence; they speak with great assurance; neither the quality or rank of those they address, being able to disconcert them. The more you reprove the *audacious* man, the more it hardens him; he wilfully forgets the respect due to his superiors, and idly imagines his boisterous behaviour, a distinguishing mark of manhood. The weapons of the *impudent* are sauciness and abuse, which they take up at every turn; and, with which they lay about them in a most unmerciful manner. As great a cause of *effrontery* as any, is the want of education; he whom it possesses, is arrogant and insolent, a stranger to good sense, and unacquainted with the rules of good-breeding.

Profitable, Advantageous, Beneficial.

Profitable is more applicable to gain; *advantageous*, to honour, or any kind of convenience; *beneficial*, to health.

Some kinds of merchandise are far more *profitable* than others. A good name is very *advantageous*, as it serves to push us forward in the world. Loss of blood, to a feverish person, is very *beneficial*.

Light *profits* make a heavy purse. A seasonable word, spoke in favour, is frequently of more *advantage* than the greatest services. The greatest *benefit* to the soul, is a sincere repentance.

To See, Look at, Behold, View.

We *see* whatever strikes the sight: we *look at* an object, when we designedly cast our eye upon it: we *behold* it, when we look with attention: *view* it, when we survey it.

We *see* all objects before our eyes: we *look at* those which excite our curiosity: we *behold* such as cause our admiration: we *view* those we are desirous to examine.

We

We *see* distinctly or confusedly. We *look at*, near or at a distance. We *behold* with wonder and attention. We *view* with care and exactness.

The eyes open to *see*; turn to *look at*; fix themselves to *behold*; and move all ways to *view*.

The connoisseur in painting *looks at* the first picture he *sees*; if it be the work of a celebrated artist, he *beholds* it with pleasure, and *views* every part of it with the greatest minuteness.

To Stare, Gaze.

Though the common meaning of these words is, to fix both the eyes upon an object, and look at it with wonder, intently and earnestly; yet there is a great difference between them: *staring*, implies looking with wonder and impudence; *gazing*, with wonder and respect.

The impudence of some fellows is so great, that they will *stare* a modest woman out of countenance.

A man in love, will sometimes *gaze* upon the object of his affections, till he almost loses his sight.

When our Saviour first appeared to his disciples, after his resurrection; they *gazed* on him with astonishment and rapture.

To *stare* another in the face, has always been considered as a breach of good manners.

Useful, Serviceable.

As nearly synonymous as these words may appear to be, there is yet a manifest difference between them; but the distinction is so delicate, as to require some attention to discover it. *Useful*, in my opinion, is more applicable to things in use; to those we have often recourse to; and what cannot be well done without: *serviceable*, to things of service, such as we oftener do without than with: and such as we cannot always obtain. Thus, furniture is *useful*;
 memorandum

memorandum books, to persons engaged in a multiplicity of business, are *useful*. Friends and good connections, are *serviceable*.

The plummet is so *useful* to the carpenter, that to fix a perpendicular without it, would give him a great deal of trouble. Of all animals, a horse is the most *serviceable*.

To those who take snuff, a box is extremely *useful*; but its contents, very far from *serviceable*.

Gulph, Abyss.

What these words should express, is rather imaginary than real: they are generally used therefore in a figurative sense: we are supposed to be swallowed up by a *gulph*; and lost in an *abyss*. The first carries with it, an idea of insatiable voracity, which drags in and consumes all that approaches; the second, of an unmeasurable depth, to whose bottom we can never get; and in which we lose, at the same time the sight of the place from whence we came, and of that where we are going.

A *gulph* is supposed to have many turns and windings; of which, if we have once set a step in, we cannot possibly get out, but are carried on in spite of all our endeavours to the contrary. An *abyss* is supposed to have many uncertain and obscure roads, without end; in which, though we may sometimes stoop, in hopes of finding a way out; yet being deceived, we become disheartened, bewildered with doubts, and overwhelmed with despair.

A loose woman is a *gulph* of woe, all perishes there; virtue, riches, and health. Philosophy teaches us, that man is continually wandering in an *abyss* of darkness.

Determination, Resolution.

Determination is an act of judgment, and supposes examination; *resolution*, an act of the will, and supposes

poses deliberation: the first shuts out suspense; the last, wavering.

Our *determinations* should be just, to avoid repentance; our *resolutions* fixed, to exclude variation.

Nothing is more disagreeable, both to ourselves and others, than to be always *undetermined* in our affairs, and *irresolute* in our proceedings.

It is more difficult to *determine* on points of precedence, than on solid and real interests. There are no weaker *resolutions* than those made at confession, or on a sick-bed; the first return of health carrying us again into the same course of life.

We may be *determined*, and yet not *resolved*; that is, we may come to some decision, and still not to be so far *resolved*, as to put that decision into execution; fear, timidity, or some other motive may prevent us.

The *determinations* of women, are seldom better grounded than on whim or caprice. Men are so often led by taste and custom, that their *resolutions* are generally vain.

In science, we say, the *determination* of a point; the *resolution* of a difficulty.

The more we *determine*, the less we prove. Though in the schools, we answer every difficulty, we *resolve* but few.

Old, Ancient, Antique.

These words rise one upon the other; *antique* upon *ancient*, and that of *ancient* upon *old*.

A fashion is *old*, when it ceases to be in use; *ancient*, when its use has been sometime past; *antique*, when it has been a long time *ancient*.

That which is recent is not *old*; that which is new is not *ancient*; that which is modern is not *antique*.

Oldness agrees best with age; *ancientness*, with the origin of families; *antiquity*, with what existed in former times.

As we grow *old*, we decrease in strength; but gain more experience.

An-

Ancientness makes fashions disagreeable ; but adds splendour to nobility.

Antiquity destroys the proofs of history, and weakens credit ; but renders monuments of greater value.

General, Universal.

General implies a great number of particulars ; *universal*, every particular.

The government of princes has no object in view, but the *general* good. The providence of God is *universal*.

An orator speaks in *general*, when he makes no particular application. Knowledge is *universal*, when it knows every thing.

Christianity is *generally* known and believed ; but not *universally*.

Word, Term, Expression.

Nothing is more common than an indiscriminate use of these words ; and yet none differ more among themselves. A *word* is a single part of speech ; is *general*, and determined by use : *term* is a particular cast of language ; owes its formation to the subject, and its excellence to its suitableness. *Expression* is a certain mode of speech ; rises from thought, and is more or less beautiful, according to its particular turn.

The purity of language depends upon its *words* ; the precision, upon its *terms* ; and brilliancy, upon its *expressions*.

Elaborate discourses require the *words* to be truly English ; the *terms* proper ; and the *expressions* noble.

A *word* which has escaped us undesignedly, sometimes has been attended with fatal consequences. *Terms* of art are now pretty generally known ; however, they appear with little grace, except in the mouths of the professors of those arts. Starched or far-fetched *expressions*, carry with them an air of pedantry.

Pile,

Pile, Heap.

These words equally signify a quantity of things together, one upon another; with this difference, that *pile* rather means things put up regularly; whereas, *heap* implies no other order in the arrangement, than what rises from chance. As; a *pile* of wood; a *heap* of rubbish.

We say, a *pile* of bricks; when they are the materials prepared for building; and a *heap* of bricks, when they are the remains of a fallen edifice.

Departure, Death, Decease.

Departure is a stile more refined, and carries with it an idea of the passage from one life to another; *death*, more common, and signifies, precisely, extinction of life; *decease*, more studied, is a term somewhat bordering upon the law, and implies the refuge of mortality. The second of these words is made use of with respect to all sorts of animals; the other two to man only.

A glorious *departure* is preferable to a shameful life. *Death* is the common lot of all things living. Succession, does not take place, 'till the moment of *decease*.

Departure presents nothing horrid to the imagination, it indicates something agreeable in eternity: *decease* conveys only an idea of trouble, in being separated from things we are much attached to: but *death* presents something dreadful and affrighting.

Value, Worth.

Value rises from the intrinsic goodness of things; *worth* from the estimation of them.

Of two things, the best is the most *valuable*; and that *worth* most, that bears the greatest price.

E VALLEY

Valley, Bottom, Vale, Dale.

Of these four words, *valley* implies a narrow space, situated between two hills; *bottom*, a like space, but quaggy and disagreeable. *Vale* signifies a space more extended: whereas, *dale* means rather low lands.

The words, *dale* and *vale*, are oftener found in poetry; *valley* and *bottom*, in prose.

Valleys are, for the most part, winding, and as they receive water from the hills on each side, are generally converted into meads. He whose house stands in a *bottom*, cannot live on a more unhealthy spot. A fine *vale*, with beautiful enclosures, bounded by rising woods, is a delightful prospect. *Dales* are much easier to be ploughed than hilly lands.

Head, Chief.

The word, *head*, is reckoned synonymous only to *chief*, when used in a figurative sense; but, even then, it requires a different application. *Head* agrees best with respect to arrangement: *chief*, with regard to subordination. Thus we say, the *head* of a batallion, or a ship; the *chief* of a party, or an undertaking.

A commander in *chief* is generally at the *head* of his troops.

Impediment, Obstacle, Obstruction.

There seems to be a gradation in these words. The *impediment* stays; the *obstacle* resists; the *obstruction* puts an entire stop to.

We say, remove the *impediment*; surmount the *obstacle*; take away or vanquish the *obstruction*.

Even small *impediments*, sometimes, prove such *obstacles* as *obstruct* our best endeavours.

The word, *impediment*, seems to express something, rising from the nature and proper circumstances of what we are about; that of *obstacle*, something from

a foreign cause; that of *obstruction*, something proceeding from a superior force.

Every temptation may be said to *impede* our resolutions to virtue. The eloquence of Demosthenes was the greatest *obstacle* that Philip of Macedon found in all his political undertakings, and which he could never surmount but by force of arms. Nearness of kin is an *obstruction* to marriage which the laws have made, and which those laws only can take away.

Learning, Literature, Erudition.

Of all order of words, there does not appear a more regular climax than in the above three; which seems to be completed by the word KNOWLEDGE; but as that has never been accounted synonymous with these, I shall take no notice of it, here.

Learning implies, simply, that knowledge which we acquire by our common study at school. *Literature* denotes polite learning, or an acquaintance with the Belles Lettres, and is rather practical; but *erudition* signifies great depth of knowledge, with a particular relation to that which is speculative.

Without some degree of *learning*, 'tis impossible to pass well through the world. There was a time, when the nobility piqued themselves on being men of *literature*. A taste for *erudition* will furnish infinite amusement for a tranquil and retired life.

To Inquire, Interrogate, Ask.

We *inquire*, we *interrogate*, we *ask*, in order to know; but the verb, *inquire*, implies curiosity; that of *interrogate*, authority; that of *ask*, something more civil and respectful.

The words, *inquire* and *interrogate*, make sense by themselves; but to use the word *ask*, with propriety, we must add the matter to it; that is, to make the sense perfect, we must mention the thing we *ask*.

'Tis the business of a spy to *inquire*. Criminals are *interrogated* by the judge. The soldier *asks* orders from the commanding officer.

To *Shun*, *Avoid*, *Fly*.

We *shun* those persons whom we would not see, or by whom we would not be seen. We *avoid* doing things that are disagreeable to us. We *fly* both persons and things which we fear and dread.

In the words *shun* and *avoid*, which seem to have the nearest affinity to each other, there is this standing difference, that the word *shun* is generally applied to persons; that of *avoid*, to things.

In order to *fly*, we turn to the opposite side, and get quick away to prevent being taken; in order to *shun*, we take another road, getting slyly away to avoid being seen, or to escape a trap; in order to *avoid*, we use some extraordinary means.

We *shun* troublesome company. We *avoid* running into excess. We *fly* those who pursue us.

Knowledge of the world makes us *shun*. Prudence makes us *avoid*. Fear makes us *fly*.

The best remedy against the plague, is to *fly* far from the place where it is. The surest method of preserving our innocence, is to *shun* bad company. It is an act of the greatest weakness, not to *avoid* doing those things which are detrimental to our interest.

Severity, *Rigour*.

Severity shews itself, chiefly, in the manner of thinking and judging; it condemns readily, and admits of no excuse. *Rigour* is seen, particularly, in the manner of punishing; it pardons nothing, nor lightens the stroke.

False-devotees are *severe* only to others, whom they are ever eager to condemn; and are always applauding their own actions. *Rigour* can never be justifiable, but at those times when example is of the ut-

most consequence; yet, even then, some sort of allowance should be made for human frailty.

To Succour, Help, Assist, Relieve.

We make use of the word *succour*, in danger; *help*, in labour; *assist*, in want; *relieve*, in distress. The first springs from a motive of generosity; the second, from good nature; the third, from humanity; the fourth, from compassion.

We give *succour*, in battle; we *help*, when we carry part of another's burden; we *assist* the poor; and *relieve* the afflicted.

The policy of states has found it necessary to *succour* each other, when the power of any one of them is gaining too great a head. Very extraordinary things have been done by the joint *help* of numbers. Many a parent has *beggar'd* himself in advancing the fortune of his child; 'tis, therefore, the indispensable duty of that child to *assist* his father to the utmost of his power. The truly compassionate man receives as much inward satisfaction in *relieving* the distressed, as he communicates.

Always, Continually, Perpetually.

That which we do *always*, we do at all times, and on all occasions; that which is done *continually*, is done without interruption or intermission, but for a time limited; whereas, what is done *perpetually*, is done also without intermission, and without any regard to time.

We should *always* prefer our duty to our pleasure. It is impossible to be *continually* at work. The heavenly bodies are *perpetually* in motion.

To please in company we should *always* talk well, but not *continually*. The longitude may be discovered by *perpetual* motion.

Diversity, Variety.

Diversity supposes a change, which taste is always in search of, in order to discover some novelty that may enliven and delight it: *variety* supposes a plurality of things, differing from each other in likeness, which cheers the imagination, apt to be cloyed with too great a uniformity.

Without some *diversity* life would be altogether insipid. Nature has thrown infinite *variety* among the smallest objects; which, if we cannot perceive, is owing to a defect of light.

An agreeable *diversity* of colours, will give as much pleasure to the eye, as harmonious sounds to the ear. *Variety* of amusements insensibly lead us into dissipation.

Difference, Dispute, Quarrel.

Opposition of interests causes *differences*. Contrariety of opinions produces *disputes*. Harshness of dispositions is the source of *quarrels*.

We make up the *difference*. We end the *dispute*. We appease the *quarrel*.

Envy and covetousness make sometimes great *differences* for trifles. Prejudice and want of attention to what is said commonly prolong *disputes*. *Quarrels*, for the most part, proceed more from disposition than animosity.

Ill, Sick.

These two words are considered only as synonymous, when they imply afflicted with disease; but as indiscriminately as they may be used, even in that sense still they convey different ideas, marking different degrees of illness. The word *ill*, in my opinion, is used with most propriety when health is the least impaired; that of *sick*, when the body is greatly diseased. Thus we say, when we find a heaviness upon the

the spirits, or a want of appetite, that we are *ill*; but when the whole frame of any one is disordered, we naturally say he is *sick*.

When we apply either of these words to ourselves they carry very different meanings; thus, I am *ill*, is general, and implies disordered in any part of the body; whereas, I am *sick*, is particular, and means disordered in the stomach.

There is yet a further distinction between them; *ill* is most applicable, when in pain only; *sick*, when diseased; thus we say, he is *ill* of the gout; but *sick* of a fever.

Disease, Distemper, Sickness.

Disease and *distemper* imply particular disorders, with this difference, that *disease* is more applicable to man; *distemper* to brutes; whereas *sickness* is more general, and may be applied to either.

Diseases, such as the plague, fevers, &c. are sometimes so epidemical, as to lay waste more than the sword. *Distempers* among cattle are generally infectious. Divine displeasure hath often shewn itself by a general *sickness* among men and beasts.

Both *diseases* and *distempers*, when become universal, are *sicknesses* so severe, as draw the joint prayers of a people, in hopes to avert them.

Weary, Tired, Fatigued.

It is the continuation of the same thing that either *wearies* or *tires*; with this difference, that *weary* implies a less degree; *tired* a greater; but it is labour that *fatigues*. We grow *weary* or *tired* with standing. We are *fatigued* with work.

When we are *weary* of a thing, to complete it, we lack spirits; when *tired*, we are totally unable; when *fatigued*, we want strength to go through it as we would.

Weariness proceeds sometimes from an unwillingness in what we undertake; we are frequently *tired* through disposition of body, and slow circulation of blood; but fatigue is always the consequence of much action; it supposes excess of work, with respect either to difficulty or length of time.

In a figurative sense, a petitioner grows *wearry*, through his impatience; *tired* through his perseverance; and *fatigued* through his importunities.

We are *wearry* with waiting; *tired* with ill success; and *fatigued* with pursuing.

Thus, we may be *wearry*, and not *tired*; *tired*, yet not *fatigued*.

Light, Brightness, Splendor.

Light is the origin or commencement of *brightness*; *splendor* is *brightness* in perfection.

The intention of *light* is only to make objects visible, that of *brightness* to make them clearly distinguishable and known: *splendor* shews them to the greatest degree of perfection.

It is *light* at day-break, *light* in the morning; *splendid* at noon.

We attribute *light* to the stars; *brightness* to the moon; and *splendor* to the sun.

Lustre, Brilliancy, Radiancy.

These three words, as the last, rise gradually one upon another, and mark the different degrees of the effect of light.

Lustre seems to be possessed of polish only; *brilliancy* of light; but *radiancy* of fire.

Lustre shines only; *brilliancy* dazzles; but *radiancy* glares.

We seldom make use of the word *lustre*, but in the literal sense; whereas we frequently use that of *radiancy*, and much more often that of *brilliancy* in the figurative. Considered then in this sense, it appears

to

to me, that it is the force of truth, the energy of language, and the newness of the thoughts, that gives *radiancy* to a discourse; whereas *brilliancy* rises from the beautiful turns and lively touches of expression: and that it is the choice of words, the agreement of terms, and the arrangement of phrases, that gives *lustre* to what is said.

Wisdom, Prudence.

Wisdom makes us act and speak properly; *prudence* prevents our speaking or acting improperly. The first, in order to attain its ends, searches out the best paths to follow: the second, that it may not miss its aim, tries to discover the bad ways, in order to avoid them.

Wisdom is more knowing; *prudence* more wary.

The *wise* man makes use of those means that are most proper for his purpose; he conducts himself by the light of reason. The *prudent* man takes those ways he thinks most sure; he does not venture into places unknown.

An ancient writer has said, that it is a mark of *wisdom*, not to talk on any subject but what we are thorough masters of, especially if we would be esteemed: we may add to this maxim, that it is a piece of *prudence* not to bring a disagreeable subject on the tapis, particularly if we are desirous of being beloved.

To Find, Meet with.

We *find* things unknown, or which we sought after. We *meet with* things that are in our way, or which present themselves to us, unsought for.

The unfortunate *find* always some resource in their misfortunes. People who readily unite themselves with all the world, are liable to *meet with* bad company.

Union, Joining.

Union relates particularly to two different things, which agree together. *Joining* respects, properly, two distant things, which draw near together one after the other.

The word *union* carries with it an idea of agreement and fitness: that of *joining* seems to suppose some kind of motion.

We say the *union* of colours; and the *joining* of armies: the *union* of two neighbours; and the *joining* of two rivers.

That which is not *united* is divided: that which is not *joined* is separated.

We *unite*, in order to form a society. We *join*, for the sake of company.

Union is often used in a figurative sense; but *joining*, only in the literal.

Union is the support of families, and the power of states. The *joining* of many streams forms great rivers.

Situation, Condition, State.

The words *situation* and *condition*, imply something accidental and transitory; with this difference, that *situation* respects outward circumstances; *condition*, those within the matter referred to; whereas that of *state* implies something more habitual and lasting.

We generally use the word *situation*, as relative to affairs, rank, or fortune; *condition*, with respect to the nature, quality, or property of a thing; and that of *state*, applying it to health, or our well or ill-being.

We say our *situation* is bad, when we are surrounded with difficulties; that a building is in bad *condition*, when out of repair; and that some persons enjoy but an indifferent *state* of health.

An ill-*state* of health, added to a bad *situation* of affairs, is a *condition* into which every man must naturally dread the falling.

Such is the *condition* and vicissitude of human life, that the most prudent men have often found themselves

selves in perplexing situations; and, from a state of happiness, have, as it were, through the perverseness of fortune, fallen into one most wretched and deplorable.

Of Fashion, of Quality.

As synonymous as these expressions may be, in the mouths of those who use them, they still imply particular characters, in their right signification, when we are obliged, on certain occasions, to express ourselves properly. The last of these expressions rises upon the first, and signifies the nobility; whereas, by the other, is only understood the gentry.

The pride and folly of the world is grown to so great a pitch, that persons in trade are continually apeing people of *fashion*; and those of *fashion*, people of *quality*.

Notes, Remarks, Observations.

Notes imply a shortness and precision: *remarks*, a choice and distinction: *observations*, something critical and far-fetched.

Notes are often necessary; *remarks* are sometimes useful: *observations* should be always learned.

Change of manners and customs, for the most part renders authors in want of *notes*. There are as good *remarks*, perhaps, to be made upon the moderns, as upon the ancients. Historical *observations* make antiquity more known.

To Take, Receive, Accept.

We *take* what is given us. We *receive* what is sent us. We *accept* what is offered us.

We *take* money; we *receive* favours; we *accept* services.

To *accept* implies always consent and approbation; to *receive* does not; to *take* excludes only refusal.

No man should ever *take* more than his due. We should always acknowledge those civilities we have *received*. What we have once *accepted* should never afterwards be rejected.

Sentiment, Opinion, Thought.

These words are all in use when the bare expression only of ideas is in question. In this sense *sentiment* is more certain; it is a belief raised by solid or apparent reasons; *opinion* is more doubtful; it is a judgment built on some foundation: *Thought* is still less certain, springing only from conjecture.

The word *sentiment* is used with more propriety when the subject is on taste. That Homer is an excellent poet is the *sentiment* of every man of learning. The word *opinion* agrees best when talking of science. It is the general *opinion* that the sun is the centre of the world. The word *thought* is more particularly in use when we are judging of the event of things, or the actions of men. Politicians have long *thought* that the Moscovians would find a greater advantage from Asia than from Europe.

Sentiments are, in some measure, guided by the influence of the heart; we often find them in favour of those persons we love. *Opinions* are frequently owing to prejudice; it is common for scholars, to have good ones of their masters. *Thoughts* rise greatly from imagination; they are often chimerical.

Angry, in a Passion, Passionate.

An impatient agitation, or rising of the blood, against any one who has offended us, is the common import of the first two of these terms: The word *angry* implies a passion more internal and lasting; whereas the expression, *in a passion*, carries in its idea, a sudden external gust of anger; short, but violent.

Anger

Anger shall sometimes brood in the breast for years, till at last it becomes as it were fixed and settled; sometimes it will dissemble for a long while together; but often finds it extremely difficult to pardon; on the contrary, it is the general characteristic of those who are *in a passion* to forgive as soon as it subsides; which may, perhaps, be the next quarter of an hour; besides, the man *in a passion* cannot dissemble; his violence of *anger* must have vent; when that is obtained he is as cool as before: indeed his *passion* will now and then settle into confirmed *anger*, but, when that is the case, it is generally owing to repeated offences.

With respect to the word *passionate*, there is a wide difference between the man *in a passion* and the *passionate* man; the one being extraordinary, the other ordinary.

Few men, for example, can avoid being *in a passion* when they are greatly offended; but *passionate* people are heated on the most trifling occasions.

Hasty, Passionate.

According to my conception, it appears that *hasty* relates more to action or blows; and that *passionate* goes seldom farther than words.

A *hasty* man is apt to lift his hand; it is generally with him a word and a blow. A *passionate* man will vent his anger in words only.

We should be upon our guard when with *hasty* people; and have patience with the *passionate*.

Strong, Robust, Stout, Sturdy.

Strength is chiefly owing to the construction of the muscles. A little man is often *stronger* than a greater. *Robustness* carries with it an idea of lustiness, is less subject to infirmities, and much owing to constitution. A short man may be *robust*. By *stout*, we understand tall and strong-made. A little man, though never so

strong,

strong, cannot be called *stout*. By *sturdy*, we mean *stout*, with a degree of hardness.

Strength gives a man an advantage over his enemies; *robustness* lends him an air of dignity and authority; *stoutness* makes him admired; *sturdiness* is accompanied with an air of meanness.

Complaisant, Polite, Well-bred.

Complaisance rises from the respect we shew those whom we meet; is sometimes sincere, sometimes not; *politeness*, from the flattering methods we make use of in our behaviour and conversation, and is generally insincere; but to be *well-bred* is to shew the same honours always with sincerity.

Complaisance is the characteristic of the lover; *politeness* of the courtier; but to be *well-bred* denotes the gentleman.

We should be *complaisant* without importunity; and *polite* without insipidity. The distinguishing mark of a *well-bred* man is the constant care he takes never to disgust or offend.

Hump-backed, Crooked, Deformed.

The true meaning of the word *hump-backed*, is having a rising upon the back; owing either to *crookedness*, or some other cause, and may be either natural or accidental: though the words *crooked* and *deformed* convey other ideas, still nothing is more common than to find them frequently in use to express the same as *hump-backed*. By *crookedness* is understood any deviation from natural straightness. *Deformity* implies any part of the body being imperfect or unnatural. Thus a man is *crooked*, if any ways twisted or bent from the natural shape; and *deformed*, if he has an eye, a finger, or a toe, too little, or too much. We may be *hump-backed* or *crooked* by a fall, or some other accident; but *deformed* we cannot be, otherwise than by a defect or exuberance in nature.

A man

A man may be *deformed* and not *crooked*; *crooked*, yet not *bump-backed*.

Perfect, Finished, Complete.

Perfection regards, properly, the beauty which rises from the design and construction of the work; *finishing*, that which rises from the workmanship and hand of the workman. *Completion* depends upon the want of nothing; but on the work's having every thing it should have. The first excludes all sorts of defect. The second shews a particular care and attention to the minutest article. The third respects more the totality of parts.

We may easily make a thing *complete*, and with much pains *finish* it; but, after all, it may not be *perfect*.

Misfortune, Disaster, Calamity.

Each of these words denotes a sad event; but that of *misfortune* is applied to casualties and outward circumstances, things detached from us. *Disaster* respects, properly, personal accidents. *Calamity* implies something more general.

It is a *misfortune* to lose our money or our friend. It is a *disaster* to fall or be wounded. It is a *calamity* to find ourselves suddenly disgraced and ruined in the world.

We say a great *misfortune*; a shocking *disaster*; and a dreadful *calamity*.

Misfortunes will happen to the best of men. We bring *disasters* frequently upon ourselves through want of proper care. *Calamities* are often sent by heaven upon the wicked, to rouse them from their sinful lethargy.

To Consent, Acquiesce, Agree.

We *consent* to the will of others, by permitting. We *acquiesce* in what is proposed, by conforming. We *agree* to what is said, by approving.

We

We naturally oppose what we do not *consent* to; discourage what we will not *acquiesce* in; and dispute what we cannot *agree* to.

It appears to me, that the word *consent* supposes some authority in the person *consenting*; that of *acquiesce*, some submission in the person *acquiescing*; and that the word *agree* denotes some aversion to dispute.

Parents *consent* to the marriage of their children. Parties *acquiesce* in the decree of a judge. Well-bred persons *agree* almost to every thing.

Management, Direction, Conduct.

Management respects only private things trusted to the care of some one to employ for the profit of another, and to whom he is to render an account; as that of a clerk to his master. *Direction* relates to certain affairs, where there is a distribution either of money, office, or whatever else is committed to the care of another, to preserve necessary order. *Conduct* points out some knowledge and ability, with respect to things; and a subordination, with regard to persons.

Whosoever has the *management* of any one's concerns in trust, should be as attentive and as careful as if they were his own. He who undertakes the *direction* of public charities, should divest himself of all prejudice and partiality. No one thing should be committed to the *conduct* of another, unless we are well persuaded he has abilities adequate to the task; and will act in conformity to the intentions of him whose business he undertakes.

Affront, Insult, Abuse.

Affront is an arrow of reproach and contempt shot in public; it piques and mortifies those who have any sense of honour. *Insult* is an attack made with insolence; it is usually repelled with spirit. Both *affronts* and *insults* may be given without words; but *abuse* results chiefly from scurrilous language.

Affronts

Affronts are often given through the childish itch of revenge. *Insults* are too frequently the offspring of pride. We seldom, if ever, hear *abuse* in the mouth of a well-bred man.

Happy is that person that can put up *affronts* with composure, bear *insults* with calmness, and turn a deaf ear to *abuse*.

To, In order to.

These terms are synonymous in that sense, where they signify doing one thing in view of another; but the word *to* denotes a nearer view; the expression, *In order to*, one farther off.

We get introduced to a prince *to* make our court: we make our court to him, *in order to* obtain his favours.

The word *to* seems to agree best, when what we do, in view of some other thing, is almost certain to take effect. The expression, *in order to*, appears to be used with most propriety, when the thing we have in view may not be the immediate consequence.

We fire cannon against a besieged place *to* make a breach, and *in order to* take it by assault, or oblige the enemy to surrender.

To respects, more particularly, an effect which ought to be produced. *In order to*, regards properly an aim which we would obtain.

Young women, at a certain age, do all they can *to* please, *in order to* procure themselves husbands.

Outside, Appearance.

In the literal sense, it is the walls, the ditches, the courts, the gardens, the avenues that form the *outside* of a castle; but it is the figures, the grandeur, the situation, and the architecture that determine the *appearance*: the *outside* being the external part of a thing; the *appearance*, the effect which a view of that thing

thing produces, or the idea we form of it, by that view.

In the figurative sense, *outside* is oftner applied to our manners, and our way of living: *appearance* seems to be more in use, with respect to our actions and our conduct.

A brilliant *outside* is no certain proof of a good fortune. Going frequently to church is an *appearance* that can determine little with regard to virtue.

Vision, Apparition.

A *vision* passes inwardly in the mind, and is supposed to be only an action of the imagination. An *apparition* strikes the senses outwardly, and is supposed to be an object from without.

Joseph was warned by a *vision* to fly into Egypt with his family. Mary Magdalen was informed of the resurrection of our Saviour by an *apparition*.

Feverish persons often think they see *visions*. Timid and credulous people sometimes take trees or posts for *apparitions*; and frequently objects of their own imagination.

To See, Perceive.

Objects that have some duration, or that shew themselves, are *seen*; those that pass by quickly, or are hid, in some measure from the eye, are only *perceived*.

We *see* the face, and by that *perceive* the disposition of the heart.

In a crowded court, those who stand forward are *seen* by the prince; while others, behind, are scarcely *perceived*.

In a further sense, *seeing* is the action of the eye; *perception*, the action of the mind.

We *see* the motions of an enemy; and *perceive* its designs.

To

To Fear, be Apprehensive, Dread, be Afraid.

We *fear* an ill; through a natural aversion to it, and from a sense that it may happen to us: we are *apprehensive* of losing a benefit, through an eager desire to obtain it, and from a conviction that we never may: we *dread* our adversary through sentiments of esteem, when we know him our superior: we are *afraid* of danger, through a timid disposition.

Want of courage makes us *fear*: Doubt of success makes us *apprehensive*. Distrust of strength makes us *dread*. Imagination itself will often make us *afraid*.

Common people *fear* death more than any thing: the Epicureans were much more in *fear* of pain; but gentlemen are of opinion they ought to fear nothing so much as infamy. The more ardently we wish for a thing, the more we *apprehend* the losing of it. Whatever merit an author may flatter himself that he has, he should always *dread* the judgment of the public. Women, who are *afraid* of nothing but losing their reputation, do honour to their sex.

To Teach, Learn, Instruct.

To *teach* is only to give lessons; to *learn* is to give lessons with success: both which words relate more to those things that are proper to cultivate the mind, and form a good education; for which reason we use them with propriety when the arts and sciences are in question. To *instruct* has a greater relation to that which is useful in the conduct of life and success of affairs; it is therefore in its proper place, when speaking of any thing that concerns either our duty or our interest.

Professors *teach* in public schools those who come to hear them. The historian *learns* posterity the events of his time. A father *instructs* his children how they ought to live in the world.

It requires great knowledge to *teach*; method and plainness to *learn* others; experience and abilities to *instruct*.

Man

Many persons attempt to *teach* what they have occasion to study themselves. Some will undertake to *learn* others what they themselves are almost ignorant of. Very few are capable of *instructing*.

The verb, to *learn*, however, is at best but inelegant, and is always used with more propriety when it signifies to gain knowledge, than to communicate it.

Gentle, Tame.

Gentle animals are naturally so; *tame* ones are so partly by the art and industry of man.

The dog, the ox, and the horse, are *gentle* animals; the bear and the lion are sometimes *tame*.

To Bind, Tie.

We *bind*, to prevent the limbs moving, or the parts of a thing separating; we *tie*, to stop a thing, or prevent its going any farther.

We *bind* the feet and hands of a criminal; and we *tie* him to a stake.

In the figurative sense, a man is *bound*, when he is not at liberty to act; and he is *tied*, when he cannot change his party, or quit it.

Authority and power *bind*; interest and love *tie*.

We do not think ourselves *bound*, when we see not our bonds: and we do not imagine ourselves *tied*, when we have no occasion to use our liberty.

To Hope, Expect.

The first of these words has, for its object, success in itself, and denotes a trust borne up by some encouragement. The second regards, particularly, the happy moment of event, and intimates a certainty of its arriving; we *hope* to obtain things; we *expect* their coming.

We

We should always *hope* for the indulgence of heaven; and *expect*, without murmuring, the hour of Providence.

What we *hope* for, seems to be more a favour or a kindness; what we *expect*, more a duty or obligation. Thus we *hope* for favourable answers to our demands; and we *expect* such as are agreeable to our propositions.

I *hope* my work will meet with the taste of the public; and I *expect* an equitable sentence.

Weight, Influence, Sway.

Taking these words in the sense of having power over the minds of others; *weight* implies prevalence, though small; *influence* seems to have more force; *sway* is more absolute.

Superiority of rank and reason gives *weight*; it is commonly by persuasion that it acts. Attachment to persons contributes much to the *influence* they have over us; it is by solicitation it prevails. The art of finding out and taking advantage of the weakness of men forms the *sway* we bear over them; 'tis by watching their motions that we succeed.

The *weight* we have with others proceeds always from some worth in ourselves, either of mind, birth, or fortune. *Influence* is owing to some tie, either of heart or interest. *Sway* rises from an ascendancy, arrogated by art, or ceded to us through weakness.

A person of *weight* has succeeded sometimes when arguments would have no force. *Influence*, on some occasions, hath wrought almost miracles, effecting that which money could not bring to bear. *Sway* is a wonderful operator on weak minds; procuring that, through art, which no other thing can possibly obtain.

What perverseness then can possibly withstand a man of some *weight* in himself; whose *influence* is great, and who knows how to bear a proper *sway*.

Authority,

Authority, Power, Dominion.

We find, in the word *authority*, sufficient energy to make us perceive a right, either of civil or politic administration. There is, in the word *power*, a particular relation to the subordinate execution of superior orders. The word *dominion* carries with it an idea of empire.

It is the law which gives *authority*; it deriving all its might from thence. *Power* is invested in delegates, those to whom the execution of the laws is intrusted, and is consequently in subordination to *authority*. *Dominion* springs from the joint consent of the people, or from the force of arms, and is either lawful or tyrannical.

We are happy in living under the *authority* of a Prince who prides himself in justice; whose minister assumes no *power* beyond what is legal; and who makes the welfare of his subjects the basis of his *dominion*.

Authority, if weak, is exposed to contempt; it is equally as dangerous not to make use of it on proper occasions as even to abuse it. A blind *power*, which acts in opposition to justice, becomes odious, and paves the way to its own ruin. A jealous *dominion*, that admits of no sharer, makes itself formidable; awakens, on that account, the ardor of its enemies, and thus ushers in its own fall.

There appears to me, particularly in the idea of *authority*, something just and respectable; in the idea of *power*, something strong and active; and in the idea of *dominion*, something great and elevated.

As there is none but God that has an unlimited *authority*; so there is none else who has infinite *power*; neither is there any absolute, sovereign, and independent *dominion* than his.

Nature has established no *authority* among men but that of fathers over their children; all other proceeds from positive right. The *power* of the passions is the true spring of action, and determines us with respect either to good or evil. It is not only by the dispo-

sition of human laws that marriage places the woman under the *dominion* of man; but it is also so settled by the divine.

Volume, Book.

A *volume* may contain many *books*: A *book* may make many *volumes*. The binding, properly, distinguishes the *volumes*; and the division of the work the *books*.

We must not always judge of the knowledge of an author by the largeness of the *volume*. Works are sometimes spread out into many *books*, which would be more valuable were they reduced to one.

To *have a Mind for*, *Long for*, *Wish for*, To *Hanker after*, *Lust after*.

The last of these expressions is more used in theology, and supposes, always, an illicit object, forbid by the laws of God; thus, we *lust after* a woman, or the goods of another. The others are all in common use, and express our inclination to a thing, be it what it will; with the following difference between them: We *have a mind for*, or *long for* a present object; but, *have a mind*, seems attended with more knowledge and reflection; *long for*, more opinion and more taste: we *wish for* things farther distant; we *hanker after* things that more affect us.

Princes sometimes *have a mind* to gratify their ambition at the expence of their future welfare. Women with child frequently *long for* most things they see: Lazy people often sit down and content themselves with *wishing for* those things they would presently obtain, if diligent and assiduous. Some children will *hanker* a long time *after* their nurses, and it is with the greatest difficulty they can be brought to forget them.

Gain,

Gain, Profit, Lucre, Emolument.

Gain seems to arise from something very casual; and implies risk and hazard; it is for this reason the word is in great use among gamesters and tradesmen. *Profit* appears to be more sure; proceeding either from lands or industry. Thus, we say, the *profits* of the earth; or the *profits* of our labour. The characteristic of *lucre* consists in a simple relation to the passion of interest; it is on this account we say, with the greatest propriety, that man is fond of *lucre*. *Emolument* relates to commissions and employments; intimating not only the salaries, but all other perquisites.

Some persons are so particularly rigid as to condemn all *gain* arising from play. Many will idly call that *profit* which has accrued by illicit means. It is low and sordid to be ever led by *lucre*. We do not always find the greatest honour in offices where there is the greatest *emolument*.

Very, Extremely.

We are apt to use these words indifferently, one as well as the other, to express a great degree of any thing. Thus, for example, we say, in the same sense, *very* wise; *extremely* wise; notwithstanding this, there appears to me some difference between them: The word *very* marks an extraordinary degree; but *extremely* a degree to admiration. Thus, we say, men are *very* wicked: Providence is *extremely* kind.

Besides this distinction, there is one more delicate, which is, that *very* does not suit well but in the literal and natural sense; for when we say a man is *very* wise, we would be understood, as saying, truly wise, whereas *extremely* may be used with elegance in an ironical sense. We say, then, in raillery, he is *extremely* wise in ceasing to pursue that he knows not how to get at; and *extremely* patient, in taking a blow calmly he has not the spirit to return.

Fantastical,

Fantastical, Whimsical, Maggoty, Fanciful.

Of these words, that of *fantastical* implies a rambling from true taste, through excess of delicacy, or an unseasonable search after something better. That of *whimsical* means an affectation of singularity. By *maggoty* is understood a great inconstancy or sudden change of taste. *Fanciful* implies a certain revolution of humour, or a particular way of thinking.

There cannot be a more despicable creature than the *fantastical* fop; he tricks out his charming self, in hopes of attracting the respect of mankind; but, on the contrary, meets only with scorn and contempt. The *whimsical* man, if his invention be fertile, is sometimes an object of present admiration; but, on serious reflection, is too frequently the subject of ridicule. A *maggoty* person is equally tiresome to himself and to others; as what pleases him one minute shall often displease him the next. He who is *fanciful* is far more troublesome to himself than to others; for being led away by his wild imagination, he fondly believes many things to be real, which, in fact, are only ideal.

Capacity, Ability.

Capacity has more relation to the knowledge of things; *ability* to their application. The one is acquired by study; the other by practice.

He who has *capacity* for a thing, is proper to undertake; he, who has *ability*, to execute.

Little, Small.

The word *little* sometimes signifies only want of bigness; and, at other times, want of greatness, in every sense; whereas that of *small* is the opposite only to bigness, and supposes some kind of length. Thus, we say a *little* house; a *little* man; a *little* cup; a *little* globe: but, a *small* thread; a *small* line; a *small* twig.

To Remark, Observe.

To *remark*, implies taking notice with attention, in order to remember : to *observe*, means rather to watch with examination, by way of passing our judgment.

The traveller *remarks* that which strikes him most ; the spy *observes* those proceedings which he thinks of consequence.

It is the part of a general to *remark* those of his men who distinguish themselves in battle ; and *observe* the motions of the enemy.

We may *observe*, in order to *remark* : but custom will not admit of an inversion of the phrase.

Those who *observe* the conduct of others, in order to *remark* their faults ; do it rather through a delight in censuring, than a desire of correcting their own errors.

To Go back, Return.

We *go back* from a place where we have some considerable time been. We *return* to a place we had just before left. Thus, we say he is *gone back* into his own country. He is *returned* home. We say, also, he is *gone back* from virtue ; he has *returned* to his fault.

Idea, Thought, Imagination, Notion.

The *idea* represents the object ; *thought* considers it ; *imagination* forms it ; thus worked up, it becomes a *notion*. The first only points ; the second examines ; the third seduces ; but the last draws.

When in conversation our *ideas* are just ; our *thoughts* fine ; and our *imagination*s brilliant ; we shall be sure to please : and our *notions*, though singular, will always be respectable.

Business, Affairs.

Business implies an object of industry; *affairs*, an object of concern. The first employs the hands; the second, the mind. The word *business*, by its having no plural number, intimates a particular employ; by the singular of *affairs* being seldom in use, in the sense before us, that word is understood to mean a variety of transactions.

The man of much *business* ought to have a strong constitution. He who has many *affairs* to settle, though he may have a clear head, will find it difficult to adjust them all to his satisfaction.

He who continually interferes with the *business* of others, neglecting his own *affairs* makes himself an object of ridicule, and merits the contempt of mankind.

To Take, Choose.

When we would *take* a thing we determine upon one, because we cannot have all. We *choose*, by comparing things, because we would have the best. The one supposes a simple determination of the will; the other a discernment of the mind.

Between two things, exactly alike, we may determine which to *take*, when, at the same time, there is no *choice*.

We are sometimes constrained to *take* one thing out of many, when we are not obliged to *choose*.

We cannot use the word *take* but with respect to ourselves; but we *choose* sometimes for others.

It is a point of good-manners, when offered fruit or any other thing, where there is *choice*, to *take* that which comes first to hand: but when we would present any thing of the like sort to a stranger, it is a mark of politeness to *choose* for him the best.

When things are at our option, that is, when we may *take* which we please, we should try to make a good *choice*.

Between a good course of life and a bad, there is no medium; we must either *take* the one or the other.

Nothing appears more difficult to me than the *choice* of a friend.

If in a journey there were only two roads to *take*, the one short, but bad ; the other long, but good, I should certainly *choose* the last.

To Choose, Make choice of.

The word *choose* is most in its place, with respect to things we would make use of. The expression, *make choice of* is more proper when it relates to persons we would appoint to any dignity or employ.

George the third *chose* the Queen's palace as his place of residence in town ; and *made choice of* Cæsar Hawkins to inoculate his children.

To *choose* indicates, more particularly, a comparison made between things, in order to know which is best to take ; to *make choice of*, marks with greater precision the simple determination of one person preferable to another.

Princes do not always *choose* their ministers ; neither do they always *make choice of* a Talbot for a chancellor, nor a Marlborough for a general.

To Choose, Prefer.

We do not always *choose* what we *prefer* : but we ever *prefer* that which we *choose*.

To *choose* is to determine in favour of a thing, either on account of its merit or its value. To *prefer*, is to determine in its favour, by any motive whatsoever ; whether it be merit, affection, good manners, policy, or what not.

'Tis the judgment that makes the *choice* ; the heart that gives the *preference*. 'Tis for this reason that we commonly *choose* what we are acquainted with, and *prefer* what we love.

Prudence sometimes forbids our *choosing* that which strikes the eye most. Justice will not often permit us to *prefer* our friends to other people.

In

In *choosing* a state of life, I think there can be no harm in *preferring* that which is most agreeable to our inclinations, as in so doing we should naturally find more satisfaction in our duty.

Choice is either good or bad, according to our taste, or the knowledge we have in things. *Preference* is either just or unjust, as reason dictates, or passion inspires.

Partial *preference* is sometimes allowed to princes in the distribution of their honours; but they should always make *choice* of the ablest men in their appointments to public offices.

Meat, Flesh.

By the word *Meat* is understood any kind of food; but *flesh* signifies only the natural composition of an animal. Thus, we say that fish and vegetables are proper *meats* for Lent; and that the *flesh* of a partridge is very white and tender.

Grain is the *meat* of birds; *flesh* the food of beasts.

Reformation, Reform.

Reformation signifies often the action of reforming; *reform* seldom any other than the effect.

A general *reformation* of manners among the people will ever be found a very difficult and laborious task. When we have not been able to complete a thing to our satisfaction, by any sort of amendment, we have often brought it to bear, by a thorough *reform*.

Smooth, Level.

That which is not rough is *smooth*. That which is free from either hollows or risings is *level*.

The *smoothest* marble is the best. A country where there is neither hills nor valleys is *level*.

Prerogative, Privilege.

Prerogative relates to honour and personal preference; it rises principally from subordination, or from the relation persons bear among themselves: whereas *privilege* implies some advantage from interest or office, proceeding from the grant of a prince, or the laws of a society.

Birth give *prerogatives*. Offices give *privileges*.

Prerogative is seldom used now but to imply the *privileges* of the Crown.

Knowing, Discerning.

The *knowing* man acts surely, he seldom deceives himself; yet knowledge of life only is his fort. The *discerning* man is clear-sighted and judicious, sees through the artifices of mankind with half an eye, and will not suffer himself to be deceived; his great abilities consist in distinguishing.

The study of man will make a person *knowing*; but it requires great experience, and a long attention both to men and books to render him *discerning*.

An artful ingenious rogue will sometimes take in the *knowing* by a novel deceit; through the fallacy of which the *discerning* man shall readily penetrate.

Order, Regularity.

Each of these words implies a prudent disposition of things; but that of *order* relates more to the effect which results from such a disposition; that of *regularity*, more to the power and to the model that conducts that disposition.

We observe *order* in conformance to *regularity*. The first is the effect of the second.

Traffic,

Traffic, Trade, Commerce.

Traffic relates more to the exchange of merchandise; *trade* and *commerce* to that of buying and selling; with this difference, that *trade* seems to imply the manufacturing and vending of merchandise within ourselves; *commerce* negotiating with other countries.

We *traffic* with nations that have not the use of money, by bartering one kind of merchandise for another. *Trade* is looked upon by the wisest of men, to be the support of every state; as the prosperity of a kingdom depends, in a great measure, upon its riches; and riches is the immediate effect of *trade*. The great and extensive *commerce* that England holds with other nations makes us the glory and admiration of the world.

Exchange, Truck, Barter.

The word *exchange* means simply, in a general sense, the act of exchanging one thing for another be it what it may: the other two are in use to denominate the particular kinds or methods of *exchange*; of which this is the difference, that the word *truck* is used with most propriety when speaking of serviceable things, such as are moveable; as the *trucking* of horses, trinkets, utensils, &c. Whereas *barter* is a more mercantile expression, and intimates the *exchange* of different commodities by way of traffic. Thus, so little are the natives of Guinea acquainted with the value of gold, that they hold commerce with other nations, by *bartering* it away for glass and other trifling ornaments.

Regard, Esteem, Veneration, Respect.

When we entertain a good opinion of a man, we are said to *regard* him; when that *regard* increases,

we call it *esteem*; we testify that *esteem* by *veneration*; and prove it by submission, through *respect*.

We have a natural *regard* for a quiet neighbour; we *esteem* him if he studies the good of the neighbourhood; if we perceive in him any eminent qualities, we hold him in *veneration*; and, in proportion to the rank he is above us, either by birth or fortune, we treat him with less or greater *respect*.

Being born in the same country claims *regard*. Civility creates *esteem*. Age and merit render *venerable*; rank and dignity, *respectable*.

Retinue, Train.

Retinue implies a number of followers; *train*, the same with order. Thus, his coach was attended with so great a *retinue* that there was no seeing the carriage for dust. It was customary in a Roman triumph to have always a number of captive slaves in the *train*.

Occasion, Occurrence, Conjunction, Case, Circumstance.

Occasion is used for the arrival of something new, whether it be that which presents itself, or what we seek; and in a sense, as indeterminate with respect to time as the object. *Occurrence* is only in use to express that which happens unexpectedly, and with relation to the time present. We make use of the word *conjunction* to mark a situation proceeding from a concurrence of events, whether of business or interest. *Case* is employed to signify the main point, with a special reference to the sort and singularity of the thing in question. *Circumstance* carries with it no other idea than that of something additional, accompanying another, which is principal.

We know people on particular *occasions*. We should demean ourselves, according to the *occurrence* of the times. It is commonly the *conjunctions* that determine us which side to take. It has been pretended that there

there are *cases* in which reason would condemn even an attention to virtue. Diversity of *circumstances* will make the same man think differently upon the same subject.

Uncertainty, Doubt, Suspence.

In that sense, in which these words are accounted synonymous, they all three imply indetermination : but *uncertainty* rises when the event of things is unknown. *Doubt* when the mind knows not how to choose. By *suspence* is understood an indeterminate state, when the mind is held in expectation.

We are in *uncertainty* with respect to the success of our proceedings ; in *doubt* what step to take ; in *suspence*, when we are held from acting, by a delay of certainty.

Uncertainty requires caution ; *doubt*, consideration ; *suspence*, patience.

A wise man is seldom *uncertain* as to what shall happen ; he foresees future events, and prepares himself for them. When we are in *doubt*, and at a loss to determine, we should leave the matter to the decision of others. Of all states of indetermination, that of *suspence* is the most vexatious, and the only remedy is a quiet resignation.

Right, Justice.

Right is the object of *justice* ; and that which is due to every one. *Justice* is the conformity of our actions with *right* ; it is to render and secure to every one that which is his due. The first is dictated by nature, or established by authority, either divine or human, and is, according to circumstances, sometimes liable to change. The second is the rule we should always follow, and is ever invariable.

It is consistent with the laws of *justice* to use the same means in support and defence of our *rights*, as are often employed to attack them.

Dejected, Melancholy, Low-spirited.

Dejection is commonly caused by great affliction, and is too often a mark of despair. *Melancholy* is generally the effect of constitution; its cloudy ideas overpower and banish all that are cheerful. *Low-spiritedness* often proceeds from a weakness of nerves: excess of joy, fatigue, bad digestion will occasion it.

The mind in *dejection* is unhappy, not having sufficient strength and reason to get the better of it. *Melancholy* will sometimes wear away by frequent diversion and dissipation. A person subject to *low-spirits* should pursue a regular course of life, and a uniform method of living.

The reverse of *dejection* is joy; the reverse of *melancholy*, cheerfulness; and that of *low-spiritedness*, gaiety.

Piercing, Penetrating.

The word *piercing* implies great strength of light, and a stroke of the eye; that of *penetrating*, great force of attention and reflection.

A *piercing* mind sees things even through the veils that cover them; it is difficult to conceal truth from it; it will not suffer itself to be deceived. A mind that *penetrates* reaches to the bottom of things, without stopping at the surface; it is not easy to deceive it, neither will it suffer itself to be amused.

Besides the above distinction, *piercing* seems to be executed by a sudden glance; *penetrating* by making way gradually.

To Put, Place.

Put seems to have a general sense; *place* one more limited, meaning to *put* orderly, and in a proper place.

We *put* columns to support an edifice: we *place* them with symmetry.

Discernment,

Discernment, Judgment.

Discernment relates not only to a thing itself, but also to its appearances, and is a distinguishing knowledge, that prevents the confounding of one thing with another. *Judgment* relates to a thing considered in itself, only in order to investigate the truth, and is a knowledge that determines. The first is limited to things present; its office is to discern truth from falsehood, perfections from defects, motives from pretexts: the second pries even into futurity; discovers the relation and consequence of things, foreseeing their effects. In short, we may say of *discernment* that it is knowing, that it renders our ideas just; and of *judgment*, that it is wise, that it makes our conduct discreet.

When choice or determination, with respect to the goodness or beauty of objects is in question, we should have recourse to those who have *discernment*. When we would take any step of consequence, we should take the advice of such persons as have *judgment*.

Arts and sciences require *discernment*; which is more or less nice, according to the delicacy of the understanding, or the extent of knowledge. Government, and the policy of states, demand *judgment*; which is more or less sure, according to the force of reason, and the length of experience.

Satisfied, Contented.

We are *satisfied* when we have obtained what we wished for: We are *contented* when we wish not for any more.

It happens often, that when well *satisfied*, we are not the more *contented*.

Possession will always prove *satisfactory*; but it is the true enjoyment only of what we possess, that can make us *contented*.

Tale.

Tale, Novel, Romance, Story.

Each of these words implies a small history, or an entertaining relation of adventures : the first three are supposed to be fabulous, and made public ; whereas the last may be either true or feigned, and told either in print or by word of mouth ; but, as they carry ideas peculiar to themselves, it is my business to point them out : by the word *tale*, then, is meant a short but dressed-up narrative of some single adventure ; that of *novel* signifies an amusing history, made up of many adventures, and carried on through one or more volumes. By *romance*, is understood a collection of wild adventures in love and war.

Tales ought to be well related ; *novels* well invented ; *romances* well carried on ; *stories* well told.

Tales, if attended with good morals, are not only amusing, but instructive. *Novels* are of no other use than to entertain ; they waste the time without making the least improvement. *Romances* spoil the taste of young people, who, by an attention to them, are apt to prefer the marvellous to the natural and simple truth. A droll *story*, told with humour, is a great enlivener of company.

Continuance, Continuation.

Continuance relates to duration ; *continuation*, to extent.

We should study a conscientious discharge of our duty during our *continuance* in any office. The several books contained in the volume of *Paradise Lost* are *continuations* of the same subject.

Continual, Continued.

There may be an interruption in that which is *continual* ; but that which is *continued* will not admit of it. So that the first of these words denotes properly the length of duration, although there may be

intervals, and different renewals; and the second marks simply the unity of that duration, independent either of length or shortness of the time; it is for this reason we say a *continual* noise; *continual* rains; but a *continued* stream; and, in music, a *continued* base.

Continual interruptions will make us weary of the best undertakings. In countries situated near the poles, there is, for the space of five or six months together, one *continued* darkness, insomuch that the inhabitants, during that time, are obliged to leave the place.

To Bid, Order.

The first of these is extremely general, the other more limited. To *bid* intimates direction to perform, whether the person directing has any authority for so doing or not. To *order* implies the exercise of authority.

Some people are so very officious, that they are always ready to do what they are *bid*, whether the thing be right or wrong, or the person *bidding* be impowered to *order* them or not.

Yet, In the mean while, However, Nevertheless.

Yet seems to have more force and energy; it assures with firmness, in spite of every opposition. *In the mean while* is less absolute, it affirms only against contrary appearances. *However*, distinguishes two things, which seem opposite; supporting one without hurting the other. *Nevertheless*, affirms a thing by exception, giving us to understand that it does not occur but at the time we are speaking.

Though the whole earth is in arms against truth, *yet* it does not prevent its triumphing. Some parents are very strict with respect to the morals of their children; *in the mean while* will indulge themselves in every thing their own heart can wish. Addison was a wretched speaker, *however* he was an excellent author

thor. Churchill, every one knows was a bad liver; *nevertheless* he was of some service to his country, by ridiculing vice, and lashing venality.

Excellency, Excellence.

Notwithstanding these words are evidently the same, *excellence* being no other than *excellency* contracted, or the redundant syllable, general in old writing taken away; yet custom seems to have applied *excellency* to express the title of a governour, or that of an ambassador from one prince to another, whereas, by *excellence*, is understood the state of abounding in any good quality.

Pride, Arrogance, Vanity, Presumption, Haughtiness.

Pride is unreasonable or inordinate self-esteem. *Arrogance* implies taking much upon ourselves, and is *pride* attended with insolence and contempt. *Vanity* is accompanied with affectation, and means *pride* exerted on slight grounds. By *presumption* is understood a blind and adventurous confidence; with respect to *haughtiness*, it is a mixture of softness and insolence, the immediate effect of *pride*.

The *haughtiness* of the *proud* man is insufferable. *Pride* makes us value ourselves; *arrogance* despise others. Through *vanity* we covet the attention of our acquaintance. *Presumption* flatters us with having a vain power.

The *proud* consider themselves in their own mind; full, and self-swollen, they are taken up with their own person. The *arrogant* claim to themselves what they have not the least pretensions to, are ready to insult those who will not allow them what they claim; and look down on the rest of the world with contempt. The *vain* value themselves upon the opinion of others; greedy of esteem, they are eager to engross the attention of all mankind. The *presumptuous* carry their audacious

cious hopes even to chimeras ; bold to undertake, they fondly imagine they have power to do every thing.

The greatest pain we can possibly give the *proud* man, is by laying his defects before his eyes. We cannot hurt the *arrogant* so much, as by silent contempt. We cannot mortify a *vain* man more, than by paying no attention to those qualifications or qualities he prides himself in. In order to confound the *presumptuous*, we need only desire him to put his *vain* designs in execution.

Cure, Remedy.

We perform a *cure* ; we procure a *remedy*. The first relates more to the malady, and to the action of him who heals it ; the second has more relation to health, and the state of the malady we heal. We say of a *cure*, that it is fine, when its success does honour to the person who performed it ; and we say of a *remedy*, that it is certain, or sure, when its operations are efficacious ; that is, when it produces those consequences we intended ; and we say of both that they are either easy or difficult.

Cure seems to have no other object than stubborn disorders, and those which proceed from constitution ; whereas *remedy* has a view to slight complaints, and such as are of short duration.

The more inveterate the disorder, the more difficult the *cure* ; in many cases, regular living is the best *remedy*.

The word, *cure*, is often considered as the effect of *remedy*. Some *remedies* will complete a *cure* much sooner than others.

Incurable disorders are not only those where the *cure* is absolutely impossible ; but such as for which no *remedy* can be found.

Haughtiness, Disdain.

Both these words denote a disposition that prevents affability, and keeps us at a distance from those whom we

we think beneath us, either in birth, fortune, or abilities, with this difference, that *haughtiness* is founded upon the esteem a man has for himself, and *disdain* upon the disesteem he has for others.

Haughtiness is seldom met with but in persons of weak understanding, and those who have had a bad education. There are a sort of vain people who look upon *disdain* as a personal accomplishment, and who use it on all occasions, as a test of the merit they pretend to.

Sloth, Laziness, Sluggishness.

Sloth and *laziness* are voluntary, with this difference, that *sloth* implies utter inactivity, an absolute aversion to work; *laziness*, an inclination, but a fear of trouble and fatigue: whereas *sluggishness* is often involuntary, proceeding sometimes from constitution, and is discovered by its dull, heavy method of acting.

The *slothful* man will not work at all. The *lazy* man is drawn to it with difficulty. The *sluggish* man is slow through the whole operation.

Industry is the reverse of *sloth*; activity of *laziness*; expedition of *sluggishness*.

He who is *slothful* is a murderer of time. *Laziness* is its own punishment. A *sluggish* person is fit for no kind of employment, seldom doing any thing well he undertakes.

Harm, Hurt, Injury, Detriment, Mischief.

These words imply some kind of ill happening to a man's person, character, or property. Those of *harm* and *hurt* relate more to the person or character; with this difference, that *harm* seems to denote a small degree of *hurt*; *hurt* a great degree of *harm*. *Mischief* implies ill to the person or property, and appears ever to be done with an evil intent. *Injury* intimates a degree of *hurt*, without justice, and relates to the character or property. *Detriment* carries an
idea

idea of loss, and is seldom used but with regard to property.

By wounding a man, more or less, we *harm* or *hurt* his person. By speaking ill of him, deservedly or not, we *harm* or *hurt* his character: by breaking his head, or setting fire to his house, we are said to do him a *mischief*. By taking away his good name, we *injure* his character: by defrauding him of his goods, we *injure* him in his property. By breaking a hedge, or treading down of corn we do a great deal of *detriment*.

Quickly, Soon, Speedily.

The word *quickly* seems more proper to express the motion with which we act; its reverse is slowly. The word *soon* respects the time when the action is performed; its reverse is late. The word *speedily* has a greater relation to the time we employ about a thing; its reverse is long time.

We advance the more by going *quick*; but we go surely by going slowly. Wickedness is always punished either *sooner* or later. It is necessary to be a long time deliberating: but we should execute *speedily*.

He who begins *soon*, and works *quick*, will *speedily* have done.

Affiduous, Expedition, Quick.

When we are *affiduous* at work, we lose no time; when *expedition*, we defer not, but finish immediately: when *quick*, we work with activity. Idleness, delay, and slowness, are the three defects opposite to these three good qualities.

An *affiduous* man thinks nothing of the trouble of what he takes in hand. An *expedition* man will not quit his work. One that is *quick* will presently have done.

We should be *affiduous* in what we undertake; *expedition* in affairs that require to be soon ended; and *quick* in the execution of orders.

Now,

Now, Instantly, Immediately, Presently.

The doing a thing *now*, expresses the taking it in hand at that very instant; the other three words, as they are here placed, express a time farther and farther off. *Instantly* implies without any perceptible intervention of time. *Immediately* means without delay. By *presently* is understood soon after.

Fashion, Custom.

These two words, like many others I have taken notice of, though they may not strike the reader at first sight, as words reputed synonymous, have nevertheless been used as such by some of our best writers, and are at present: it is therefore necessary to point out the difference between them. *Fashion* then, seems more universal; *custom* more antient: that which the greater part of the people practise is a *fashion*; that which has been practised a long time is a *custom*.

Fashion introduces itself, and extends daily; *custom* establishes itself, and gains authority; the first forms the mode; the second a usage: each is a kind of law, independent on reason, with respect to that which relates to our outward actions.

There is sometimes more policy in conforming to a bad *fashion*, than being singular in some good things. Many persons follow *custom*, even in their way of thinking; imbibing the notions of their mothers and nurses.

Variation, Change.

Variation consists in being as much of one sort as another: *Change* consists only in ceasing to be the same.

We *vary* in our sentiments when we give them up, and embrace them again. We *change* our opinions when we reject one in order to embrace another.

He

He who has no certain principles is liable to *vary*.
He who is more attached to fortune than truth, will
find no difficulty in *changing* his doctrine.

Variation, Variety.

Successive changes in the same subject make *variation*. A multitude of different objects forms *variety*. Thus, we say the *variation* of time; *variety* of colours.

There is no government but is subject to *variation*.
There is no species in nature in which we may not
observe great *variety*.

Track, Footstep.

Track is more general, meaning any mark left on
the way of whatever passed. *Footstep* is more limited,
implying the print of the feet. Thus we say, the *track*
of a horse or a carriage; but the *footsteps* of a man.

Fickle, Inconstant, Unsteady, Changeable.

The attachments of the *fickle* man are slight; those
of the *inconstant* of short duration. As to the words
unsteady and *changeable*, they imply an aversion in ad-
hering to the same thing, with this difference, that
the *unsteady* man is eager to enjoy many things; the
changeable man is in constant search of different
ones.

Men are commonly more *fickle* and *inconstant* than
women; but women more *unsteady* and *changeable*
than men. The first err through indifference; the
second through a love of novelty. Consequently it is
a merit in men to persevere; and in women to
resist.

Rogue.

Rogue, Sharper, Thief.

These are all persons who steal what does not belong to them; with this difference, that the *rogue* steals in secret; he pilfers. The *sharp* steals by finesse; he over-reaches. The *thief* steals by all manner of means, robbing by force and violence.

The *rogue* fears to be discovered; the *sharp* to be known again; and the *thief* to be taken.

Intention, Design.

Intention is a disposition or inclination of the mind to something at a distance; its characteristic is to aim. *Design* seems to suppose something studied and methodical; it is employed in searching out the means of execution.

Intentions are more secret and vague; *designs* more extensive, and more rational.

Intention is the soul of action, and the spring of true worth. *Design* is the effect of reflection.

As no one cares to be balked in his *intentions*, or crossed in his *designs*, we should have no other *intention* than to do our duty; nor any other *design* than to conform to the will of Providence.

Nothing is less followed than the original *intention* of charitable foundations. Nothing has been found more difficult to accomplish than the *design* of bringing about a thorough reformation of manners.

That man is truly great, who is right in his *intentions* and reasonable in his *designs*.

To Tolerate, Suffer, Permit.

We *tolerate* a thing when knowing it, and having sufficient power, we do not hinder it. We *suffer* it, by making no opposition, but seeming either not to know it, or not to have the power of preventing it. We *permit* it, when we authorise it by formal consent.

The

The words *tolerate* and *suffer* are never used but with respect to bad things, or such as we believe so; whereas the word *permit* relates either to good or bad.

The legislative power is sometimes obliged to *tolerate* certain evils, in order to prevent worse. It is sometimes prudence to *suffer* even abuse in the discipline of the church, rather than destroy its unity. Human laws never will *permit* what the divine law forbids; but sometimes forbids what the other will *permit*.

Gay, Merry.

We are *gay* by disposition; *merry* through turn of mind. Sad and serious are exactly their opposites.

Our *gaiety* turns almost entirely to our own advantage: but our *merriment*, at the same time that it is agreeable to others, is no less so to ourselves.

We should, if possible, suppress our *gaiety* when in the house of affliction. We should cease to be *merry* when others are serious.

Enmity, Rancour.

Enmity is more declared; it seems always open. *Rancour* is more concealed; it generally dissembles.

Bad services and rude language create *enmity*, which never ceases, till tired out with punishing, or a reconciliation is brought about by the intercession of friends. Remembrance of injuries, or affronts received, keeps *rancour* alive in the breast, which never subsides while there is the least thirst of vengeance, or till we pardon sincerely.

Enmity does not always destroy our esteem for an enemy, nor prevent our doing him the justice he is entitled to, but it will not admit of our caressing him, or doing him any good, otherwise than through a sense of honour, or greatness of soul, to which we sometimes sacrifice our vengeance. *Rancour* makes us embrace with pleasure every opportunity of revenging ourselves,

ourselves, but can hide itself with the cloak of friendship, till the very moment it begins to act.

Enmity is sometimes noble, and it would be mean not to conceive it against certain persons; but *rancour* is always low.

A settled *enmity* in families sometimes runs through many generations, and will not cease till length of time shall obliterate it. Perfect reconciliations are very rare; there remaining often a great deal of *rancour* in the breasts of those who seem most sincere.

A philosopher should have no object of *enmity* but the disturbers of public tranquillity. If *rancour* can, in any case, be excusable, it must be with respect to traitors; their crime being too black to be thought of without indignation.

To *Insinuate*, *Suggest*.

We *insinuate*, by cunning and address; we *suggest* by credit and artifice.

In order to *insinuate*, we must consult both time and opportunity; in order to *suggest*, it is necessary to have ascendancy over the minds of persons.

Insinuate implies something delicate: *suggest*, frequently something fraudulent.

We cover artfully what we would *insinuate*: and what we would *suggest*, we make of some consequence.

We often imagine that what others *insinuate* was first thought of by ourselves. He who *suggests* evil to another is much more culpable than he who commits it.

Ordinary, Common.

These words have been reputed synonymous in two senses, as implying frequent use, and meaning of little or no value: but they are different in both. In the first sense, the word *ordinary* seems to me to be best applied when the repetition of actions is in question

tion; *common*, when a multitude of objects. Thus, nothing is more *ordinary* at court than dissimulation. Monsters are *common* in Africa.

In the second, that which is *ordinary* has nothing to distinguish it; that which is *common* has nothing to make it sought after.

To Hear, Hearken.

To *hear* implies having the ear struck with any sound. To *hearken*, means to lend an ear in order to *hear*. Sometimes we *hear* without *hearkening*; and we often *hearken* without *hearing*.

To Understand, Comprehend, Conceive.

To have just and proper ideas of every thing that occurs, is the common signification of these words: but, to *understand* implies a conformity of ideas, which has a peculiar relation to the value of the terms we use; to *comprehend* denotes such a conformity as answers directly to the nature of the things we explain; and that which is expressed by the word *conceive* relates more especially to the order and design of what we propose. The first is used with propriety when applied to the particulars of what we say; the tone with which we speak; the turn of our phrases; and the delicacy of our expressions. The second seems to agree best with a relation to principles, lessons, precepts, and speculative knowledge. The third appears with greater elegance, when it relates to forms, arrangement, projects, and plans; in short all that depends on the imagination.

We *understand* languages. We *comprehend* sciences. We *conceive* whatever has relation to arts.

It is difficult to *understand* that which is enigmatical; to *comprehend* that which is abstruse; and to *conceive* that which is confused.

Readiness of *understanding* is a mark of acuteness; that of *comprehension* is a proof of penetration; that of *conception* denotes a clear head.

A lover

A lover *understands* the language of the passions. A learned man *comprehends* the metaphysical questions of the schools. An architect *conceives* the plan and oeconomy of buildings.

Fashion, Figure, Form.

Fashion rises from labour, and results from the workmanship; the workman enriching it more or less, according to his taste. *Figure* springs from design, and results from the outlines of the thing; the author of the plan making it either more or less regular, according to his abilities. *Form* rises from construction, and results from the arrangement of parts; the conductor of the work making it more or less natural, as his imagination directs him.

The *fashion* of a work frequently exceeds in value the price of the materials. We seldom give in architecture a round *figure* to any thing, except to single pieces, and such as stand by themselves. Paganism pictures the Deity under all kinds of *forms*; whereas Christianity confines it to those of a man and of a dove.

We say of *fashion*, that it is either pretty or ugly; of *figure*, that it is either agreeable or disagreeable; of *form*, that it is either common or uncommon.

Fault, Defect, Imperfection

Fault includes in its idea a relation to the maker; so that, while it implies some real want in the finishing of the work, it denotes also that it was owing to the workman. *Defect* expresses something *imperfect* in the thing, without any relation to the maker of it. *Imperfection* intimates something of less consequence than is understood by the preceding words, and is used with more propriety in morality, than either in physics or mechanics.

The smoking of chimneys is a great *fault* in houses; as a little attention in the builder may easily prevent

prevent it. When the beauty of a building is spoiled for want of room or proper materials, it is a *defect* which the builder could not prevent. *Imperfections* are considered by the bigoted religionist as real sins; but reasonable christians look upon them only as the natural consequents of frail humanity.

Fault, Crime.

Faults result from human weakness; being transgressions of the rules of duty. *Crimes* proceed from the wickedness of the heart, being actions against the rules of nature.

The effects of anger and the intrigues of gallantry are *faults*. Calumnies and assassinations are *crimes*.

It is our indispensable duty to pardon *faults*, but punish *crimes*.

To Oblige, Constrain, Compel, Force.

The last of these words rises upon the third, as the third does upon the second, and the second upon the first, each of them implying an opposition to liberty. The word *oblige* relates more to duty or necessity, intimating a power acting on us, in conformity to our inclinations: *constrain* refers to those troublesome oppositions that make us determine against our inclinations; *compel* alludes to power and authority, which makes us act in express contrariety to our will, which we lament the not being master of: the word, *force*, implies contrary efforts of a vigorous action, which we try to resist, but in vain.

The duty of a child to its parents *obliges* it to assist them in their old age. The weaker and softer sex is that which can least brook *constraint*. There are some occasions on which we should not be sorry to be *compelled* even to that we are most unwilling to do. Ancient politeness of the table went so far as to *force* guests to eat and drink.

Heaviness, Weight.

In the figurative sense, the difference of these words is so extremely great as need no pointing out; in the literal, indeed, they are often confounded; considered then, in this last sense, *heaviness* is that quality in a body which we feel, and distinguish by itself: *weight* is the measure and degree of that quality, which we cannot ascertain but by comparison.

We say absolutely, and in an undetermined sense, that a thing is *heavy*; but relatively, and in a manner determined, that it is of such a *weight*, for example, of two, three, or four pounds.

A thousand circumstances prove the *heaviness* of the air; and the mercury determines its exact *weight*.

To Return, Surrender, Restore.

We are said to *return* what has been lent or given us: to *surrender* what we have in pledge or charge: to *restore* what we have taken or stolen.

We ought to *return* punctually; to *surrender* faithfully; and to *restore* wholly.

We borrow with an intent to *return*; we take a thing in charge with a view of *surrendering* it again; but we seldom take with a design to *restore*.

Custom makes use of these words on the following occasions; the first with respect to civility, favours, presents, or testimonies of kindness: the second with respect to what we are entrusted with; honours, employments, or offices, with which we are invested: the third, with relation to things taken away that have been our due. Thus, we *return* money that has been lent us; presents we have received; and letters to a deserted sweet-heart: we *surrender* a child to its parents; the ribbon of an order, the staff of command, seals, and dignities to a prince; we *restore* an accused person, when found innocent, to his estates and honours; and a minor to the possession of his effects which have been held from him.

Sincerity,

Sincerity, Frankness, Plainness, Ingenuosness.

Sincerity prevents our speaking otherwise than we think, and is a virtue. *Frankness* makes us speak as we think, and is a natural effect. *Plainness* is speaking freely what we think; and springs, sometimes, from want of reflection. *Ingenuosness* makes us declare what we know, and is often a folly.

A *sincere* man will not deceive; a *frank* man will not dissemble; a *plain* man is not apt to flatter; an *ingenuous* man knows not how to conceal any thing.

Sincerity is of great value in the intercourse of the heart. *Frankness* facilitates the commerce of the world. *Plainness* is often considered as a want of politeness. *Ingenuosness* is frequently found to err against prudence.

The *sincere* are always esteemed. The *frank* please all the world. The *plain* sometimes offend. The *ingenuous* often betray themselves.

Experiment, Trial, Proof.

Experiment relates properly, to the truth of things; it determines whether a thing is or is not; clearing up of doubt, and dissipating ignorance. *Trial* concerns particularly, the use of things; judging whether they are proper or not; it settles the matter and determines the will. *Proof* has a greater relation to the quality of things, teaching us whether they are good or bad, distinguishing the best, and taking away any fear of being deceived.

We make *experiments*, in order to know; *trials*, to choose; and *proofs*, to be thoroughly acquainted with.

Experiments confirm our opinions, being the root of knowledge. *Trial* conducts our taste, being the road to satisfaction. *Proof* removes our fears, and is a remedy against error and imposture.

Effigy, Image, Statue.

Corporeal representation is the common idea of these three words; but an *effigy* is to supply the place of the real thing; an *image* is to shew the attitude and design, but in miniature; a *statue* the same; but as large as life.

Persons who draw on themselves the popular odium are sometimes hung in *effigy*. *Images* are made of china, silver, &c. and set up in houses by way of ornament. We erect *statues* of our kings, in grateful remembrance of them.

To Give, Present, Offer.

Of these three words, that of *give* is generally used in a familiar sense; that of *present* in a respectful one; that of *offer* in a religious one. We *give* to our servants. We *present* to princes. We *offer* to God.

We *give* what we would have received. We *present* what we think will be agreeable. We *offer* what we imagine will be acceptable.

We cannot *give* what does not belong to us, nor *offer* what is not in our power; but we sometimes *present* what is neither ours, nor in our power to *give*.

Frugality, Oeconomy.

Frugality implies only discretion of expence; *oeconomy* includes in its idea some kind of management, in order to eke matters out.

Frugality is generally the province of the husband; whose business is to take care his expences do not exceed his income: *oeconomy* is principally the care of the wife, whose study is, by a prudent management, if possible, to make up every deficiency.

Clothes, Dress.

Clothes exprefs simply, that which covers the body, and include all, for that purpose, from head to foot, and nothing more; it is for this reason we fay, with propriety, the neceffaries of life confift in meat, drink, lodging and *clothes*. *Dress* has a more confined meaning; befides that of a bare covering, it includes in its idea a relation to form and fafhion, as well to the ornaments as the neceffaries; thus we fay a Spanifh *dress*; a Hungarian *dress*; a rich *dress*, &c.

Though the fword and cockade cannot be called *clothes*, they are nevertheless part of the *dress* of an officer.

Wonder, Astonishment, Amazement, Surprise.

Of thefe words, that of *wonder* implies admiration at fomething extraordinary; *astonishment* is a fudden confufion of mind, arifing from either fear or *wonder*; *amazement* implies a greater degree of *astonishment*; as to *surprize*, it means only being taken unawares.

Of all thefe words, *wonder* and *surprize* are fuppofed to be neareft to each other in fignification; but even between thefe may be obferved a difference; the firft being generally confidered as relative to things good in themfelves, the latter with refpect to either good or bad. We are apt to *wonder* when a bad man does good, and be *surprized* when a good man does ill.

Befides *wonder* includes in its idea fome fmall degree of confideration, *surprize* does not.

If a mean-fpirited perfon whom I have infulted fhould come to me in order to folicit a reconciliation, I fhould naturally fay, I am *surprized* at his coming, but when I reflect on the meannefs of his fpirit I do not much *wonder*.

Wonder and *surprize* act upon the mind; *astonishment* and *amazement* upon the fenfes.

We *wonder* and are *surprized* at the miraculous events of providence. We are *astonished* and *amazed* at the extraordinary qualities of the magnet.

Liberality, Generosity, Bounty.

A ready and willing distribution, according to our abilities is the general idea of these three words; but they have each a particular one, as follows: *liberality* implies acts of mere giving or spending: *generosity*, acts of greatness; *bounty*, acts of kindness.

A *liberal* man gives freely; a *generous* man nobly; and a *bountiful* man charitably.

Liberality is a natural disposition; *generosity* proceeds from elevation of sentiment; *bounty* from religious motives.

Liberality denotes freedom of spirit; *generosity* greatness of soul; *bounty* openness of heart.

Too great *liberality* borders upon profuseness, it then becomes a fault. *Generosity* is a princely quality, and if it does not exceed the bounds of our abilities is always commendable. *Bounty* is an amiable virtue, and never goes unrewarded.

Prepossessed, Opiniated.

These epithets denote a folly which consists in being too much wedded to our own opinion; but that which is particularized by the word *prepossessed*, seems to arise from excess of prejudice; which seduces and causes us to think what we have preconceived the best, paying little or no regard to the opinions of others. In one *opiniated*, this folly seems to be the effect of an over-fondness for his own notions, and a contempt for those of others.

A person *prepossessed* follows his own opinions, after examining in some sort those of others. One who is *opiniated* follows his own notions implicitly, without ever listening to those of others.

To Lift, Raise.

We *lift* in taking any thing up; we *raise*, in setting it upright or placing according to some order. Thus,

we

we *lift* a weight, &c. we *raise* the head; we *raise* a ladder; we *raise* a mast.

To Institute, Found, Establish, Endow.

To *institute* is to create and form things, having some relation to the author or him who first contrived or laid down the plan. To *found*, is to give birth to such plan. To *establish*, is to fix that plan upon a lasting basis. To *endow*, is to provide the necessaries for its subsistence.

After universities were once *instituted*, colleges were *founded*, though not at first *endowed*; since which, those noble *institutions* have been well *established* by such *endowments* as do honour to our country.

Chance, Fortune.

Chance forms neither order or design; we neither attribute to it knowledge or will, and its events are always very uncertain. *Fortune* lays plans and designs, but without choice; we attribute to it a will without discernment, and say that it acts blindly.

The chief of our successes are more owing to *chance* than skill: it is sometimes a long while before *fortune* will look upon us with a favourable eye.

Lot, Destiny.

Lot supposes distinctions and a method of decision; we attribute to it a hidden determination, which keeps us in doubt till the instant it shews itself. *Destiny* forms designs, dispositions, and connections; we attribute to it knowledge, will and power; its views are determined and unalterable.

Lot decides; *destiny* ordains.

We observe many so extremely rash as to leave their lives to the *lot* of a die. Whatever *destiny* decrees is

inevitable, because we can neither force its disposition nor see beyond the reach of its light.

Religion, Piety, Devotion.

The word *religion* is not considered here as signifying the worship we owe to the Deity, and the tribute of our dependance upon him, but as denoting a quality of the soul, and a disposition of the heart towards God: it is in this sense only that it is reputed as synonymous with the other two. This disposition, then, prevents our failing in any part of our duty to the Supreme Being. *Piety* makes us acquit ourselves with greater respect and zeal. *Devotion* adds to this, outwardly, a serious composed behaviour.

It is sufficient for a worldly person to be *religious*; *piety* agrees best with persons who pride themselves in virtue, and, as to *devotion*, it is the employ of people perfectly recluses.

Religion is more internal; *piety* is both internal and external; *devotion* is sometimes more external.

Where there is no integrity there is no *religion*. He who fails in his respect for religious worship fails in *piety*. *Devotion*, unless sincere, is mocking the Most High.

Empire, Kingdom.

These are names given to different dominions whence princes take the title of emperor or king; 'tis not, however, in this alone that their difference consists.

It appears to me that the word *empire* conveys an idea of a vast territory, composed of various people: whereas that of *kingdom* implies one more bounded, and intimates the unity of that nation of which it is formed. It is perhaps from this difference of idea that the different denomination of states, and the titles their princes enjoy take their rise; if it is not the only reason, it is at least the common one, as we may
remark

remark in the *empire* of Germany, the *empire* of Russia, and in the Ottoman *empire*, of whose diversity of people and nations the world is well acquainted: on the other hand, we see, in those states which bear the name of *kingdom*, such as France, Spain, Poland, &c. that the division of provinces does not destroy the unity of the people.

There is in *kingdoms* a uniformity of fundamental laws; the difference of particular laws arising from different customs, which in no respect hurt the unity of political administration. It is from this uniformity, or single government, that the words *king* and *kingdom* take their rise; for this reason also, though there may be many persons in the administration, there is nevertheless but one prince or sovereign minister: but it is not the same in *empires*, one part of which is sometimes governed by fundamental laws, very different from those by which another part of the same *empire* is governed: this diversity destroys the unity of government; and 'tis the submission of certain chiefs to the command of a general superiour, that preserves the union of the state: it is also from this right of governing that the words *emperor* and *empire* are derived. Hence it is, that there are many sovereigns and *kingdoms* in the same *empire*.

The Roman dominion was originally a *kingdom*, being formed of one single people; the name *empire* was not given it till such time as it brought under its subjection other foreign ones, who became, though in themselves distinct nations, members of that state, and over whom the Romans established one government, though they had separate administrations.

The advantages we find in the society of a body politic, contribute as much on the part of subjects to form *kingdoms* as the desire of governing on the part of princes. It was ambition alone that formed the plan of *empires*, which were established, and are supported chiefly by the force of arms.

Power, Ability, Faculty.

These words are explained, and taken here in a moral and literal sense: they all signify a disposition in the subject, by means of which it is capable of acting or producing an effect; but that of *power* results from supply or liberty of acting; *ability* rises from strength; *faculty* from natural properties.

A man, without the aids of grace, has not even the *power* of doing good. Youth is in want of wisdom to deliberate; old age, of *ability* to execute. The human mind has the *faculty* of reasoning.

Our *power* frequently diminishes, by long use. Age destroys our *ability* to satisfy the passions, though it does not our desires. The mind will often lose its *faculties* by accidents happening to the organs of the body.

Pleasure, Delight.

The idea of *pleasure* is of a good much more extensive than that of *delight*, because this word relates to a greater number of objects than the other; whatever agreeably affects the mind, the heart, the senses, the fortune, &c. produces *pleasure*. The idea of *delight* rises upon that of *pleasure*, by force of opinion; but is nevertheless a good of much less extent, with respect to objects; it is limited, properly, to sensation, and has a particular relation to good entertainment.

True philosophy finds *pleasure* in every occupation. There cannot be a greater *delight* than in the true relish of innocent mirth.

There is still another sense in which these words are used, that in which we say of a person that he gives himself up entirely to *pleasures*; that he enjoys the *delights* of the country. Taken in this last sense, they have equally, as in the other, their differences, and particular niceties. Thus, *pleasures* relate more to personal practice, such as customs, pastimes and recreations; *delights* more to the charms which are furnished

furnished by nature, art, and opulence; such as sweet habitations, studied conveniences, and choice company.

Content, Satisfaction.

Content alludes properly to that inward serenity of heart which renders the soul sedate and composed. *Satisfaction* relates more to the passions, being a change, owing to some success, in which we hug ourselves.

No restless or turbulent man can ever enjoy true *content*. *Satisfaction* hardly ever accompanies immoderate ambition.

Excursion, Ramble, Jaunt.

Excursion supposes a pleasurable expedition to some distant place, determined on some time before. *Ramble* implies an irregular roving in places unthought of till the time we arrive there. By *jaunt* is understood a walk or journey, agreeable to the person who takes it, but held in contempt by others, or considered as an act of levity.

We say innocent *excursions*; wild *rambles*; and imprudent *jaunts*.

Excursions are necessary to persons in a sedentary way of life, in order to unbend the mind and exercise the body. *Rambling* is an evident sign of an unsteady disposition. *Jaunts*, in parties of pleasure, have been often attended with calamitous consequences.

Ale-house, Public-house.

Nothing is more common than the general use of these terms to express one and the same thing, but with great impropriety: though every *ale-house* is undoubtedly a *public-house*, it does not follow that every *public-house* is an *ale-house*. *Public-house* is a more extensive

tensive expression, implying a house open for the entertainment of the public; whereas *ale-house* is more limited, denoting a particular species of *public-houses*, that which is appropriated to the sale of beer. Thus taverns, coffee-houses, &c. are *public-houses*; but not *ale-houses*.

Gentlemen frequent many *public-houses* without any sort of disgrace; but it always lessens their characters to be seen in an *ale-house*.

Lie, Falsehood.

Contrariety to truth is the general idea of these two words; but that of *lie* supposes always something criminal, whereas that of *falsehood* does not.

If questioned in a cause, wherein bound to tell the truth, we do not; we are guilty of a *lie*; if we deviate from truth, where there is no such obligation, it is merely a *falsehood*.

Lies are always sinful; *falsehoods* many times justifiable. A *lie* is an offence to God, and a disgrace to man. A beneficial *falsehood* is preferable to a destructive truth.

Sea, Ocean.

By *sea* is understood a large body of water opposed to land, confined within certain bounds; by *ocean*, a much larger body, whose utmost verge is not particularly known. Thus, we say the Baltic *sea*; the Mediterranean *sea*; the Adriatic *sea*; but the Western *ocean*; the Atlantic *ocean*; the Pacific *ocean*: So, again, the wide *sea*; but the vast *ocean*.

Social, Sociable.

Of these two words, that of *social* relates more to a christian-like disposition; that of *sociable*, more to a familiar one.

'Tis

'Tis goodness of heart that makes a man *social*; sweetness of temper that makes him *sociable*.

Humanity, benevolence, beneficence, friendship, &c. are the *social* virtues; good nature, good humour, condescension, &c. are the qualities that render *sociable*.

Luxury, Voluptuousness.

In the general sense of these words, *luxury* implies a giving one's self up to pleasure; *voluptuousness*, indulgence in the same to excess.

The *luxury* of a people is the forerunner of their ruin. The *voluptuous* man wallows in sensuality, and is void of the feelings of humanity.

Besides this distinction, there is one far more delicate and refined, and which requires some attention to be thoroughly conceived. Notwithstanding custom has always made use of the word *voluptuousness* in a bad sense, equally with that of *luxury*, it appears to me that it may sometimes be used with propriety in a good one. To comprehend this properly, it must first be considered that *luxury* implies gross corporal indulgence only; *voluptuousness*, mental as well as corporal. Thus ebriety, epicurism, venery, &c. are each a species of *luxury*; but we may be *voluptuous*, even in things innocent in themselves, as in the rapturous enjoyment of a fine prospect; the studied delightfulness of a rural retreat.

In this sense, *lust* indulged to excess is *luxury*; love indulged to excess *voluptuousness*.

Sober, Temperate, Abstemious.

A man may be *sober*, and not *temperate*; *temperate*, yet not *abstemious*.

In that sense in which these words are reputed synonymous, *sobriety* implies present freedom from the power of strong liquor; *temperance* signifies moderation in drinking; and by *abstemiousness* is understood

stood a refraining from all sorts of liquor that may intoxicate.

Some men who have the character of being *sober* very little deserve it, as their freedom from intoxication is more owing to strength of constitution, which resists the force of strong drink, than to the virtue of *temperance*. An *abstemious* person practises the virtue of self-denial, and by a rigid abstinence from all liquors that may hurt him, keeps his head clear, and his constitution sound.

A *sober* man may drink much and not be affected with it. A *temperate* man drinks little. An *abstemious* man drinks not at all.

Note. By the word *drink* here, is meant the use of strong drink.

Sharp, Sour, Acid.

These words express different degrees of sourness; *sharp* implies sourness without astringency, or a small degree of sourness. Thus, wine, beer, &c. grow frequently *sharp* by long keeping. *Sour* includes in its idea little or no acrimony. Thus, cyder, vinegar, verjuice, &c. are *sour*, but palatable; made so for use. By *acid* is understood a corrosive *sour*; as the *acid* lemon; the *acid* vitriol, &c.

Unreasonable, Inconsistent, Absurd.

The general idea of these three words is incongruity; but that of *unreasonable* implies rather non-agreeableness to reason; that of *inconsistent*, contrariety of act or argument, where one part destroys the other; that of *absurd* seems to intimate both.

Nothing can be more *unreasonable* than requesting the services of another to his detriment; he who complies with such request would act *very inconsistently*; and both would commit the grossest *absurdity*.

He who endeavours to raise his own name by crushing that of another, acts *unreasonably*. He who would be thought a man of sense and learning, and strives

to support that character by a contumelious contempt of others, acts *inconsistently*. He who is culpable in either of these particulars, acts *absurdly*.

Abstinence, Fast.

Abstinence implies a forbearance from such food as is supposed to pamper the flesh; *fast*, a restraining from all sorts of food. Wednesdays and Fridays are appointed by the church as days of *abstinence*, Ash-Wednesday and Good-Friday as *fast-days*.

Contiguous, Adjacent.

By the word *contiguous* is understood, so situated as to touch; by *adjacent*, so lying as having nothing of the same kind between; Thus, one house or one room is *contiguous* to another; but we say an *adjacent* church; the *adjacent* village.

The true sense then of these words is, that *contiguous* implies actual contact; *adjacent*, only hard by.

Benevolence, Beneficence.

Of these two words one is the intention, the other the act; *benevolence* being the desire of doing good, *beneficence* actual goodness.

A *benevolent* man delights in *beneficence*.

Providence has sufficiently evinced its love to mankind, by planting in our nature a *benevolent* disposition, and rewarding the effect of that disposition, *beneficence*.

Acquainted, Familiar, Intimate.

A slight or initial knowledge of any one constitutes *acquaintance*. To be *familiar* requires an *acquaintance* of some standing. *Intimacy* supposes such an *acquaintance* as is supported by friendship.

These

These words then rise one upon the other by gradation; *intimacy* resulting from close *familiarity*, which proceeds from long *acquaintance*.

Those who are apt to be *familiar* on a slight *acquaintance*, will never acquire any degree of *intimacy*; as forwardness of that sort generally meets with the contempt of mankind.

Pillar, Column.

By the word *Pillar* is understood a supporter of some roof; by the word *column*, a particular kind of *pillar*, that which is round: thus every *column* is a *pillar*, though every *pillar* is not a *column*.

In most buildings, where the beauty of the architecture is studied, *columns* are generally insulated; whereas square *pillars* are, for the most part, set within a wall, shewing only a fourth or fifth part of their thickness, and are then called *pilasters*.

Amusement, Diversion.

The general idea of these words is innocent recreation; but that of *amusement* implies tranquil entertainment; that of *diversion*, tumultuous merriment.

Card-playing, concerts, plays, &c. are *amusements*; cricket, cudgel-playing, horse-races, &c. are *diversions*.

Some persons are so quietly inclined as to find great *amusement* in reading, while others are of such a riotous disposition, as to imagine all *diversion* consists in uproar and confusion.

Satire, Lampoon.

Satire is general, being a poem in which the folly and wickedness of the times are severely censured; written with an intent to reform. *Lampoon* is a poem also, but personal, containing invective reflections against

against one person in particular, with a design only to vex.

A *satire* then is commendable ; a *lampoon* scurrilous. The lash of *satire* has been often found more beneficial to a state than the scourge of power. The writer of a *lampoon* may be well compared to a bee, whose sting wounds but slightly, but whose malicious act is sure to be punished by the whole swarm.

Steeple, Spire.

By these words is meant a high building, raised above the main edifice ; but that of *steeple* is more general ; that of *spire* more particular.

Steeple implies the turret of a church, be it of what form soever. By *spire* is understood a *steeple* rising taper to the top.

Religion, Persuasion.

The sense in which these words are held as synonymous is that of a certain system of divine faith and worship. But that which *religion* implies seems to be one more general and established ; that which is understood by *persuasion* more particular and vague.

By *persuasion* then is meant a deviation from some settled *religion*.

The divine systems of the church of England and of the church of Rome are *religions* ; those of a Presbyterian and a Lutheran are *persuasions*.

Letter, Epistle,

Custom has made the word *letter* of more general use than *epistle* : *letter* being quite familiar ; *epistle* rather pedantic : but this is not the only observation I would make. *Letter* appears to me more proper when the matter relates to private correspondence ; *epistle*, when the business is public. Thus we say
letters

letters of friendship; letters of business; but if these letters relate to public matters, or appear in print, we may with elegance call them epistles; as Paul's epistles; Ovid's epistles; Melmoth's epistles.

The word *epistle* may be used with propriety when the subject is written in verse, or in an ancient language; indeed it is never used with elegance when it refers to modern compositions. We say Voltaire's *letters*; Pope's *letters*; but the *epistles* of Cicero, Pliny, and Seneca.

Gold, Golden.

The present age has made an innovation with respect to these two words, converting the substantive *gold* into an adjective, and altering the sense of *golden*, which in reality implies made of *gold*, into that of gilt. In this corrupted sense then I am obliged to consider them; as such, the word *gold* relates to the metal of which a thing is made; that of *golden* to the hue it bears. Thus we say a *gold* ring; a *gold* watch; a *gold* buckle; but the *golden* lion; the *golden* head; the *golden* lamp. That these ideas are often confused is very evident; as we sometimes hear of a *golden* cup, or a *golden* ewer. Should it be said such a one stole a *golden* cup from the house, with the *golden* lamp, we must either imagine that both cup and lamp were of solid *gold*, or that they were only gilt.

Endeavour, Effort.

Endeavour is labour directed to some certain end; *effort* is a laborious *endeavour*.

When we would accomplish a design, we use our *endeavours*; if we meet with any considerable and unexpected obstacles in the way, we apply our utmost *efforts*.

Muse,

Mute, Silent.

By *mute* is understood incapability of speech; by *silent*, a voluntary forbearance.

In eastern countries nobles have mute attendants. *Silence* is a mark of wisdom.

A man had sometimes better be absolutely *mute* than inadvertently betray himself, as is frequently the case by too great a volubility, and which *Silence* only would prevent.

Room, Chamber.

Room is a general expression; *chamber* a particular one. *Room* implies any divided part of a house. *Chamber* is a *room* appropriated to sleep in.

We say a spacious *room*; a snug *chamber*.

Some *chambers* are so contrived as to conceal the bed, and make the *room* fit to entertain company.

House, Tenement.

The present signification of these words is, that *house* means a dwelling distinct by itself; *tenement*, part of a house divided off for the use of another family.

We say a spacious magnificent *house*; a snug pretty *tenement*.

Large *houses*, which the owners find difficult to set to one family, are frequently converted into small *tenements*, and let out to many.

In law, the word *tenement* implies any estate that may be holden.

Lodging, Apartment.

Lodging relates more to a set of rooms appropriated to a family in some private house; *apartment*,

ment, more to a convenient dwelling in some public edifice.

The first or second story of a house let out is called a *lodging*: any particular range of rooms in a large building, so allotted as to contain a number of families, one over another, is called an *apartment*. As the *apartments* in an hospital; the *apartments* in an inn of court; the *apartments* in a palace.

It is, in some respects mean to live in a *lodging*; but persons of great fortune have dwelt with credit in *apartments*.

Warmth, Fervency.

Considering these words in a religious sense, that of *fervency* seems to rise upon *warmth*; *warmth* implying a flame of devotion in opposition to coolness; *fervency* great heat of mind, as opposed to coldness.

Warmth is in some measure necessary; it will make us punctual in the exercise of our duty, thro' a sense of gratitude and affection: *fervency* has a dangerous tendency; it will, if not kept within due bounds, drive men into enthusiasm.

Warmth is the offspring of a good heart; *fervency*, of a weak mind.

Warmth makes the heart beat high in the cause of God. *Fervency* will carry us into a vain confidence of having some intercourse with the Deity.

Plenty, Abundance.

By *plenty* is understood enough, and some little to spare; by *abundance*, more than enough, or a considerable deal over.

He that wants but a yard of cloth, and possesses a yard and a quarter, has *plenty*: he that needs but one yard, and has several, may be said to have *abundance*.

A contented man will be satisfied, tho' he should fall short

short of *plenty*; but the covetous man is still grasping for more, even though he enjoys *abundance*.

Surmise, Suspicion.

Surmise is imagination in general, without certain knowledge: *Suspicion* is imagination of some ill, without proof.

Surmise is often used with respect to things good in themselves; *suspicion*, never but with regard to things that are ill.

Surmise is an imperfect notion, or a kind of conjecture, rising in a great measure from curiosity; *suspicion* supposes a degree of fear and jealousy concerning things not known.

We should never build an opinion upon bare *surmise*, which is at best but a sandy foundation. *Suspicion* is in reality its own tormentor, raising in the mind a thousand apprehensions, which is no easy matter afterwards to quell.

Sequel, Conclusion.

Sequel is the succeeding part; *conclusion* the close.

The *sequel* continues; the *conclusion* ends.

A story is unintelligible without its *sequel*; but not so without its *conclusion*; the *conclusion* being comprehended in few words; the *sequel* requiring many.

The *sequel*, in part, forms the story; the *conclusion* puts the finishing stroke to it.

Before we pass any judgment on what we hear, we should attend to the *sequel*, and wait till the *conclusion*.

To Disperse, Scatter.

The act of spreading abroad is the general idea of these two words; but that of *disperse* seems to imply some

some sort of order and care : that of *scatter* means to throw about loosely and carelessly.

In order to sow a field we *disperse* the seed in different places. He who *scatters* his wealth, without making a proper use of it, will one day come to want.

To *disperse* is always voluntary : to *scatter* is frequently involuntary.

When a family of children are come to years of maturity they generally *disperse* themselves into various parts. It is almost impossible to carry a load of hay from one place to another without *scattering* some of it.

New, Fresh, Recent.

That which has not been used is *new* ; that which is not stale is *fresh* ; that which has just happened is *recent*.

We say of clothes that they are *new* ; of topics that they are *fresh* ; of actions that they are *recent*.

A thought is *new* by the turn we give it ; *fresh*, by the sense it expresses ; *recent*, by the time of its production.

New things carry with them a creditable appearance. *Fresh* matters are food for tatlers. We are more affected with *recent* stories than with those of long date.

Expression, Word.

These words have been treated of before, when that of *expression* was considered as implying a phrase of speech ; but there being another sense in which it is used as synonymous with *word*, it may not be unnecessary to shew the difference between them : and as the distinction is very delicate, we must view it with attention.

Expression then represents the meaning : a *word* expresses the idea, which we employ to form that meaning. It is in order to use the *expression* that the *word* is established.

blished. The first is natural, general, and universal among all men; the second is arbitrary and different according to the varied custom of the people. The *Yes* and the *No* are always, and in all places, the same *expressions*; that is, they carry the same meaning; but that meaning is not expressed by the same *words* in all languages and on all occasions.

We have the gift of *expression* and the knowledge of *words*: we give a turn and justness to the one, we choose and range the others.

The production of sense and formation of a proposition are what we expect from an *expression*: but a *word* is commonly of no other value than to make a part of that sense, or of that proposition. Thus *expressions* differ among themselves, according to the difference of the senses they bear; and *words* differ among themselves, either by the simple articulation of the voice, or by the different ideas they convey. A *word* is no otherwise bad than by its not being in use in the polite world.

A variety of *expressions* proceeds not always from the fertility and extent of the mind. An abundance of *words* enriches not the language, unless those *words* convey an abundance of ideas.

Not, No.

Not barely expresses the negation; *no* strengthens, and seems to affirm it. The first often denies the thing in part only, or with limitation; the second denies it always, absolutely, wholly, and without reserve. Thus we say he has *not* money; he has *not* patience; meaning he is *not* overburdened with either: but when we say he has *no* money; he has *no* patience; we would be understood to say he has none at all.

It is on account of this limitation that the word *not* is generally used in company, with those words, that mark either the degree of quality or quantity; such as *MUCH, VERY, ONE, and the like.*

There

There is *not* commonly *much* money to be found in the possession of men of letters. The major part of those who frequent divine service are *not very* devout. It often happens that he who has *not one* single penny in his pocket is much happier than many rich men.

Great, Sublime.

These words here are considered in no other sense than as they relate to language, in which that of *great* seems to me to have more relation to the learning or the nature of the subjects we treat of; and that of *sublime* more to the spirit and manner in which we treat them.

Locke on Human Understanding is a very *great* work; Milton's *Paradise Lost* is a very *sublime* one.

Great or scientific pieces are often starched, and discover the labour of the author; but *sublime* pieces, tho' composed with a great deal of art, seem always natural.

Studied words, known only to the learned, joined to profound and metaphysical reasonings, form the *great* or elevated stile; expressions, equally just and brilliant, joined to beautiful thoughts, finely and nobly turned, constitute the *sublime*.

It is not possible for every work to be *great*; but it may be *sublime*: *sublime* works, however, are more rare than *great* ones.

To Excel, be Excellent.

To excel supposes a comparison; is being superior to all of the like kind; excludes equals, and is applied to all sorts of objects. *To be excellent* is being in the highest degree without any sort of comparison; it admits of equals, and agrees best with things of taste. Thus we say that Titian *excelled* in colouring; Michael Angelo in design; and that Garrick is an *excellent* actor.

Persons

Persons who *excell* in any particular art gain a name. The more *excellent* the meats, the more dangerous the feasting.

Lazy, Indolent.

A *lazy* man never goes through with an undertaking. An *indolent* man will undertake nothing. The first wants courage and resolution; he stops, he turns, he fears, and changes presently. The second wants will and emulation; one cannot animate or make him sensible.

The *lazy* man is a burthen to society. The *indolent* man is an enemy to himself.

To Name, Call.

As much as these words differ in their meaning, they are nevertheless used frequently to express the same idea; the absurdity of which is gross. We *name*, to distinguish in conversation: we *call*, as for help, when wanted.

The Lord *called* every living creature before Adam, and he *named* them.

It is not proper to *name* all things by their names; nor *call* all sorts of people to our assistance.

Quality, Talent.

Qualities form the character of persons; *talents* are their ornament. The first renders them either good or bad, and have great influence over their morals. The second makes them useful or entertaining, and goes a great way towards making them esteemed.

We may use the word *quality* either in a good or bad sense; but we cannot take that of *talent* in any other than a good one.

Man is a mixture of good and bad *qualities*, sometimes so strange as to possess the extremes of each:

H

There

There are persons possessed of such *talents* as make themselves admired, and yet give some pain to others who would be witnesses of them ; but, in this case, I should think it more eligible to endure the caprice of the entertaining, than the disagreeableness of the tiresome.

The *qualities* of the heart are more essential ; those of the mind more brilliant. *Talents* which are of use in necessity are more necessary ; those which conduce to entertainment are best rewarded.

Our *qualities* render us either beloved or despised. Our *talents* make our company coveted.

Excellent *qualities*, joined to rare *talents*, constitute great worth.

To *Extol*, *Praise*.

We *extol* a person, to procure him the esteem of others, or raise his reputation ; we *praise* him, to testify the esteem we have for him, or to applaud him.

To *extol*, is to say a great deal in the favour of others, and ascribe to them great qualities, whether they possess them or not. To *praise*, is to approve, with a kind of admiration, whatever they say or do, whether they deserve it or no.

We *extol* the abilities of a man ; we *praise* his conduct.

The word *extol* supposes that the person of whom we speak, and the person to whom we speak, are different, which the word *praise* does not.

Quacks never fail to *extol* themselves ; they promise always more than they can perform ; and pride themselves in an imaginary esteem. Conceited persons frequently *praise* themselves, and are generally well satisfied with that *praise*.

It is far more ridiculous, in my opinion, for a man to *praise* himself than *extol* himself ; for we *extol* ourselves through a desire of having the esteem of others, which is a vanity one may look over ; but when we are guilty of self-*praise*, it is done through the great esteem

esteem we have for ourselves, which is a pride insufferable.

Darkness, Obscurity.

Darkness seems to signify something real, in opposition to light: *Obscurity* is a mere privation of brightness.

We say often of *darkness*, that it is thick; of *obscurity*, that it is great.

Considering them in a figurative sense, *darkness* implies a state of life in which we are shut up from the world; as the state of a hermit; the state of a recluse. By *obscurity* is understood a state of retirement, or a state unnoticed, as when we retreat into the country, far from the observation of the public eye.

He who lives in a state of *darkness* is useless to society, and dead, as it were, to mankind. He who lives in a state of *obscurity* enjoys a serenity unknown to him who revels in the open world.

To Feel, Handle.

We *feel* lightly; we *handle* with the full hand.

We *feel* a column to know whether it be made of marble or wood; we *handle* stuff to know what strength it has, or what body it is of.

It often happens that a thing, though disagreeable to the eye, shall be agreeable to the *feel*. There is no pleasure in *handling* any thing that is rough.

Translation, Version.

Translation relates to the turning into modern language; *version* into ancient. Thus the English Bible is a *translation*; but the Latin, Greek, Arabic, and Syriac Bibles are *versions*.

Translations, to be perfectly good, should be neither more or less ornamented than the originals. The an-

tient *versions* of scripture have acquired almost as much authority as the Hebrew text.

A new *translation* of Virgil and Horace would still please, notwithstanding the many that have appeared. The time when the *version* of the Septuagint was made is unknown.

Vile, Bad.

Although the first of these words is not in very general use, with respect to the sense in which I would here consider it; yet it is not so entirely disused but that I may characterise it without fear of impropriety. As to the second word, it is not here taken in all its significations, but in that only in which it is used as synonymous with the first.

Uselessness, and little or no value, make a thing *vile*. Defect, and loss of merit render it *bad*. Thence it is we say, in a mystic sense, that we are *vile* creatures, intimating that we are nothing with respect to God, or that he does not stand in need of our services; and that we say he is a *bad* christian who is void of faith, or who has, through sin, lost the grace of baptism.

He is a *vile* subject who is fit for nothing, or who cannot be of any service to the community: He is a *bad* subject who will not attempt to do good, but gives way to every vicious inclination.

A *vile* man is contemptible, and becomes the outcast of the world. A *bad* man is condemnable, and draws upon himself the hatred of every honest person.

In speaking of useful things, as stuffs, linen, and the like, the word *vile* rises upon that of *bad*. That which has been much used, but will still serve upon an occasion, is *bad*: that which cannot be used any more, or that we cannot use with credit, is *vile*.

Bad clothes are not always a mark of poverty. There is sometimes more pride under a covering of *vile* rags, than under that of gold and purple.

Matter,

Matter, Subject.

Matter is that which we use in the work ; *subject* is that on which we work.

The *matter* of a discourse consists in the words, in the phrases, and in the thoughts ; the *subject* is that which we explain by those words, those phrases, and those thoughts.

The reasonings, the passages of holy writ, the characters of passions, and the maxims of morality are the *matter* of sermons ; the mysteries of faith, and the precepts of the gospel ought to be the *subject*.

To Mask, Disguise.

In order to *mask*, it is necessary to cover the face with a false visage ; but to *disguise*, it is sufficient to change the common appearance.

We *mask* ourselves, to go to a ball. We *disguise* ourselves, to bring about an intrigue.

View, Prospect.

The sight of something distant is the general idea of these words ; but that of *view* seems, in my opinion, to imply a sight more extensive than that of *prospect*. Thus we say a confined *prospect* ; but a long or extended *view*.

Besides, there seems to be less variety in a *view* than in a *prospect*. Thus we say, the pleasing *prospect* of the neighbouring villages. The fine *view* of a distant mountain. See *Landscape, Prospect*.

Hovel, Shed.

A *hovel* is a small place, indifferently run-up, with mud walls, in order to preserve things from the weather : a *shed* is a supported roof only ; a place covered

covered overhead, but open on the sides; generally erected as a dry standing-place for carts or other things.

Houels are seldom seen but in country places; *sheds* frequently in towns.

The poor, in many parts of the kingdom, are reduced to the necessity of dwelling in huts, very little better than *houels*. Happy is the traveller, in bad weather, to take shelter even under a *shed*.

Oval, Oblong.

By *oval*, we mean that which is regularly so; by *oblong*, that which resembles the longitudinal section of an egg, whether regular or not.

Tables are frequently made *oblong*, though not exactly *oval*.

We may say, with propriety, that an *oval* is *oblong*; though custom will not admit us to invert the expression.

Mist, Fog.

By *mist* is understood a thin cloud, hanging very low: or rain so extremely small as not to be perceived in drops. By *fog* is implied a moist vapour near the surface of the land; or water so dense as to obscure the sight.

* The *mist* falls; the *fog* rises.

A *mist* prevents our seeing things at some distance; a *fog* those immediately before us.

Some days are so extremely *misty* as to obstruct prospects; others so very *foggy* as to be unhealthy, and mislead the traveller in his way.

Genteel, Elegant.

Genteel implies something above the common run; *elegant* means beautiful without grandeur.

Genteel

Genteel carries with it the idea of something reputable ; *elegant*, of something in taste.

By a house *genteelly* furnished, is understood a house containing every necessary, good and creditable ; by *elegantly* furnished, is meant *genteelly*, and in such a manner as to please without elevation.

Genteel relates more to the neatness and goodness of the furniture ; *elegant* more to the disposition of it.

A man's notions are discovered in the *genteelness* of his house ; his taste in the *elegance*.

To Beat, Strike.

In order to *beat*, we must redouble the blows ; but to *strike*, we need give only one.

We are never *beaten* without being *struck* ; but we are often *struck* without being *beat*.

We are never *beat* but with design ; we often *strike* by accident.

Wise men have said, that the rod should be always on the back of children : those, therefore, who have the bringing of them up should never think differently : however we are to interpret these words no otherwise than alluding to fear, not imagining that we are to be constantly *beating* them ; for nothing is more opposite to good education than the example of violent conduct and severe discipline. The preceptor who *strikes* his pupil, does it oftener through hastiness of temper than design of correction.

Coward, Poltron.

The *coward* will fire up upon the least offence, but proceed no farther. The *poltron* is so meanly spirited, as, through want of courage, to take every insult calmly.

The *coward* draws back ; the *poltron* dares not advance.

Cowards, they say, will fight when desperate. We must not depend on the succour of a *poltron*.

To *Think*, *Study*, *Muse*.

We *think* quietly and orderly to be thoroughly acquainted with our object. We *study* with inquietude and without order, to attain our wishes. We *muse* deeply, to pass away the time agreeably.

The philosopher *thinks* on the arrangement of his system. A person in difficulty *studies* for expedients how to get out of it. The solitary lover *muses* on his mistress.

I have often remarked, that obscure things frequently appear clear to those who know not how to *think* properly; they comprehend, but are not able to explain. It is an act of prudence to *study* to avert such evils as threaten us. The pleasure of *musings* is perhaps most agreeable, but less useful.

Sign, *Signal*.

The *sign* makes known, and is sometimes natural. The *signal* gives notice, and is always arbitrary. The appearances of the face are commonly the *signs* of what passes in the heart. The hoisting of a flag in one ship is a *signal* to another.

We make ourselves understood by the deaf, by *signs*. The readiest way of making persons understand us at a distance is by *signals*.

Only, *Alone*.

When speaking of a thing, we make use of the word *only*, we mean there is no other of the same kind; when that of *alone*, that it is not accompanied with any other.

A child that has neither brother or sister is an *only* child. A person when by himself is said to be *alone*.

That thing must be very rare of which we can find *only* one. Nothing is more tiresome than to be always *alone*.

Affection.

Affection, Love.

Affection is that attachment arising from natural ties, or from a continued course of friendship. *Love* is that attachment between the sexes implanted in us by our Creator, for mutual happiness in a connubial state.

It is *affection* that unites a man to his child or to his friend, but *love* that ties him to his wife.

Love attaches us solely to one person; but we may have an *affection* for many.

It is rare to find a first *love* followed by a second; and I doubt whether ever it can be said by a third; but *affection* is as frequent as attractions occur.

To Lower, Let down.

We make use of the word *lower* with respect to diminishing the height of things, or to certain motions of a body; we *lower* a beam; we *lower* the sails of a ship; we *lower* a building; we *lower* the eyes, the head. We use the expression *let down*, with regard to things made to cover others, and which being lifted up, leave them uncovered; we *let down* the lid of a trunk; we *let down* the eyelids; we *let down* the lappets, or the gown.

The contrary of to *lower* is to raise; that of to *let down* is to lift up.

To *lower* is in use in the neuter sense; to *let down* is not.

Rivers *lower* in the summer. Tall persons are obliged to *lower* their heads when they pass through small door-ways. It is dangerous to *let* ourselves down; as advantages are frequently taken of it. It is not a prince's *letting* himself down, even to familiarity, that acquires him the reputation of being good; but the mildness and equity of his government.

Plant, Herb.

A *Plant* is any vegetable production arising from seed; but seems confined to such as are not very large. Thus saplings are the largest that should be called *plants*. *Herbs* are those *plants* whose stalks are soft, and have no woody substance in them, such as grass, hemlock, &c.

The knowledge of *plants* is both useful and entertaining. There are many medicinal qualities in *herbs*.

To Grow, Increase.

Things *grow* by the nourishment they receive; they *increase* by the addition that is made to them of the same kind. Corn *grows*; the harvest *increases*.

The better we manure the land, the faster the trees *grow*, and the more our revenues *increase*.

The word *grow* signifies only the augmentation, independent of that which occasions it. The word *increase* gives us to understand, that augmentation is caused by a fresh quantity which casually joins it. Thus to say that the river *grows* larger, is to say only that the water is risen, without expressing that it is become so by the arrival of an additional quantity of water: but to say that the river is *increased*, is to say that it is swelled by a fresh quantity of water. This distinction is extremely delicate; it is for this reason, therefore, that we make use of the words *grow* and *increase* indifferently on many occasions, where that delicacy of choice is of no great importance, as in the example I have mentioned; for we may say, with equal propriety, that a river either *grows* larger or *increases*, although each of these words has its particular idea. But there are other occasions where it is proper, and sometimes even necessary to pay a regard to the peculiar idea, and make some kind of choice between these terms, according to the strength of meaning we would give our thoughts: for example, when we would be understood to say, speaking of the passions, that

that they are in our nature, and that the nourishment we take to support life, at the same time gives strength to them, the use of the word *grow* would be elegant. Otherwise we might employ that of *increase*, with respect either to the passions or the talents of the mind.

The passions in general receive birth, and *grow* with the man; but there are some which exist but for a time, and which, after having *increased* to a certain age, diminish and disappear with the powers of nature: there are others which last the whole life, and which are always *increasing*, so as to be stronger in old age than in youth.

Love, which forms itself in infancy, *grows* with age. True courage never brags; it *increases* at the sight of danger. Ambition *grows* proportionably as our wealth *increases*.

It is easy to see through all these examples, that one of these words will agree in some places in which the other will not: for what person is so little delicate in expressing himself as not to perceive, by his natural taste, if not on reflection, that there is more propriety in saying, ambition *grows* proportionably as our wealth *increases*, than to say, ambition *increases* proportionably as our wealth *grows*. If it is not difficult to perceive this delicacy, it is to explain the reason of it: to do this, I must express myself a little metaphysically, and have recourse to such ideas as may enable me to explain it: these ideas, however, shall be no other than the proper ones. Since wealth consists in many different things, which unite themselves in the possession of one single person; the word *increase*, which, as I have said before, denotes the addition of a fresh quantity, agrees better with it than that of *grow*, which precisely marks the augmentation of one single thing, caused by some sort of nourishment. For this same reason, the word *grow* agrees best with ambition, it being a single passion, to which wealth serves as a kind of nutriment to support it, and makes it act with more force and ardour.

Corporeal things *grow* by an inward and mechanical addition, which is in effect their proper and real nu-

triment; they *increase* by the bare outward addition of a fresh quantity of the same matter. Spiritual things *grow* by a kind of nourishment, considered in a figurative sense; they *increase* by the addition of degrees they bear.

An egg does not *begin to grow* in the ovarium till it teems, that is, till fruitfulness has made it fit to receive nourishment; nor does it leave the body till its bulk is sufficiently *increased*, to cause an alteration in the membrane that encloses it.

Our pride *grows* in proportion as we exalt ourselves; and *increases* sometimes till we become contemptible in the eyes of the world.

To Rise, Get up.

To change our posture from recumbent to erect, is the true meaning of the verb to *rise*; whereas to *get up* implies rather to climb: thus we *rise* from the ground; we *rise* from our bed; we *rise* from our seat. We *get up* stairs; we *get up* a ladder.

Copy, Model.

The sense in which these words are reputed synonymous, does not instantly present itself to the reader; the first glance of the eye that shews us a *copy* made after an original work, and a *model* made as the original of a work, throws them so far distant from each other as not to admit the least similitude; but a second reflection will make us sensible that custom has used these two words under one common idea on many occasions; and that to denote equally the original after which a work is made, and the work made after the original; *copy* having been understood as well as *model* to mean the first work by which we form the second: and *model*, as well as *copy* the second work, formed after the first. Thus then they have been considered as in a manner doubly synonymous; but they have each their peculiar ideas as follow.

In

In the first sense, *copy* should be never used, but with respect to the manuscript of an author upon which the printer works. *Model* may be used on every other occasion, as well with respect to morality as the arts.

A proof sheet is not often very incorrect, unless the *copy* is so. Booksellers, who often refuse to purchase excellent copies, frequently buy bad ones at too great a price. There is no perfect *model* of virtue. I should imagine that the arts and sciences would gain more ground, if artists and authors would pursue more their own genius, than imitate the *models* they meet with.

In the second sense, *copy* is used for painting; *model* for relief. A *copy* ought to be faithful; a *model* just. The second of these words seems to suppose a greater resemblance than the first.

Some *copies* are so extremely well performed as to be little inferior to the originals. *Models* of antiquity are frequently more expressive than modern originals.

Precision, Abstraction.

The common idea of these two words is that of a separation made by the force of the mind in considering of objects; but difficult as it is to find out their peculiar ideas, and determine their respective characteristics, I have attempted it.

Precision then separates things distinct in themselves, in order to prevent the confusion which arises from a jumble of ideas. *Abstraction*, if I may use the expression, separates things that are in themselves inseparable, in order to consider them apart, independent one of another. The first is the effect of the justness and clearness of the understanding, which prevents our adding any thing that is useless or foreign to the subject we treat of; consequently it will agree in every circumstance, either with respect to affairs or sciences. The second is the effort of a metaphysical mind, which removes from the point of view all that

we would detach from the subject; it in some respect mutilates, though it sometimes contributes to the discovery of truth, and sometimes draws it into error. We may however use it, but with care.

It appears to me that *precision* is more applicable to things which may not only be considered apart, but may be conceived to be one without the other, such as, for example, alms and charity; and *abstraction* more particularly to things which may indeed be considered apart, but which cannot be conceived to be one without the other, as body and size. Thus the design of *precision* is to prevent a wandering from the subject, removing, for that purpose, all that is foreign to it; and that of *abstraction*, to obviate our entering into the utmost extent of it, considering only one part, without any regard to the other.

There is no science more certain or more clear than that of geometry; it making very exact *precisions*: There are however certain metaphysical *abstractions* blended with it, which make geometers fall into errors equally with others; not indeed when size and quantity are in question, but with respect to physics.

Our ideas cannot be too *precise*; but it is sometimes dangerous to have them too *abstracted*. The first is the surer way of arriving at the truth in science, and our aim in affairs; whereas the second often puts us farther from both.

Precision is the gift of nature, receiving its birth with the mind; those who are endowed with it are excellently qualified for conversation; we listen to them with pleasure, because they listen to us in return: they understand what is said to them equally as they make themselves understood. *Abstraction* is the fruit of study, produced by profound application; those who are familiar with it, talk of common things sometimes with too great refinement; simple and natural subjects are in their conversation very difficult to comprehend in the manner they speak of them.

Precise ideas embellish common language, and make it in my opinion sublime. *Abstracted* ideas are very tiresome, they seem to me to be of little use, except in the schools; or in certain learned debates.

We

We express by *precise* ideas the most simple and most sensible truths ; but we cannot prove them otherwise than by ideas very *abstracted*.

Justness, Precision.

Justness prevents our running into errors : *precision* removes every thing that is useless.

The *precision* of discourse is a common mark of the *justness* of the mind.

Attachment, Passion, Devotion.

Although the word *attachment* may sometimes be used with respect to things bad in themselves, it is however applied with more propriety when an honest or moderate passion is in question than either of the two others. As for example, we are *attached* to our duty, to our friends, to our families, and to virtuous women whom we esteem. That of *passion* is more applicable with respect to things, less approved, or when they are carried to excess ; thus men are said to have a *passion* for gaming, for women, &c. As to the word *devotion*, though I have ranked it here, as most agreeable to the other two substantives ; the idea it is supposed to convey is best comprehended by the preterite of the verb *devote* ; the substantive *devotion* being very rarely used in this sense : by it then is understood an implicit obedience, or a perfect disposition to conform in every thing. Thus we say, a man is *devoted* to his prince, to his master, to his benefactor, to a lady who has acquired an absolute empire over him.

Attachment is strong ; *passion* is violent ; *devotion* has no reserve.

The first unites us to what we love ; the second to what we thirst after ; and the third makes us submit to the will of those we are desirous of serving.

The manners of the present age have banished from the laws of friendship all *attachment* contrary to interest.

terest. We dare not confess a *passion* for any thing through fear of censure. We often observe, that those persons who *devote* themselves to others, in expectation of future advantage, are frequently disappointed.

Life would not be agreeable without some *attachment*. A *passion* for any one thing generally gives as much pain as pleasure. It is difficult to please the great, without *devoting* ourselves entirely to their will.

In Love, Lover.

It is sufficient to regard with passionate affection, in order to be said with propriety that we are *in love*; but we must testify that affection, in order to be called a *lover*.

We become *in love* with a woman whose beauty affects the heart; we become her *lover*, by waiting on her.

Variety of tender sentiments crowd into the breast of a man *in love*. Passionate airs appear with caution in the behaviour of a *lover*.

We are often very much *in love*, without daring to appear a *lover*. We frequently declare ourselves a *lover*, without ever being *in love*.

It is always the passion that constitutes our being *in love*, of which the possession of the object is the only end we propose. Reason and interest may form the *lover*, of whom an honest establishment, or some particular advantage, is the chief aim or tendency.

It is very rare to be *in love* with two persons at the same time; there is none that I ever heard of, except Phillis of Siro, who was so much *in love* with two men, that she could not give the preference, or her company, to either one or the other: but it is not very rare to find a man at the same time the *lover* of many mistresses, which he continues to be, frequently to the very hour of marriage. We may also be *in love* with one person, and the *lover* of another; I speak of that case where interest engages us to the one, whilst we sigh in secret for her whom it is not convenient for us to marry.

Affiduity finds opportunity to favour the designs of a man *in love*. Riches give the *lover* a great advantage over his rivals.

Absent, Inattentive.

These two words equally express want of attention; but with this difference, that it is our own inward ideas occupying us so fully, as to prevent our attention to any other thing that offers which renders us *absent*; whereas 'tis some fresh outward object attracting our attention, in such a manner as to turn it from what we at first gave it to, or from what we ought to give it to, that makes us *inattentive*. When these faults are become habitual, they are very inconvenient in our commerce with the world.

We are *absent*, when we think not of any present object, or any thing that is said to us. We are *inattentive*, when we pay more regard to any other object than to that which is proposed to us, or when we listen to any other conversation than to what is addressed to us.

Very studious persons, and those who have great affairs upon their hands, or are endued with strong passions, are more apt to be *absent* than others; their internal ideas and designs quite engrossing them. Young people are the most apt to be *inattentive*; a mere nothing being sufficient to amuse and divert their attention.

Our *absence* of mind is owing to thoughtfulness; our *inattention*, to curiosity.

The mind of an *absent* man is never where he himself is; nothing round him makes the least impression on him; he is often at Athens or Rome, in the midst of London or Paris; and frequently muses upon politics or geometry, while the conversation perhaps runs upon love or gallantry. The mind of an *inattentive* man is always present with him; is caught by every thing he either sees or hears; he quits his attention to one thing, in order that he may attend to another; listening to all that is said, both on the right
and

and left; he frequently understands not thoroughly, or comprehends but in part, which makes him liable to take things sometimes in a quite opposite sense to what they are meant.

The *absent* man cares little for conversation; the *inattentive* man loses the fruit of it. When we are in company with the former, we had best give ourselves up to silent meditation; when with the latter, we had better wait for their attention till every other object is out of their way.

A new passion, if strong, seldom fails to render us *absent*. We can scarce help being *inattentive* when listening to a tiresome story, or when we hear on the other side something more interesting.

To Conduct, Guide, Lead.

The first two of these words suppose a superiority of light, which the last does not; but, on the other hand, the last carries in its idea a degree of credit and ascendancy, entirely foreign to the other two.

We *conduct* and *guide* those who know not the way; we *lead* those who cannot or care not to go by themselves.

In the literal sense it is, properly speaking, the head that *conducts*; the eye that *guides*; and the hand that *leads*.

We *conduct* an affair. We *guide* a traveller. We *lead* an infant.

It requires understanding to *conduct* in business. Politeness should be our *guide* in all proceedings. Taste should *lead* the way in pleasures.

We are *conducted* step by step, that we may do exactly what is necessary. We are *guided* in roads, to prevent our losing the way. We are *led* to the knowledge of people, in order to procure their acquaintance.

Wise men do not *conduct* themselves by the light of others so much as by their own. An attentive perusal of the gospel is sufficient to *guide* us in the way of salvation. It is great weakness to suffer ourselves to be
led

led in all our actions by the will of another; sensible persons will indeed consult a friend in matters of doubt, but they make their determinations themselves.

Entire, Complete.

A thing is *entire* when it is neither mutilated, broken, or divided, but when all its parts are together as they ought to be. It is *complete*, when it wants nothing, but has every thing that is necessary.

The first of these words relates more to that totality of parts which constitutes the whole of a thing; the second more to that totality which contributes to its accidental perfection.

Small families in the country occupy *entire* houses; but in London they have scarcely *complete* apartments.

Disgraceful, Scandalous.

Both these words express the effect of those actions that hurt the reputation of those who commit them; with this difference, that a *disgraceful* action is an obstacle to glory, loses us the esteem, and draws on us the contempt of the honest: whereas a *scandalous* action is a shameful blot in our life, destroys our honour, and draws on us the hatred of the just.

He who has the folly or the misfortune to do any thing *disgraceful* should be very careful not to give himself any unbecoming airs. When we have been guilty of any thing *scandalous*, the best thing we can do is, to hide ourselves entirely from the eyes of the world.

Nothing is more *disgraceful* to men than meanness of spirit; nor any thing more so to women than gallantry carried to excess. Nothing is more *scandalous* to all sorts of people, than to be punished according to the sentence of public justice.

Reserved

Reserved, Modest.

The advantage of these two qualities is confined to the person who possesses them; they contribute to his perfection, which are nothing to others but an object of speculation, which merits their approbation, but is sometimes injurious to their satisfaction.

We are *reserved* in our words and actions. Taking too great a liberty is the fault in opposition; when that liberty is carried to excess, and we are in no respect *reserved*, it becomes impudence. We are *modest* in our desires, in our gestures, and in our dress. There are three kinds of *modesty*, those of the heart, the mind, and the body; but their opposite vices are not all expressed by the word *immodesty*, which denotes only that which regards the body, proceeding from the indecency of gestures and clothes. That vanity which we assume in giving ourselves bold and unbecoming airs is the vice in opposition to *modesty* of mind: that which is contrary to *modesty* of heart is immoderate ambition, which makes us covet all that comes in our way, and all that we can possibly attain.

Reservedness is good at all times; but it is absolutely necessary in public, and in company with our superiors; any liberty they may seem to wink at giving some degree of offence: for they reserve to themselves a certain title to respect, the failure of which they consider as an unpardonable fault. *Modesty* is an ornament to persons who have some pretence for carrying their head higher than others, and to those who are possessed of some known and distinguished merit; but to all other persons it is an indispensable virtue, and a quality, without which they cannot appear becoming, or avoid ridicule.

Ashamed, Bashful.

It is reproach of conscience that makes us *ashamed*; but the sentiments of modesty that make us *bashful*. Both one and the other throw a colour into

into the face, but when we are *ashamed*, we redden ; when *bashful*, we blush.

We need never boast or be *ashamed* of our birth, which is a mark only of pride ; but it is praise-worthy in all ranks of people, both high and low, to be *ashamed* of their faults. Although *bashfulness* is a virtue, there are nevertheless occasions when it would pass for weakness and timidity.

To Finish, Cease, Leave off.

We *finish*, by putting the last hand to a work. We *cease*, in quitting it entirely. We *leave off*, in discontinuing.

To *finish* a discourse properly, we should do it just before it begins to grow tiresome. We ought to *cease* from our pursuits as soon as we discover them to be useless. We should not *leave off* work but to refresh ourselves, that we may begin again with fresh spirits, and more vigour.

Man is born to trouble ; he has no sooner *finished* one affair, than another succeeds ; he may indeed seek repose and tranquillity, but Providence will not permit him in this life to *cease* from labour ; and if want of spirits or fatigue induces him sometimes to *leave off* his work, it is not for any length of time ; he is presently obliged to return to his task and continue his employ.

That is certainly a good maxim which says, we should not begin a thing which we cannot *finish* ; but that in my opinion is much better, which forbids our *ceasing* from one work in order to begin another, without necessity obliges us. When our mind is employed, it is necessary sometimes to *leave off* ; not at that time when the imagination, full of fire, finds itself best capable of its task ; but only at the first instant we perceive it flag ; it being wrong either to stop it in its career, or attempt to drive it when it stops.

Persons who never *finish* their stories, *cease* talking, or *leave off*, are as little fit for conversation as those who never speak a word.

To

To Invent, Find out.

We *invent* new things by the force of imagination. We *find out* things that are hidden or unknown by examination and study. The one denotes the fruitfulness of the mind; the other the penetration.

It is the principle of mechanics to *invent* tools and machines; of physics, to *find out* causes and effects.

The ventilator was *invented* by Dr. Hales. Harvey *found out* the circulation of the blood.

Joy, Gaiety.

Joy is in the heart; *gaiety* in the manners. The one consists in the sweet sentiments of the soul; the other, in the agreeable situation of the mind.

It sometimes happens that the possession of a good, from which we expected a great deal of *joy*, gives us a great deal of uneasiness. It is often owing to a turn of imagination only, that the bitterest tears are succeeded by the greatest *gaiety*.

Project, Design.

A *project* is a plan or an arrangement of means, in order to execute a *design*. The *design* is what we propose to execute.

We commonly say of *projects*, that they are fine; of *designs*, that they are great.

The beauty of *projects* depends upon their order and magnificence. The grandeur of *designs* rises from the advantage and glory they may procure. We should not suffer ourselves to be dazzled with the beauty of the one, or the grandeur of the other; for practice does not often agree with speculation; the admirable order of a system, and the advantageous idea which we form from it, do not always prevent *projects* from running aground, or put *designs* out of the possibility of failing.

The

The experience of all ages teaches us, that heads fruitful in great *designs*, and excellent *projects*, are frequently chimerical.

The word *project* is taken also for the thing we even propose to execute, as well as that of *design*. But though these words, considered in that sense, are more nearly synonymous, we shall nevertheless find a difference very conspicuous to those who have any delicacy of taste. The following is such as I am able to discover.

It appears to me that *project* relates to something more distant; *design* to something more near. We make *projects* for the time to come; we form *designs* for the time present. The first is more vague; the other more determined.

The *project* of an avaritious man is to enrich himself; his *design* is to amass money.

A good minister of state has no other *project* than the glory of his prince, and the happiness of the subject. A good general studies as much to conceal his own *designs* as to discover those of his enemy.

The union of all the states of Europe into one single republic for general government, and the discussion of their particular interests, without changing the interior government peculiar to each of them, was a noble *project* of Henry the IVth of France; but perhaps more difficult to execute than the *design* of universal monarchy, in which Spain was at that time busied.

To Oblige, Engage.

To *oblige*, implies rather something of force; to *engage*, rather something agreeable. Duty and necessity *oblige* us; promises and good manners *engage* us.

Convenience often *obliges* those who are abroad in the world to do things they very much dislike. Complaisance *engages* those, who are not very choice in their company, sometimes to enter upon bad actions.

Also,

Also, Likewise.

Also relates more to number and quantity, its proper office is to add and to augment.

Love is not only liberal, but *also* prodigal.

Likewise is used with most propriety when it relates to similitude or comparison; its particular office is to denote the conformity and equality of things.

When the body is sick, the mind is so *likewise*. Politeness is not only to be met with in London, but *likewise* in country places.

Upright, Up.

We are *upright*, when we are neither crooked or stooping. We are *up*, when upon our feet.

A graceful air requires us to be *upright*. Respect makes us sometimes hold ourselves *up*.

Flags, Colours.

By the word *flags*, we understand ensigns hoisted upon the top of towers, castles, or churches. The word *colours* implies the jack, ensign, and pendant of a ship, or the standard of a regiment.

The arms of England are generally painted upon *flags*; the union upon *colours*.

The first, for the most part, is used in the singular number; the second never. We say *the flag* of a fort; the *colours* of a regiment. English *flags*, except those on which the arms of the country are painted, are commonly of one colour, such as white, blue, &c. but *colours* are of many.

Flags are hung out on days of public rejoicing; and frequently hoisted as signals. Great respect is usually paid to the *colours* of a regiment, as military honour seems there to be chiefly centered.

Trench,

Trench, Ditch.

A *trench* is either a channel made in lands by digging out the earth, in order to carry off the water, or where earth is thrown up, in order to defend soldiers in their approach to a town, or to guard a camp. *Ditch* is a *trench* cut in the ground between two fields, in order to separate them.

The earth dug from *trenches* that serve as drains is generally spread so as to leave no heap. The earth dug from *ditches* is usually thrown up into a bank on one side.

Trenches are commonly regular. *Ditches* are often irregular.

The largeness of a *ditch* is determined by the wideness of the *trench*.

Fine, Delicate.

To conceive things that are *fine*, we need only sufficient comprehension; but it requires taste to conceive that which is *delicate*. The first is within the reach of many persons; the second but of few.

A *fine* discourse is sometimes usefully repeated to those who do not at first comprehend it: but he who perceives not the *delicate* at first glance, will never perceive it. We may seek the one; but must catch the other.

The word *fine* is of more extensive use; we apply it equally with respect to the strokes of ill-will as to those of good. The application of the word *delicate* is more rare; it agrees not with any thing malicious, but is used with most propriety with respect to things in themselves flattering. Thus we say a *fine* satire; a *delicate* encomium.

Steadiness, Constancy, Resolution.

Steadiness prevents our varying, and supports the heart against levity and curiosity which diversity of
1 objects

objects may produce: it rises from preference, and justifies choice. *Constancy* prevents our changing, and furnishes the heart with resources against being disgusted or tired with the same object: it results from perseverance, and gives a lustre to attachment. *Resolution* prevents our giving way, and endues the heart with strength to resist the attacks it meets with: it springs from resistance, and throws a brightness upon victory.

Rakes pride themselves more in being fickle, than in the *steadiness* of their engagements. If the affections of the ladies do not last for ever, it is less owing to a want of *constancy* to the persons they love, than to a want of *resolution* in the object of their affections.

To Conceal, Dissemble, Disguise.

We *conceal*, by a profound secret, that which we would not have known. We *dissemble*, by reserve, that which we would not have appear. We *disguise*, by contrary appearances, that which we would not lay open to the penetration of others.

It requires care and attention to *conceal*; art and cleverness, to *dissemble*; labour and cunning, to *disguise*.

He who would *conceal*, throws as it were a veil over himself, that he may not betray himself through indiscretion. He who would *dissemble*, throws a veil over the eyes of others, that what he does or says may not fall within the reach of their knowledge. He who would *disguise*, never opens himself any otherwise than to elude.

Were we to enter into affairs of interest or policy we should always *conceal* our designs, often *dissemble*, and sometimes *disguise* them: with respect to matters which concern the heart we should be more frank.

It is sufficient to *conceal* from those who cannot see without some additional light; we must *dissemble* with those who can see without any such accessory brightness; but it is necessary to *disguise* thoroughly from those,

those, who not content to pierce through the darkness that opposes, examine into that light with which we would dazzle them.

When we have not resolution to correct our faults, we should at least have wisdom to *conceal* them. That maxim of Louis the XIth of France, which says, in order to know how to reign, we should know how to *dissemble*, is very just, even with respect to domestic government. When the necessity of circumstances, and the nature of affairs require us to *disguise*, it is political; but when urged to it, through an inclination to cheat or shuffle, it is knavish.

To Adjust, Reconcile.

To *adjust* supposes some dispute or disagreement. To *reconcile* supposes only some distance or difference.

We *adjust* matters; we *reconcile* minds.

It seems impossible to *adjust* the liberties of the Gallic church with the pretensions of the court of Rome; sooner or later one must necessarily destroy the other; for it will always be difficult to *reconcile* the maxims of their parliaments with the opinions of the consistory.

We use the word *adjust* with respect to opinions which oppose one another; and that of *reconcile*, with respect to passages that seem to contradict each other.

Want of justness in the mind, is what commonly prevents schoolmen from *adjusting* their disputes. A precise knowledge of the value of every word, in all the different circumstances wherein they may be used, would go a great way towards *reconciling* authors.

To Bring, Fetch.

To *bring*, implies conveying a thing ourselves from one place to another, in opposition to the verb send. To *fetch* implies going to a place, in order to *bring*.

He who *fetches* a thing is always supposed to *bring* it; but he who *brings* it is not always supposed to *fetch* it. Thus we cannot *fetch* without *bringing*; but we may *bring* without *fetching*.

If we send for a workman in any branch of business in order to make or repair, he naturally *brings* his tools with him: should he leave any behind through forgetfulness, he is obliged to go back and *fetch* them.

To Swallow, Gulp.

In the literal sense, these words are more nearly synonymous than in the figurative; yet even in that they will admit of some distinction. We *gulp* in order to *swallow*. This however is not the only difference. By *swallowing* we understand taking down the throat simply; by *gulping* we mean sucking down eagerly, or without intermission.

With respect to eating, *swallowing* carries in its idea the act of chewing; *gulping* does not.

The glutton will *gulp* down a greater quantity of food in five minutes, than a moderate eater would *swallow* in half an hour.

In the figurative sense, *gulping* rather implies a difficulty of *swallowing*.

We are all too apt to *swallow* flattery; and as fulsome as it may possibly be, there are some vain persons that will make a shift to *gulp* it down.

Detraction, Defamation.

Injuring the reputation is the general idea of these two words; but that of *detraction* implies the taking off from a man's good name; *defamation* the giving him a bad one. Were we to be silent, when asked the character of a worthy man; it would be *detraction*. Were we to vilify him, by declaring him guilty of infamous practices, it would be *defamation*.

Defamation

Defamation is punishable by human laws; *detraction* is not.

The one is an open and scurrilous way of injuring the reputation; the other a close and demure one.

There are those accustomed to *detraction* who would fly the thoughts of *defamation*, little imagining that both are equally bad, being two different means, only working to the same end.

Meagre, Lean.

In that sense in which these two words are reputed synonymous, *meagre* signifies want of flesh; *lean*, want of fat.

Meagreness supposes a waste of body, owing either to a bad constitution or a scarcity of food. *Leanness* supposes no want of flesh, being opposed only to corpulency or fatness.

A man may be *lean*, yet not *meagre*.

The *lean* are usually strong; the *meagre* commonly weak.

The first is generally a mark of beggary; the second frequently denotes the person accustomed to labour.

Activity attends the *lean*; indolence the *meagre*. Many persons, if possible would choose to be *lean*; but none would care to be *meagre*.

Sailor, Seaman, Mariner.

These words denote persons who live by the sea, or practise navigation; but *sailor*, in my opinion, is used with most propriety with respect to the common men, or, in the sea phrase, those before the mast. *Seaman* agrees best with regard to the superior class of the ship's company, such as the officers, boatswain, gunner, &c. *Mariner* relates more to those who gain their livelihood at sea, but who are generally their own masters; as fishermen.

Sailors are ignorant of navigation, and are they who work the vessel by the direction of others; *seamen* are supposed to understand it, and are they who generally direct it: *mariners* are supposed to have no greater knowledge of the art than such as is sufficient to serve their purpose; working their vessels themselves.

Both *sailors* and *seamen* take long voyages; whereas *mariners* do little else than coast.

We say an able *sailor*; an expert *seaman*; a bold *mariner*.

The great hardships the poor *sailors* undergo, one would imagine should be sufficient to endear them to their country. It is not every captain of a ship that is a good *seaman*. *Mariners* earn their bread very hard; they not only being obliged to work more than other men, but are in daily danger of their lives.

Grot, Grotto.

Though these words are evidently one and the same, *grot* being no more than an abbreviation of *grotto*, yet custom has made them expressive of different ideas.

Grot then seems to denote something more natural; *grotto* something more artificial.

The first is, in effect, the work of nature; the second the work of art.

The one implies a cool cave appropriated to pleasure, stony, rough, irregular, and overgrown with moss; the other a pleasurable cave or room ornamented with shell-work.

We say a pretty *grot*: a beautiful *grotto*. It is as much out of the power of the most ingenious artist to make a *grotto* any thing equal to a *grot*, as it is for art to rival nature.

Cave, Cell.

The sense in which these words are esteemed synonymous, is that of the retired dwelling of some religious person.

Cave

Cave is a habitation under ground, made either by art or nature. *Cell* is some little dwelling raised above ground.

We dig a *cave*. We build a *cell*.

Hermits, or such persons as chuse to seclude themselves from the world bury themselves in *caves* they may chance to meet with, or wear out their lives in *cells* remote from public view.

Broad, Wide.

By *broad* is understood extended each way; as *broad-cloth*; a *broad-brimmed* hat. By *wide* is meant *broad*, to a certain degree; as three inches *wide*; four feet *wide*.

Broad seems to be confined to things of less extent; *wide* to those of greater. Thus we say a *broad* bean; a *broad* face; a *broad* back; a *broad* apron; a *broad* table-cloth; but a *wide* room; a *wide* ditch; a *wide* field; the *wide* ocean.

Blessing, Benediction.

Benediction appears to me to be limited to the decretory pronouncement of happiness. *Blessing* is a more general expression, intimating the various means of happiness.

Religious men find as much comfort in the *benediction* of the church; as others experience in the *blessings* of life.

Blessing seems to intimate divine favour; *benediction* that which is human.

We say the *blessing* of God; the *benediction* of the priest.

Heaven showers down its *blessings* upon the virtuous. The *benediction* of a good man is a very desirable thing.

Ambassador, Resident.

The general idea of these words is that of a minister, representing the person of his sovereign, sent from one court to another; but *ambassador* is superior to that of *resident*.

The first are generally men of greater rank; the second of less.

Ambassadors are not supposed to stay long at the court to which they are sent, their office being to transact some state affairs between the two powers. *Residents* are supposed to reside for some considerable time, as a testimony of the good harmony between the two states.

The Earl of Northampton was sent from London *ambassador* to Venice in the year 1764, during the time that Mr. Murray was there as *resident*.

Dregs, Sediment.

Dregs are gross; a *sediment* is fine.

After the *dregs* are taken away, there will frequently remain a *sediment*.

We say the *dregs* of wine; the *dregs* of melted tallow; but the *sediment* of water; the *sediment* of urine.

Lofty, High.

Lofty seems to carry with it an idea of magnificence, which *high* does not. Thus we say a *lofty* room; the *lofty* cedar; but a *high* house; a *high* tree.

With respect to other things 'tis the same. Thus it is in the power only of a severe fit of sickness or a heavy stroke of adversity to lower the *high* looks of the great, and the *lofty* imaginations of the proud.

Betwixt,

Betwixt, Between.

If any two words in the English language may be said to carry the same meaning, these, in some respect may. As a studied delicacy here is not immediately essential, custom has made no other distinction than that of using the word *between* on every occasion, as being softer on the tongue, and almost banishing the use of the word *betwixt* as being much harsher : but as I deviate from the common opinion, and think there is no word so trivial but the choice of it, on particular occasions, may be necessary, I hope I may not be condemned as too nice with respect to the words before us.

Betwixt then appears to me to be used with most propriety when that which is in the middle is as it were embraced by the other two ; *between*, when that which is in the middle is at a distance from the other two. Thus, to speak properly, with respect to a house standing in a row, we should use the word *betwixt* ; as, for example, the house I dwell in stands *betwixt* two high houses : but, with respect to a tree standing in a line with others, we should use the word *between* ; as for instance, the oak tree I mentioned stands *between* two elms.

Middle, Midst.

A thing is in the *middle* when it stands at an equal distance from the two extremes ; it is in the *midst* when it stands in the center of a great many.

Thus we say in the *middle* of a pond ; in the *midst* of a crowd.

There cannot be a more tormenting situation than to hang in the *middle* between hope and fear. Providence sometimes has taken a man out from the *midst* of misfortunes, when he has seen no visible way of escaping.

Marshy, Boggy.

Marshy lands are those that lie low, and are watery ; *boggy* lands are those where there are many quagmires.

In walking over the first, we sink not deeper than our ankles. In passing over the second we may entirely be lost.

Marshy lands frequently produce fine meadows ; *boggy* lands are wholly useless.

Rough, Rugged.

Roughness is a small degree of *ruggedness* ; *ruggedness* a great degree of *roughness*.

Smooth is the reverse of *rough* ; level the reverse of *rugged*.

We say a *rough* hand ; a *rugged* road.

Ray, Beam.

A *beam* seems to me to be more powerful than a *ray*, casting a greater degree of light and heat.

We say *rays* of light ; *beams* of the sun ; by the first of which expressions we mean that those are *rays* which shine early in the morning ; by the second, that those are *beams* which gleam at noon.

We frequently apply the epithet cheerful to the word *ray* ; that of scorching to the word *beam*.

The *rays* of the sun being separated by a prism is the origin of colours. The *beams* of the sun collected into one point, by means of a convex lens, will set fire to any thing they touch.

Clergyman, Parson.

There are three ranks of *clergymen* below that of a dignitary, viz. *parson*, vicar, and curate. *Parson* is

is the first, meaning a rector, or he who receives the great tythes of a benefice. By the word *parson* then is implied one of a particular class of clergy; whereas by the word *clergyman* is understood any person ordained to serve at the altar.

Parsons are always priests; many *clergymen* are only deacons.

Every bishop, dean, &c. is a *clergyman*, tho' not always a *parson*.

As the general and indiscriminate use of these two words has rendered it necessary, I have pointed out the distinction that should be made between them; but am of opinion, as custom has thrown into the word *parson* an idea of contempt, it would be better not to use it at all, but when we have occasion to point out one of that class of *clergymen* who enjoy the great tythes of a living, to substitute in its room that of rector.

Suffocated, Smothered, Choaked.

Death, brought on by a stoppage of breath, is the general idea of these three words; but that of *suffocated* implies an extinction of life, occasioned by being in a place where we cannot breathe; that of *smothered*, by being in a place where we are not suffered to breathe; that of *choaked*, by having the wind-pipe closed.

Thus men are frequently *suffocated* by smoke. Persons raving mad, when incurable, are sometimes *smothered* between two feather beds. Malefactors, when hanged, are *choaked*.

It has happened that travellers, by falling into bogs, have been sometimes *suffocated* before assistance could be had. Children are frequently *smothered* in bed through the carelessness of nurses. Persons are often *choaked* by eating too greedily.

The words *smother* and *choak* are often used in a figurative sense; the word *suffocate* never.

We *smother* a flame. We *choak* a passage.

It is an act of charity to *smother* the failings of another. When interest is predominant, it is sure to *choak* up all the avenues to the heart, which would otherwise be open to the cries of distress.

Rule, Order.

Rule respects properly those things that ought to be done; *order*, the manner in which they should be done. In the idea of the first, there seems to be something arising more from natural right; in the idea of the second something resulting more from positive right.

Equity and charity ought to be the two grand *rules* of our conduct; they may even deviate from all kind of *order*.

We submit to *rule*. We conform to *order*. Although the first is much more indispensable, it is yet much more broke through; the particularity of *order* making a greater impression on us than the advantage of *rule*.

Regular, Methodical.

We are *regular* in our conduct. We are *methodical* with respect to our affairs.

A *regular* man is careful of his reputation; he runs into no excess. A *methodical* man takes care of his time; he gives no way to dissipation.

With respect to expences, we are *regular* in relation to the bounds we set to them; *methodical*, with regard to the manner of them.

Regular persons are always admired; *methodical* persons are frequently laughed at.

To be Sorry for, Regret.

We are *sorry for* the misfortunes of another; we *regret* his absence. The one is the effect of pity; the other of attachment.

Grief

Grief occasions our *sorrow* : repentance excites our *regret*.

A court favourite in prosperity is the object of envy ; but when he falls into disgrace no one is *sorry for* him. Those princes who are most commended during their life are not always most *regretted* after their death.

The expression, *sorry for*, when used with respect to ourselves in some measure changes its signification. Retaining the common and general idea of sensibility, it ceases to express that particular motive of pity that makes us sympathise inwardly for the distresses of others, and in its room marks only a certain uneasiness which discovers itself outwardly. When we are *sorry for* the misfortunes of others, we are often inwardly touched, and perhaps no outward sign of it shall appear : when we are *sorry for* our own, we shew it outwardly, in order to draw the compassion of others. This expression is sometimes used in another sense besides that mentioned ; instead of motives of pity it denotes motives of repentance : In this sense we say he is *sorry for* the steps he has taken.

As much taken up as we may be with ourselves, there are certain moments when we are *sorry for* the distresses of others. However philosophical we may pretend to be, it is extremely difficult to suffer a long time together without shewing some signs of sorrow. Mercenary people are *sorry for* every step they take that does not turn out to advantage. We often seem to *regret* the absent, in order to affront the person present.

A hard heart is *sorry for* no one. An insensible man is never *sorry for* any thing that happens to him. A miserly person *regrets* every morsel he eats.

We should never be *sorry for* a man who suffers deservedly ; for ourselves when we can procure no kind of comfort ; nor for any trouble we take, when prudence enjoins it. We should not *regret* the departure of a friend when his absence will turn out to his advantage.

Rivulet,

Rivulet, Brook, Stream.

Rivulets and *brooks* are certain species of *streams* which are running waters, with this difference, that a *rivulet* runs between banks; whereas a *brook* winds its way through the meadows, or by a hedge side.

A *rivulet* is a much larger *stream* than a *brook*.

Fish are found in *rivulets*, but never in what we properly call *brooks*, there not being sufficient depth of water.

We say the rapid *stream*; the clear *rivulet*; the gurgling *brook*.

Heavy rains will swell a *stream* in such a manner as to overflow the neighbouring grounds. Poets are very luxurious in their description of *rivulets* and *brooks*.

Stream, Current.

A *stream* issues from a head, and moves forward with a continuity of parts. A *current* is a certain progressive motion of some fluid body. These words, in the literal sense, are applied to water. Thus we say, the *stream* of a river; the *current* of a sea.

Streams are frequently rapid; *currents* are seldom so.

In the figurative sense these words convey the same ideas. Thus we say, a *stream* of light; a *current* of air.

To Swear, Make oath of.

Custom has made the word *swear* to signify the profane and illegal use of the sacred name in common conversation; whereas, by the phrase *make oath of*, is understood the divine name used solemnly on legal occasions in confirmation of the truth.

In courts of judicature we are required to *make oath* of every thing we have to say. He who *swears* upon every

every occasion gives us to understand, that his bare word is not to be credited.

Pleasing, Agreeable.

It is the air and behaviour that renders *pleasing*; good sense and good humour that renders *agreeable*.

We love the company of a *pleasing* man, because he charms. We covet the company of an *agreeable* man, because he diverts.

Well-bred persons are always *pleasing*. Merry persons are commonly *agreeable*.

How difficult is it to avoid being attached to one of a *pleasing* address and *agreeable* conversation!

It appears to me that it is more the behaviour than the air that makes the men *pleasing*; and that it is rather the air than the behaviour that makes the women so. It seems to me also, that it is rather good sense and a liveliness in conversation that constitutes *agreeableness* in the men; and that it is an even temper and a merry disposition that establishes that quality in the women.

When these words are used otherwise than to denote personal qualities, that of *pleasing*, properly speaking, implies something which flatters the sense, or self-love; that of *agreeable*, something which agrees with the taste and the mind.

It is *pleasing* to have always desirable objects before us. Nothing is more *agreeable* to a joyous man than good company.

It is sometimes dangerous to approach that which is *pleasing* to the sight; and it may happen, that what is very *agreeable* may be very prejudicial.

Graces, Charms.

Graces result from natural politeness, accompanied with a noble freedom; it is a varnish that appears in our conversation, our actions and our carriage, making us please in every thing we do. *Charms* rise from

an assemblage of fine touches animated by good-humour and good sense, and are sometimes far superior to what is perfectly agreeable.

The body seems to be more susceptible of *graces*; the mind of *charms*. We say of a lady that she walks, dances, and sings with *grace*; and that her conversation is full of *charms*.

What can a man desire more in a lady than an outward union of *graces* and *charms*, and an inward composition of solidity in her disposition and delicacy in her sentiments.

Ready, Easy.

Both the one and the other of these words denote that which is done without difficulty; but the first excludes difficulty which arises from obstacles and oppositions; the second, that which springs from the very nature of the thing. Thus we say a *ready* entrance, when no one stops the passage; an *easy* entrance, when the passage is large and commodious. For the same reason we say of a woman, without reserve, that she is *ready* of access: and of a shoe that does not pinch that it is *easy*.

It appears to me best to use the word *ready* in naming the action; and that of *easy* in expressing the event of that action. Thus, speaking of a commodious harbour, I should say we have there a *ready* landing; and that it is *easy* to land there.

Of these two adjectives there are formed two adverbs *easily* and *readily*. Which, besides the difference of ideas, remarked in their originals, have one peculiar to themselves, which I should not here omit taking notice of. In speaking then of a sensible person, I should rather say he comprehends *easily*, and pardons *readily*, than that he comprehends *readily*, and pardons *easily*. This choice of words, I must confess, is delicate; but as I can perceive the necessity of it, why should not another do the same?

Flas,

Flat, Insipid.

That which is *flat* does not pierce the taste ; that which is *insipid* does not touch it in the least. Thus the last rises upon the first ; the one wanting only a degree of seasoning ; the other wanting it entirely.

In works of the mind they are both very far from pleasant : but the *flat*, appearing to affect the graces, displeases : the *insipid*, appearing to have no knowledge, tires.

In relation to the beauty of the sex ; I do not think the word *insipid* should be used but with respect to those who are of a disposition wholly insensible : but we say beauty is *flat* when it is not animated, and when it has neither the charms of vivacity nor those of softness.

To Keep, Detain.

We *keep* what we intend not to part with. We *detain* what we propose not to restore.

We *keep* that which is our own. We *detain* that which is another's.

The miser *keeps* his money. The debtor *detains* the property of his creditors.

The honest man finds a difficulty in *keeping* what he possesses, when the rogue finds none in *detaining* what he has taken.

Complicated, Involved.

Affairs or actions are *complicated* one with another by their mixture and mutual dependance. Persons are *involved* in actions or in affairs, when they are far immersed in them.

Things, extremely *complicated*, become obscure to those who have not sufficient understanding or discernment to unfold them. If we are often in company with rash people, we are liable to be *involved* in disagreeable matters.

The

The most *complicated* affairs become simple and easy to be understood in the mouth or in the writings of an able advocate. It is dangerous to be *involved*, even innocently, in the crimes of the great, as at those times we are always the dupe, and are sure to be sacrificed to their interests.

Complicated has a substantive in general use, *involved* has not; but, in return, that has a verb in general use, which the other has not. We hear frequently of *complication*, seldom of *involution*; so again, we meet frequently with the verb to *involve*, seldom with that of to *complicate*.

Nothing embarrasses physicians more than a *complication* of disorders, of which the remedy of one shall oppose the cure of another. It is very disagreeable to have such acquaintance as *involve* us always in their own faults.

For, As to.

However synonymous these may be, *for* seems to me to agree best when speaking of a person or thing which governs the following verb: *As to*, appears to me to be used with most propriety when speaking of that which is governed by the verb. I should say then, *for* my part I will not interfere in such matters as do not concern me; *as to* me all things are indifferent.

The religion of the understanding part of mankind consists in a lively faith, a pure morality, and in a simple conduct, guided by divine authority, and supported by reason. *For* that of the people in general, it consists in a blind credulity, and in exterior practices, authorised by education, and corroborated by the force of custom. *As to* that of those belonging to the church, we can determine nothing concerning it, unless we could detach them from their temporal interests.

Trade,

Trade, Business, Profession.

In the sense in which these words are esteemed synonymous, that of *trade* implies a manual occupation; that of *business* such an occupation as consists only in buying and selling; that of *profession*, such as results from the lucrative use of the sciences. Thus the occupations of a carpenter, taylor, baker, &c. are *trades*; those of a linnen draper, mercer, haberdasher, &c. are *businesses*; those of a physician, counsellor, musician, &c. are *professions*.

In point of rank, *professions* take place of *businesses*; *businesses* of *trades*.

Divination, Prediction.

Divination brings hidden things to light; *prediction* foretells what will come to pass.

The first regards things present and past. The objects of the second are things to come.

A learned and discerning man, one who knows what relation the least outward signs bear to the motions of the soul, readily passes with the world as well-skilled in *divination*. A wise man, one who sees what will be the consequences of certain principles, and the effects of certain causes, may pass with the people as having the knowledge of *prediction*.

To Reprove, Reprimand.

He who *reproves* another, points out his fault and blames him. He who *reprimands*, pretends to punish, and mortifies the offender.

We *reprove* a friend. We *reprimand* a child.

Reprove is seldom used but with respect to the faults of the mind; *reprimand*, with regard to the manners and conduct.

We sometimes *reprove* one who knows better than ourselves. No one has a right to *reprimand* but superiors.

Austere,

Austere, Severe.

We are *austere* by our manner of living; *severe* by our manner of thinking.

Softness is the reverse of *austerity*; it is rare to pass immediately from one to the other; a common regular way of life is the medium between the two. Remissness and *severity* are the two extremes, in one of which we are sure to fall; few persons being able to distinguish the true medium, which consists in an exact and precise knowledge of the law.

We are *austere* only with respect to ourselves; but we may be *severe*, as well with respect to others as ourselves.

Enthusiasts give themselves up to the exercises of *austerity*; this was also once the custom of recluses. Some casuists affect to distinguish themselves by a *severe* morality, extending it even 'till it loses sight of every degree of reason.

An *austere* life consists in the privation of pleasures and conveniences; we sometimes embrace it through a taste of singularity, and would fain have it thought to proceed from a principle of religion. Morals too *severe* may, equally with morals too remiss, wound the regularity of manners.

To Appear, Seem.

I know not how much I may differ from the rest of my countrymen; but the verb *appear*, in my opinion, relates more to the eye; *seem* more to the imagination.

An object always *appears* less the farther it is off. Many things *seem* practicable which cannot be carried into execution.

Fast, Hard.

The sense in which these words are accounted synonymous is that of quick motion; but *fast* denotes

notes quickness without force; *hard*, quickness with violence. Thus to run, ride, or rain *fast*, implies a quicker motion than common; but to run, ride, or rain *hard*, some degree of force or violence.

With respect to work, *fast* means expeditiously; *hard*, laboriously. Thus he who works *fast* will soon have done. He who works *hard* will soon be weary.

Clock, Dial.

These are both time-pieces, with this difference that the *clock* strikes; the *dial* does not. 'Tis for this reason we call that plate which determines time by a shadow in the sun, a *sun-dial*.

The *clock* tells the hour; the *dial* shews it.

Dials were long in use before the invention of *clocks*.

Every, All.

Though the word *every* is more frequently made use of by itself, it is sometimes connected with the word *one*; especially when used as synonymous to *all*. As *all* of us; *every one* of us. These expressions shew that *every* is rather particular, relating more to individuals; and that *all* is rather general, relating to the whole; the word *one*, being added to *every*, specifying that determination.

Every includes always in its idea the word *all*, though *all* does not always include the word *every*; that is, *all* speaks in general only, whereas *every* excepts none.

Every man is undoubtedly bound to assist his neighbour. *All* men are mercenary.

All seems to me to be the plural of *every*; *every* being constantly applied to the singular number; *all* to the plural. Thus we say *every* man, *every* thing, *every* part, &c. but *all* men, *all* things, *all* parts, &c.

Pity,

Pity, Compassion, Commiseration.

I cannot say whether, in the characterising of these words, I may fall in with the opinion of the public; but with respect to the first two, *pity* seems to me to be rather particular, and to be used with most propriety with regard to persons we have some knowledge of; whereas *compassion* is more general, and may be used equally with respect to those we know, as to those we know not.

We are said to *pity* the distresses of a friend; and *compassionate* the misfortunes of a stranger.

Pity seems most applicable to the first emotions we feel at the sight or description of an object in distress, rising from tenderness of heart; *compassion* seems to result from reflection on the unmerited calamities of another, springing from the truest benevolence.

Thus we say, it was through *pity* we were led to *compassionate* his case.

Besides *compassion* may be used with propriety with respect to the brute creation, which *pity* cannot. Thus the killing of a lamb or the beating of a dog will excite the *compassion* of a person of feeling.

Commiseration, in my opinion, implies a fellow-feeling, or the bearing a part in another's woe, and rises from sympathy.

We naturally *commiserate* the sorrows of one we love.

According to this interpretation of the words, we may *pity* and yet not have *compassion*; we may have both *pity* and *compassion*, yet not *commiseration*.

The word *pity*, on some occasions, has been made use of by way of contempt; as I *pity* her pride: but it seems here to be used rather ironically, than to imply in its real signification any degree of scorn.

Slippery, Glib.

Glibness implies a great degree of *slipperiness*; *slipperiness* a small degree of *glibness*.

All ice is *slippery*; but that which is remarkably smooth is *glib*.

The proper and literal definition of *slippery* is, affording no firm hold or footing; that of *glib*, made easy to be moved. In this sense, the first denotes something natural; the last something not so.

An eel is so *slippery* as to be difficult to hold. Wet weather succeeded by a frost makes the ways *slippery*. Oiling the fly of a jack makes it run *glib*.

So, in the figurative sense, speaking of a woman fond of gallantry, we say she is a *slippery* dame. Nothing is of a more *slippery* nature than true happiness, it slides through the fingers even while we think we hold it fast. Strong liquor on different persons has different effects: some it sickens; others it stupifies; of others again it makes the tongue run so *glib* as to be greatly entertaining.

Ridicule, Derision.

Laughter in scorn is the common import of these words; but that of *ridicule* implies contemptuous merriment; that of *derision*, sportive insult.

We *ridicule*, in order to shew another his fault and induce him to amend: We never *deride*, but with the utmost contempt.

A friend will often *ridicule*; none but an enemy *derides*.

If we have done any thing deserving *ridicule*, we should endeavour to retrieve our character, lest we become the *derision* of all who know us.

To Cry, Weep.

Shedding of tears is the general sense in which these words are understood; but to *cry* implies shedding of tears audibly; to *weep* shedding of tears silently.

Children commonly *cry*; grown persons generally *weep*.

'Tis

'Tis not the noise we make that denotes a greater or less measure of grief; for the silent *weeper* may be more distressed than one who *cries* aloud.

Crying is found, by experience, to give greater relief to sorrow than bare *weeping*.

To *Shake*, *Tremble*.

Both these words imply being agitated with a vibratory motion; but as this motion seems to arise from different causes, it renders the choice of them necessary.

Shake appears to me more applicable to a tremulous motion occasioned by cold; *tremble*, to a like motion occasioned by fear.

We *shake* with cold; we *tremble* with fear.

When the blood is chilled we naturally *shake*. The very thought of danger will make the coward *tremble*.

The verb *shake* is often used in the active sense; the verb *tremble* never. Thus we *shake* the house; *shake* a tree; *shake* hands, &c.

Pedigree, *Genealogy*.

Pedigree is our lineal descent from some ancestor, ages back pointed out; *genealogy* is a history of such *pedigree*.

We trace our *pedigree*. We write our *genealogy*.

It is sometimes necessary to examine into our *pedigree*, in order to claim or secure our property in lands. The transmitting of *genealogies* to posterity, though they may be in some respect useful, is a standing mark of the vanity of our ancestors.

Discourse, *Conversation*.

The general import of these words is the mutual intercourse of speech, but that of *discourse* implies serious

serious or set talk upon any particular subject; that of *conversation*, such as is easy and familiar, and not confined to any particular topic.

Discourse is generally formal; *conversation* commonly cheerful.

The attention of men is so much scattered by dissipation, that when together, exclusive of business, they seldom enter into any *discourse* that is improving: but their general *conversation* runs on things in their nature trifling and impertinent.

Impertinent, Impudent, Saucy.

Nothing is more general than the indiscriminate use of these words, though none differ more among themselves: if a man gives rude language, how common is it to say he is an *impertinent*, *impudent*, or *saucy* fellow. One would imagine their peculiar ideas are so well known as to render it unnecessary to take farther notice of them; but as some people never see the stumbling block till they fall over it, it may not be unnecessary to give them a perfect view of it: in order to which I need only define them.

Impertinent then means intruding and meddling with what no way concerns us. *Impudent* implies shamelessness or want of modesty. *Saucy* means insolent and abusive.

To shew a further difference between them, or give any examples of their use, would be needless.

Tongue, Language.

I know not whether in characterising these words I may fall in with the taste of the public; but, according to my opinion, *tongue* seems to agree best with a corrupted *language*; that is, *tongue* appears to be more particular or provincial; *language* more general or national. Thus I would say the vulgar *tongue*; the mother *tongue*; the Yorkshire *tongue*; but the English *language*; the French *language*; the Spanish *language*.

K

That

That of the Indians may be rather called a *tongue* than a *language*; it being neither formal or regular.

The generality of people content themselves with speaking the *tongue* common to the place they are bred up in, without paying any regard to the beauties of their native *language*.

The word *tongue* may be also more elegantly applied when we are speaking of a living *language*; as the French *tongue*; the Spanish *tongue*, &c. *Language*, when we are speaking of such as is dead, and not at present spoken; as the Hebrew *language*; the Greek *language*; the Latin *language*.

Fuddled, Drunk, Intoxicated.

With respect to the first two of these words, *drunk* rises upon that of *fuddled*; *fuddled* implying a less degree of inebriation; *drunk*, a greater. As to the word *intoxicated*, its greatest distinction is, that whereas *fuddled* and *drunk* are seldom used in the figurative sense, *intoxicated* is hardly ever in the literal.

Half a pint of wine will make some men *drunk*, when others shall drink a gallon, without being the least *fuddled*. Good success will sometimes so *intoxicate* a person as to take him off from his business, and render him disagreeable to all his acquaintance.

Bargain, Agreement, Contract.

Bargain is more limited, relating to sale; *agreement* and *contract* are more general, implying any sort of stipulation, with this difference between them, that *agreement* seems to denote a verbal one; *contract*, one that is written.

It is a mark of honesty in dealing never to draw back from a *bargain* once made. Such is the unsteadiness of mankind that we are frequently obliged to enter into *contract* in order to bind them to their *agreement*.

Mine, My own.

Though many are of opinion that the word *own* is added to the possessive pronoun *my*, by way of emphasis, or corroboration only; yet custom seems to have thrown into the idea of the expression *my own* a greater degree of property than into that of the word *mine*. Thus a workman, to whom certain tools have been appropriated by his master for the work he is employed on, might with propriety say these tools are *mine*, though at the same time they are not *his own*, being the property of his master. So again a wife might lay claim to the clothes she wears, and say they are *mine*; though she could not say with propriety that they were *her own*, being in reality the property of her husband. On the other hand, the expression, *my own*, may with elegance be used by the person in whom the sole right of a thing is vested.

Nigh, Near.

I will leave it to the decision of the curious, whether or no the word *near* is not a corruption of *nigher*, the comparative of *nigh*: be this as it may, *near*, in my opinion, implies a less distance than *nigh*. Thus I should say, when we come *nigh* to such a place we shall be *near* home: the *nigher* the enemy, the *nearer* the danger. As a farther proof of this, speaking of the close ties of kindred, we use the word *near* in preference to that of *nigh*, as implying a less distance or greater degree of consanguinity between the two persons. Thus my brother's child is my *near* relation, or is *nearly* related to me.

Efficacious, Effectual.

With respect to these two words, that of *efficacious* seems not so powerful as that of *effectual*.

The first gets the better of most obstacles; the last of all.

By an *efficacious* remedy we put an *effectual* stop.

Width, Wideness.

Width seems more applicable to things small in themselves; *wideness* to those which are large. Thus we say the *width* of paper; the *width* of cloth; but the *wideness* of a ditch; the *wideness* of a field.

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